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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis, as its title indicates, is to
investigate the differences between az-Zamakhsharl (d. 1144
A.D.) and al-Baydawl (d. 1286 A.D.?) in respect of Muslim
theological doctrines and the extent which al-BaydciwT
manages to refute az-Zamakhsharl•s views.
The significance of az-Zaraakhshari and al-BaydawT. in
Muslim theology is that their works al-Kashshaf and
Anwar at-TanzH respectively, represent the views of the two
famous schools of Islamic thoughts called the Mu4tazilites
and the Ash'arites.
Az-Zamakhsharl as a Mu'tazilite, gave Reason priority
to Revelation. Al-Baydawi as an Ash'arite maintained that
Revelation is prior to Reason.
Chapter one describes the historical backgrounds of
the two scholars and the different environments in which
they were brought up.
Chapter two illustrates how the two scholars discuss
the concept of the attributes of God, in particular the
visibility of God and the speech of God.
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Chapter three considers the relation of Reason and
Revelation in az-Zamakhshari and al-Bayd&wi. Topics
discussed include the question whether God always does
"the best", the question of good and evil, the question
whether angels or prophets are superior, the nature of
the karamat (miracles) of the saints, and God's giving of
sustenance.
Chapter four deals with a number of topics concerning
faith (iman), unbelief (kufr)t repentance (tawba), and
Muhammad's intercession (shafa'a).
Chapter five discusses the concept of God's justice
and the associated question of man's free will.
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CHAPTER ONE
PART ONE
THE LIFE OF AZ-ZAMAKHSHARX
His full name was Mahmud b. •Umar b. Ahmad, his Kunya
was AbH-1-Qasim, and his laqab "Jar-Allah" (the neighbour
of God) indicating his sojourn in Mecca. The nisba
az-Zamakhsharl is derived from the small town in Khwarizm
called "Zamakhshar"He was born there on 27th Rajab 467
(March 18, 1075).2
Az-ZamakhsharT was born during the rule of Malik Shah
as-Saljuql and his famous vizier Nizam-al-Mulk. Nizam al-
Mulk was a religious and scholarly person, who loved all
branches of knowledge, was always accompanied by jurists;
3
he established many institutions for higher learning.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Khwarizm became the
centre of learning for many centuries.
1. YaqHt, Irshad. vol. VII, p. 147;
Ta'rlkh AbT-l-Fida, vol. Ill, p. 16.
2. Ibn-Khallikan, Wafayat. vol. II, p. 83;
Ibn-al-Qiftl, Inbar, vol. Ill, p. 265;
as-SuyHtl, Bughya, II, p. 279.
3. cf. Ibn-al-Athlr, al-Kamil. vol. X, p. l4l.
His family background
There are very scanty materials telling us about
az-ZamakhsharT*s family background, but one can deduce
from his poems that his parents were very pious and
az-ZamakhsharT states that the piety of his parents was
very well known among the people of Khwarizm; his father
fasted during the day and got up during the night for
* ibULda, while his mother had subtle feelings, full of
hospitality even towards the animals. One day,
az-ZamakhsharT caught a bird and fastened it with a thread
as a result, the foot of the bird was cut off due to the
pressure of the thread. His mother was very depressed,
and said that God would cut her son's foot as he had cut
2
the foot of the bird. Az-ZamakhsharT seems to have been
impressed by his mother's remark and eventually the same
event happened to him. When asked what happened to his
foot, he frequently replied that it was the benediction
O
(baraka) of his mother's invocation.
Az-ZamakhsharT also tells us that his father was
imprisoned by Mu'ayyid-al-Mulk (d. kyk). He made a
1. PIwan, ff, 85a, 72b.
2. Wafayat, II, 82.
3. Ibid, Irshad, VII, 1^7.
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strenuous effort in order to release his father, but it
proved to be unsuccessful. Eventually his father died in
the prison while he was still young. This, however, was
indicated by az-ZamakhsharT through his poem.*
Az-ZamakhsharT mentions nothing about the reason for his
fathers imprisonment. It is rather difficult to presume
whether it.was related to politics or not. However, the
death of his father, of course, affected his life,
2
especially at the time he was away.
Az-Zamakhsharl's education
Owing to the good background of his family,
az-Zamakhshari had the opportunity of pursuing knowledge.
His preliminary education, like others, generally, started
in his home town Zamakhshar. At least he learnt how to
recite the Qur'an. For further education, he travelled
3
to Bukhara while he was very young. His travelling to
Bukhara is due to the fact that Bukhara was the main
centre of learning of the century, attended by many
celebrated scholars who were specialists in various
4
fields of knowledge.
1. Piwan, fol. 97a«
2. Ibid, fol. 72b.
3. Wafayat. II, 82.
4. Ath-Tha'alabl, YatTmat ad-Dahr, IV, 101.
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His teachers
Az-Zamakhsharl, like other eminent scholars, has had
many teachers. Perhaps the most outstanding figure who
managed to influence az-Zaraakhsharl was Abu-Mudar Mahmud
b. Jarlr ad-Dabbl al-IsfahanX (d. 507) who was well versed
in Arabic grammar and literature. It was he who introduced
the Mu4tazilite doctrine to the people of Khwarizm. Owing
to his having the science of knowledge, he was called
"the unique of his time" (wahld 4asri-hi).^ Az-Zamakhsharl's
relationship with his teacher Abu-Mudar was very close.
He did not only impart his knowledge to az-Zamakhsharl,
2
but supported him financially. It is natural that
az-Zamakhsharl's eagerness for knowledge and his teacher's
sponsorship, one way or another developed their relationship,
and az-Zamakhsharl confesses that he was greatly indebted
3
to his teacher Abu-Mudar.
Az-Zamakhsharl's teachers in the tradition (hadlth)
4
are Abti-MansTir Nasr al-Harithl, Abu-Sa4d ash-Shafani
and Abu-al-Khitab b. Abll-al-Batr.
1. Irshad. VI, 145 ; Bughya. II, 279.
2. PIwan, fol. 91a.
3. Ibid, ff. 64a, 57a.
4. Irshad, VII, 147; Bughya, II, 279;
Al-Hufl, Ahmad Muhammad, Az-Zamakhsharl, p. 49.
5. As-Suyhtl, Tabaqat al-Mufassirln, p. 4l.
A
Az-ZamakhsharX studied literature under Abu-4A1X
al-Hasan b. al-Muzfir al-Naysabtirl While in Baghdad,
he studied some books of linguistics tinder Abu-MansTir
Mawhtib b. Abft-Tahir Ahmad al-JawaliqX (d. 539) who was
well versed in literature, and therefore was considered
O
as one of the prides of Baghdad (min mafakhir Baghdad),
The meetings between az-ZamakhsharX and Abu-Mansur al-
JawaliqX, was described by Ibn-al-QiftX in which he states
that he himself saw az-ZamakhsharX twice studying some
books of linguistics under Abti-Mansur al-JawaliqX in the
U
year 533 A.H. in order to obtain Ijaza. It is said that
he met the Hanafite jurist Abu-*Abd-Allah Muhammad b.
5*A1X ad-DamighX and he was warmly welcomed by a celebrated
scholar called Hibat-Allah b. 4A1X Abu-as-Sa4ada known as
Ibn-ash-ShajarX.^ While in Mecca, az—ZamakhsharX studied
7
Kitab SXbawayh under 4Abd-Allah b. Talha al-YabirX (d. 518).
The students of az-ZamakhsharX
The fame of az-ZamakhsharX spread out almost all over
the world of Islam during his time onwards. Wherever he
1. Irshad, IV, 147; Bughya , II, 279
2. Ibn-al-QiftX, Inbact, III. 270.
3. Wafayat, II, l42 .
4. Ibn-al-QiftX, Inbafc, III, 270.
5. Wafayat, II, 83.
6. Ibid, Nuzhat al-Alibba*, P. 23;
.
7. Bughya, II, 46.
Irshad, VII, l48.
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visited, he was always met by many people studying or
discussing the branches of knowledge."'" Of course, a
great scholar like az-ZamakhsharX must have had many
students studying under him. Now we shall try to give
a list of the names of his students as follows:
I In Zamakhshar, Abu-MJmar 4Amir b. al-Hasan as-Sammar.
He is also said to be a cousin to az-ZamakhsharX.
II In Tabarstan, Abti-l-Mahasin Isma'Xl b. 4Abd-All'Sh• a ' •
at-TawXIX.
• •
III In Ibyurd, Abu-l-Mahasin 4Abd-ar-RahXm b. 4Abd-
Allah al-Bazzaz.
IV In Samarqand, Abu-Sa'd Ahmad b. Mahraud ash-ShatX
and others.^
V In Khwarizm, Abu-Tahir Saman b. 4Abd-al-Malik7 •
al-FaqXh, al-Muwaffaq b. Ahmad b. AbX-Sa4Xd who
was known as the best speaker in Khwarizm. He
could speak Arabic fluently and was knowledgeable in
3
jurisprudence and literature. Also among them is
1. Inbat. Ill, 266 ff.
2* Al-Insah, p. 2?8j al-HufX, Ahmad Muhammad,
az-ZamakhsharX. pp. 52-3.
3. Al-Insab, p. 278.
♦All b. Muhammad al-'Amrani al-Khwarizml Abtl-1-
Hasan; a lettered man. He is best known with the
"proof of the eminentp" (hujjat al-afadil), and the
"pride of the teachers" (fakhr al-mashayikh) (d. 560
A.H.) He studied literature under az-Zamakhsharl,^
VI Muhammad b. AbTl-1-QSsim Bayjuk, Abb-al-Padl
al-Yaqall al-Khwarizml al-Adaml, known as the
"decoration of the teachers" (zayn al-mashayikh).
He studied Arabic language and the science of
2
syntax under az-Zamakhsharl.
VII Abli-YTisuf b. 'All b. Muhammad b. Ja'far al-Balkhl.
He studied Arabic grammar and literature under
3
az-Zamakhsharl.
VIII Abti-l-Hasan 'All b. 'Isa b. Hamza b. Wahhas,
Amir of Mecca. It was he who encouraged
az-Zamakhsharl to write al-Kashshaf.
IX Zaynab bint ash-Sha'rl who conferred Ijciza to
Ibn-Khal 1 ikan.
1. Irshad. V, 412 ; Bughya, II, 195.
2. Irshad. VII, 77.
3. Irshad. VII, 30k.
4. Ibid, vol. V, p. 288, III, 268.
5. Wafayat. II, 83.
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The journeys of az-Zamakhsharl
As previously stated, az-Zamakhsharl's first journey
took place when he was very young; it was probably after
finishing his preliminary education in his home town
Zamakhshar. He travelled to Bukhara for higher learning,^
because Bukhara at that time was well known as a centre
of higher learning and intellectual gatherings since the
Samanids came to power in 204 A.H.
After studying various branches of knowledge,
az-Zamakhsharl returned to KhwS.rizm. Perhaps his return
was also due to the death of his father, under the reign
of Mu'ayyid ad-Dawla (d. 494). Az-Zamakhsharl seems to
3
have been away at the time of his death.
From the beginning, az-Zamakhshari was very ambitious,
- not only in pursuing knowledge but also for the high post
(mansab) in the governmental office. His self-confidence
of his knowledge and his desire for the post caused him
one way or another to approach the vizier Nizam-al-Mulk
(d. 1092) under the Sultan Malik Shah. Az-Zamakhshari
praised Nizl?Lm-al-Mulk and complained about the situation
1. Wafay£t, II, 82.
2. Yatlmat ad-Dahr, p. 101.
3. PIwan, fol. 72b.
in the governmental office in which there were less
capable officials who were admitted to the office.
Az-Zamakhshari thought that he was capable enough to be
given the high post.* Unfortunately his complaint was not
heard even when he was introduced to Nizam al-Mulk by his
2
beloved teacher AbU-Mudar.
A question arises, what is the reason for his
"unsuccessfulness" in achieving the post while he was well
qualified? Was it because of his Mu'tazilite view? This
does not seem to be possible, since az-Zamakhsharl himself
states that his teacher Abu-Mudar had a close relationship
3with Nizam-al-Mulk and informed him about az-Zamakhsharl's
4
brilliancy. Another alternative perhaps is due to the
fact that az-Zamakhsharl was so proud of being the most
learned scholar in various branches of knowledge while
others were not. Whatever the reason was, his desire to
obtain the important governmental post in Khwarizm was
futile. There seemed to be no way of removing his
frustration other than to leave the country, then he
5
decided to travel to Khurasan.
1. Ibid, ff. 95a, 95b.
2. Ibid, fol. 104a.
3. Ibid
4. Ibid, fol. 94a.
5. Ibid, fol. 37b.
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Vhlle he was in Khurasln, he was close to several
government officials and praised them; such as Mujlr
ad-Dawla Abu-l-Fath 'All b. al-Husayn al-Ardastan!,* and
Mu'ayyid-al-Mulk 'Ubayd-Allah b. Nizam-al-Mulk.^
After all his efforts to obtain the governmental post
in Khurasan failed, he went to Isfahan, the capital city
of the Saljuq. Isfahan at that time was under the rule
of Muhammad b. Abl-l-Fath Malik Shah (d. 1092).
Az-Zamakhshar! praised him and his successor Mu'izz.-ad-
3
Din Sanj ar.
It was in 512 A.H. that az-Zamakhsharl suffered a
serious illness (nilhika) and mundhira (warning). As the
result he made a vow, not to approach any government
officials, nor to offer his service to them. Instead, he
promised himself to devote all his lifetime to writing
k
and teaching.
After his recovery from the illness, he went to
Baghdad to see many scholars."*
1, Ibid, fol. 23b.
2, Ibid, fol, 97a.
3, Diwan, fol, 20a.
k, Maqamfl, p. 6
5. Ta'rlkh Abi-l-Fida, III, 16.
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Having met these scholars, he travelled to Mecca,
hoping that God would forgive his sins and decided to stay
there.^ It was there that he was welcomed by the great
2
man of the city called AbG-l-Hasan •All b. Hamza b. Wahhas,
p 0 e
C*~<A in^v-i, a az-Zamakhshari praised him describing his love and
3
indebtedness to him. During his two years stay in Mecca,
he visited Hamadan in Yemen and praised the family of the
vizier.**
After staying about two years in Mecca, he was affected
by the memory of his home town and then decided to leave
5
Mecca for Zamakhshar. It was there in Khwarizm, the desire
for high post again influenced him. In order to obtain the
post he praised Muhammad b. Anushtakin known as Khwarizm
6 7
Shah and afterwards his son Atsiz (d. 55l). It is probable
that az-Zamakhsharl's praise helped him to obtain some gifts
g
even if he was not very satisfactory. Later on he decided to
1. PIwan, ff. 42a, 42b.
2. Ibid:
3. Ibid, 27a, 7^a; al-Kashshaf, I, 3.
4. Dxwan, fol. 111b;
az-Zamakhsharl, Asas al-Balagha, I, 78.
5. Divan. fol. 5a.
6. Ibid, ff. 107a, 107b.
7. Muqaddimat al-Adab, I, 2.
8. Divan, ff. 4la, 4lb.
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travel to Mecca for the second tirae.^" Perhaps his journey-
to Mecca this time was due to the conflict of the soul in
which he thought that it could be solved by staying in
2
Mecca. On his way to Mecca, he passed through Syria for
a while and praised Taj-al-Multik (The Crown of the Kings)
TughtakTn (d. 526), the ruler of Damascus, and his son
4
called Shams-al-Mulk, after his father's death.
Presumably, at this time, az-ZamakhsharT's praise was not
for the purpose of obtaining any reward, but it was full
of sincerity. <
Az-Zamakhsharl•s second stay in Mecca took place in
526 A.H. for a period of three years. It was at this time
that he wrote his Tafsxr, receiving great hospitality and
5
honour from Ibn-Wahhas.
Having stayed there about three years, he returned
again to his home town for the second time, and lived
there until his death.^
1. Ibid, fol. 4la.
2. Ibid
3. Ibid, fol. 4la.
4. Ibid.
5. PIwan, ff. 79b, 80a.
6. Vafayat. II, 83.
-13-
The Mu*tazilite influence In Khw5.rj.zin ,
The coming of the Buwayhids to power in 320 A.H.f
started the open door policy of welcoming indiscriminately
Shi'ites or Mu'tazilites of different shades of opinion,
even if the}' themselves were politically Twelvers.^" The
traditional Shi*ite festivals such as Ghadlr Khum etc.
were introduced into their territories. The vizier known
as as-Sahib ibn-*Abbad (d. 995 B.C.) under Mu'ayyid-ad-
Dawla and Fakhr-ad-Pawla is said to have had Mu'tazilite
leanings by--reeaag=x>jf -granting high posts in the
3
governmental office.
As a result, it is not surprising that the majority
of the Shi'ite jurists were theologically Mu'tazilites
k
and the quarrel among the masses frequently took place.
In general Khwarizm was dominated by the Mu'tazilite
views; it is very difficult to find someone who is not
Mu*tazilite. If he is not a Mu'tazilite, the only way to
lot people know about his stand is to deny that he is a
5
Mu*tazilite, other-wise he xvill be included among them.
1. C. Collin Davies, "Buwayhid? in EI2, p. 1352.
IrshSd, II, 274; cf. The Islamic Dynasties, p. 96.
3« Irshad, II, 274-76; cf. The Majesty that was Islam
p. 218.
4. Ahsanti at-Taqasim, pp. 395, 396-439.
5 * Irshad, VI, 155.
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This shows that in general the people of Khwarizm are
Mu4tazilite. It was in this environment that az-ZamakhsharX
was brought up and finally became a distinguished scholar
of the Mu4tazilites. The unique scholar of that time
known as AbU-Mudar Mahmud b. Jarlr ad-Dabbl (d. 507 A.H.)
is said to have introduced into Khwarizm the Mu'tazilite
views and later on took an initiative part in the
propagation of their views. As a result, he was met by
many people and they were attracted to his views.Of
course, az-Zamakhsharl, besides being greatly influenced
by his teacher Abu-Mudar, was also interested in using
2
reason as a criterion in contemplation and discussion.
Therefore, his teacher's view is always consistent with
his reasoning. It is not surprising that his relation
with his teacher Abu-Mudar was very close. The fact that
az-Zamakhsharl liked to be called Mu4tazilite is obvious.
That happened when he visited his friend and was asked
who was standing at the door? He quickly replied it was
3




Irshad. VII, 145. Bughya. II, 276.
Atwaq adh—Dhahab, p. 46.
Wafayat. II, 82.
-15-
The reasons for his writing al-Kashshaf
It was during his second stay in Mecca that he began
writing al-Kashshaf. That was in the year 526 A.H. It
took almost two years for him to complete it,*" since he
states that he finished writing al-Kashshaf on Monday
23rd RabT* „ftl-Awwal, 528 A.H.2
In his introduction to al-Kashshaf (p.3), az-Zamakhsharl
states that the idea of writing al-Kashshaf was originally
motivated by the great need of the Mu'tazilites in Mecca
for a Qur'anic exegesis which explained the Qur'an in
accordance with their Mu'tazilite views. They found
az-Zamakhshari's explanation interesting and they
suggested that he should write the Qur'anic exegesis and
call it al-Kashshaf (The Unveiler). Az-Zamakhshari was
not happy with their suggestion and begged to be excused,
but they insisted that he should carry out the task, and
finally he accepted. Perhaps their insistence is not the
main reason for az-Zamakhshari1s later decision, since he
considered it afterwards as obligatory (fard'ayn) upon
1. Al-Kashshaf. I, 3. cf. Al-JuwaynT, Mustafa as-Sawi,
Minhaj az-Zamakhshari fl Tafsir al-Qur'an, p. 76,
in which he mistakenly states that the period of
az-Zamakhshari1s writing al-Kashshaf is three years.
2. Al-Kashshaf. II, 570.
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him to fulfil it. This, however, is due to the fact that
az-Zamakhsharl himself was fully aware about the real
situation at that time and the less capable of the people
of Mecca intellectually. His old age did not prevent him
from carrying out the task since he was mainly motivated
by his religious consciousness. Of course, besides this,
he was encouraged by Ibn-Wahhas, the Amir of Mecca who
welcomed him and offered him many facilities in completing
his tafslr.^ It appears that az-Zamakhsharl's completion
of writing al-Kashshaf in the period of two years was
unexpected, because he himself estimated that he should
be able to finish it only in more than thirty years.
Finally, az-Zamakhsharl confesses that his "success"
is due to the baraka (benediction) of the Holy Shrine
(Ka'ba).2
The death of az-Zamakhshari
Az-Zamakhshari, after spending many years in different
places in the world of Islam, returned to his home town
Zamakhshar, and lived there until his death in 537 A.H. /
3
1144 A.D. He was buried at a place called Jurjaniyya.
1. Ibid, I, 3.
2. Ibid
3. Vafayat. II, 83.
'
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The works of az-Zamakhsharl
The works of az-Zamakhsharl. can be divided into those
that have survived, and those that are missing. Of those
WVCIAA \ s
that survive the following o&u) be sadrd,
1. Al-Kashshaf 'an Haqa'iq Ghawamid at-Tanzll wa ' Uyhn
~
I I I 1
al-Aqawil fi Wujhh at-Ta'wil
This has been considered as the most important
work of az-Zamakhsharl, completed in 528 (1138). In
spite of its Mu'tazilite view it was widely read and
commented upon in orthodox circles. The most famous
orthodox comment ator was al-Baydaw! tried
to surpass him in the accuracy of the grammatical
2
explanation and in quoting variant readings. It
was published for the first time by ¥« Nassau Lees
and the Mawlawis Khadin Husayn and 'Abd-al-Hayy,
Culcutta, 1856. Latex" it was published in Cairo,
1307, 1308, 1318 and 1948 in Beirut (4 vols.) n.d.
Besides all these, there are sub-commentaries on the
3
work.
!• Wafayat, II, 81.
2. Brockelmann " al-Zamakhsharl" in EI"*". iv, 1205.
3. GAL, I, 3^5.
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1
Kitab al-Unmudhaj fl an-Nahw
A book on Arabic grammar autographed by
Broch, Christiania, 1867, printed in Tehran, 1269,
2
Tabris, 1275, Cairo, 1289, Istanbul, 1299»
3
Asas al-Balagha
This work was printed in Cairo, 1299,
4
Lucknow, 1311, Cairo, 1972.
Kitclb al-Amkina wa 1-Jibal wa-l-Miyah
This work was published by M. Salverda De Grave
(Auspice T.G. Juynboll), Leiden, 1859,"'
Kitab al-Mufrad wa 1-Mu'allaf fi an-Nahw^
It was published by Mubarak in Istanbul, 1300,
7
Cairo, 1324, 1328, Damascus, 1966 by 4Abd al-Mu4In
al-Maluhl.
8
Al-Mustaqsa fl Amthai al-'Arab
It was printed in Hyderabad by Majlis Da'irat






Ibn-Qutlubugha, Taj at-Tarajim, p. 71*
Majalla Majma' al-'Ilm al-'Iraqi, vol. XV, p. 100.
Wafayat, II, 81.
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it was made by Ibrahim al-Gallipoli with Persian
commentary and Turkish glosses under the title
Zubdah al-Amthal.
7. Al-Muhajat wa Mutammim MaharnmArbab al-Hajat fl-1-
-
Ahajx wa 1-Ghaz.
This work was edited by Dr. Bahljah al-Hasanl
and published by Baghdad University in 1973.
, 3
8 . Mas' ala fl Kalimal ash- Shahada
This work was also edited by Dr. Bahijah
al-Hasanl and published by Majma' al-'Ilm al-'Iraqi,
vol. XV, p. 121 in 1967.
4
9• Rabi' al-Abrar
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Cambridge
e
University in 1963 by Dr. Bahijah al-Hasani.
10. Sharh Abyat Kitab Sibawayh^
This work is still in manuscript form in
Ahmad 3, Istanbul. The work is being edited by
7
Dr.'*Abd-Allah Darwlsh.
1. GAL, I, 3^8.
2- Irshad. VII, 151; cf. Vafayat. II, 81; GAL. I, 3^7.
3* Ma.1alia Majma' al-*Ilm al->Iraqi, XV, 121, Baghdad, 1967
4. Taj at-Tarajim. p. 71; cf. Wafayat. II, 81.
5. Paterson, Index to Thesis, vol. XV, p. 23.
6. Wafayat, II, 81.
7. Majalla Majma* al-'Ilm al-'Iraqi, XV, 91.
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a.
11. Nukt al-I4rab f"I GharTb al-I4rab




This work is still in its manuscript form,
preserved in DUr al-Kutub al-Misriyya, no. 529
(adab). The MS consists of 120 folios, in clear
writing.
3
13• Kitab Nuzhat al-Muta'annis wa Nuzhat al-Muqtabis
It remains in manuscript form preserved in the
Aya Sofia, no. 4331.**
14. Al-Minhaj fl-l-Usul5
This work is preserved in Landh.^
15. Al-Kashf fl-l-Qira'at7
This work is preserved in Maktaba Ribat Sayyid
* Uthman
1. Ibid, XV, p. 94.
2. Wafayat. II, 81
3. GAL, I, 350
4. Ibid.
5. Vafayat. II, 81.
6. GAL, supp. I, 513•




16. Ru*us al-Masa*11 fi-l-Fiqh
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis recently submitted to
St. Andrews University (1977) by *Abd-al-Hallm Muhammad.
17• Al-Dur»r ad-Da1 ir al-Muntakhab fl Klnayat wa Isti'Srat
2
wa TashbThat al-'Arab.
This work was edited by Dr. Bahljah al-Hasanl,
and printed in Baghdad in 1968.
4
18. Al-Qistas al-Mustaqlm f"T *Ilm al-4Artid
It was edited by Dr. Bahljah al-HasanT and
published in Baghdad by Maktabat al-Andalus, in 1969.
19. Atwaq adh-Dhahab fl-l-Mawa4iz
This work was translated by H.L. Fleischer,
Leipzig 1835» by G. Weil, Stuttgart I863,
translated and edited by C. Barbier de Meynard,
Paris 1876, printed in Beirut in 1293, 1322, 1314,
Istanbul with Turkish translation in 1286,
Cairo 1321 with commentary Qala'id al-Adab by
Mirzs YXisuf Khan Asir,"* 1328 by Matba4at as-Sa4ada,
1. Vafayat. II, 81.
2. GAL, Supp. I, 511.
3. Ma.lalla Ma.jma4 al-4Ilm al-4 Iraqi. XVI, 1968.
4. Wafayat, II, 81.
5. GAL, I, 349.
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1910, with commentary by Muhammad Sa4ld ar-Rafighl.
20. Khaaa' is al-'Ashara al-Kiram al-Barara^
• •
This work was edited by Dr. BahTjah al-Hasanl,
and published in Baghdad in 19^9•
21. Nawabigh al-Kalim^
This work was edited and illustrated by
H.A. Schultens, Leiden 1772, Cairo 1287, 1305,
Beirut 1306,"^ and Cairo 1960-1961.
4
22. Muqaddimaval-Adab
The above work was edited by J.G. Sipaphansslar
and published in Leipzig 1844,"* Tehran 1342, 19^3-
1965.
23• A4jab al-4Ujub Sharh Lamiyyat al-4Arab^
It was published with a commentary by Mubarak
7
in Istanbul 1300, Cairo 1324, 1328. Damascus in 1966.
1. GAL. I, 348.
2. Al-Kashshaf, I, 297; Irshad. VII, 151.
3. GAL, I, 348.
4. Vafayat. II, 81.
5. GAL, I, 348.
6. Irshad. VII, 151.
7. Brockelmann, "al-Zamakhsharl" in EI^. vol. IV, p. 1206.
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2k. Al-Fa'iq fl Gharlb al-HadTth1
2
This work was published in Hyderabad in 132^,
Cairo in 19^5-^8 by Dar Ihya* al-Kutub al-4Arabiyya.




It was published in Cairo in 1313» 1325»
translated by 0. Rescher, Beitrage Zur Magaraen-
literatur, Fasc. 6, Greifswald 1913- This work
li
is also under the name an-NasjS.' ih al-Kibar.
e
26. Mukhtasar al-Muwafaqa bayna Ahl al-bayt wa as-Sahaba
This work is still in its manuscript form
preserved in the Library of Ahmad Timor.^
27 • Masa' il al-Ghazall^
8
This work is still preserved in Berlin.
1. Irshad. VII, 150; cf., Wafayat. II, 81.
2. GAL. I, 3^8.
3. Irshad. VII, 151.
k. Vafayat. II, 81.
5. Irshad. VII, 151.
6. Brockelmann, "al-Zamakhsharl" in EI^, vol. IV, 1207.





It is also preserved in Berlin.^"
29. Al-Mufassal^
• •
This work was published by J.B. Broch, Christiania
in 1859, 1879, in Cairo 1325, 1905, Alexandria in 1291,
Delhi in 1891 by Mawlawi Muhammad Ya'qub RasbtirT,
Paris 1876, Lugduni Batavorun 1772.
30. Sharh. al-Maqamat
This work was published on the margin of
3
al-Maqamat, Cairo, 1325.





2 . Kitab al-A.jnas^
3 . Piwan at-Tamthl.1^
1. GAL. I, 350
2. Ibid, I, 347.
3. Brockelmann, "al-Zaraakhsharl" EI^. vol. IV, p. 1207.
4. Irshad. VII, 151.
5. Ibid.










Kitab Mutashabih Asma' ar-Ruwat^
Dallas an-Nashid''

















Ibid., cf., Vafayat. II, 81.
Irshad, VII, 151.










20. HSshiya *Ala al-Mufassal5
1. Irshad. VII, 151.
2. Ibid., cf., Vafayat, II, 81.
3• Ibid.
4. Ibid.




His full name was AbTi-Sa4ld 4Abd-Allah b. 'Umar b.
Muhammad b. 4All Abu-l-Khayr Nasir-ad-Dln. His birth
place was al-Bayda', situated in the province of Fars,
2
north of its capital called Shiraz.
1. This honorific title (kunya) "Abu-Sa4ldM is what
al-BaydawI calls himself in the preface to the
Nizam at-Tawarikh. Hgijjl Khalifa styles him Nasir-ad-Dln
Abu-Sa4ld 4Abd-Allah b. 'Umar al-Baydawl. Ahmad ar-
Razl in his Haft al-Iqllm calls him Qadl Nasir-ad-Dln
b. Qadl Imam Badr-ad-Dln 4Umar b. Fakhr-ad-Dln 4All.
2. As-Subkl, Tabaqat, V, 59» Isnawi, Tabaqat, I, 283-^;
as-Suytitl, Bughya, II, 50; Hamd-Allah Mustawfl,
Tarlkh Guzidah, 811; al-Yafi4l, Mir'at al-Janan,
IV, 220; Khwand-Amlr, Hablb as-Siyar, III, 13^;
Ahmad ar-Razl, Haft al-Iqlxm. I, 176; Ibn al4Imad,
Shadharat adh-Dhahab. V, 392-3; Hajjl Khalifa,
Kashf az-ZunUn, I, 186-7; cf., Anon Br. Mus. MS.,
• • 1
fol. 201a.
Ibn-Zarktib Shlrazl, Shiraz-Namah, 136;
Broekelmann, GAL, I, 530.
Khuda-Baksh Khan, Mahbub al-Albab, 11.
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_ v\a<*NC'
Al-Baydawx, by whichA4Abd-Allah, b. 'Uraar is well
known, is derived from the small town of al-Bayda'.
Unfortunately, sources do not tell us the year of his
birth. Judging from the fact that in 67k A.H., he had
compiled a book called "Nizam at-Tawarxkh", and about the
same year that he had held the office of Chief Justice of
Pars, it can be presumed that he was born during the reign
of the Atabak Abu-Bakr b. Sa'd I (628/1231 - 658/1260).
It was at this time that the province of Pars as a whole
was at the height of its glory.
During his reign, Atabak Abu-Bakr geared his great
effort towards developing his country by the setting up of
hospitals, and many religious institutions for higher
studies with facilities for those who were thirsty for
knowledge in which capacity Shxraz flourished as the
centre of learning.^ Thus, it is not surprising that
2
many scholars had recourse to it.
His' rule over the country was a prosperous one, and
1. Mirkhond, The History of Atabak, p. 3^»
Tabaqat Nasiri, pp. 179-180.
2. cf. MaqrxzT, Kitab as-SulBk. vol. I, part III, p. 733.
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his sagacity well known. For this, the great poet,
Shaykh Sa'dT'*' Shxrazi (d. 1292 A.D.) dedicated to him
some beautiful verses in the preface to the Gulistan,
describing the city of Shlraz as one of the most populous
on earth under the rule of the Atabak, while the
surrounding districts were suffering from an uprising of
savage Turks.
The population of Fars were Sunnites of the Shafi'ite
rite although a few were Hanafites and there were also
2
Shi'ites. Even though the Iranian Sunnism was chiefly
Shafi'ites and Hanafites, these two schools were not often
3
on good terms; similar reasons held between the Shafi'ites
and the Shi'ites. Thus it was not surprising that
al-BaydawT who was a Shafi'ite Ash'arite, bitterly attacked
the Shi'ites and the Mu'tazilites.
His family
Al-Baydawi was brought up into a prominent family
about which we know little. At least we know that his
family was renowned for its scholarship. His father
•Umar, held the office of Chief Justice of Fars. His
1. The Gulistan, tr. by Edward B. Eastwick, p. 11.
2. Hamd-Allah Mustawfx, Nuzhat al-Qulub (English
translation, p. 113«
3. A. Bausani, "Religion in the Saljuq Period" in
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ancestor 4All, was also appointed to the office of
Judgeship. According to the account given by Ibn-Zarkub
Shirazi, al-Baydawi's father was appointed Chief Justice
of Fars by the viceroy of Iraq-i 'Arab and Pars called
— 2
Noyan Suqunchaq, who was working under Abaqa Khan (663-
683 A.H.). This appointment took place when he visited
Fars in 670 A.H. Moreover, Ibn-Zarkub Shlrazi states that
3the appointment received a very warm welcome. Therefore,
4
the account given by Brockelmann that 'Uraar was appointed
Chief Justice under the Atabak Abu-Bakr b. Sa4d I, does
not seem to be correct.
'Umar appears to have won reputation for his
5
resolution, perfection and devoutness which possibly
influenced his son al-Baydawi.
Unfortunately, sources do not make any mention of
the family's economic situation. However, it can be
presumed that it was comparitively wealthy, for the position
of Chief Justice which some of its members held, was a
profitable career. As W.M. Watt said,** "Fewer of the
1. Shlraz-Namah, p. 65.
A. .•
2. Descendent of Qubil^y's brother Hulegu, who ruled Persia
from 654/1256 - 75V1353. He (Abaqa) was the second.
3 . Shi r a.z-Namah, p. 65.
4. GAL, I, p. 530.
5. Shlraz-Namah, p. 136.
6. Muslim Intellectual, p. 109.
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scholar jurist could afford to fulfil such duties without
resftuiBe rat ion. " *
'Umar died in 673 A.H., and v/as buried in Maghribl
school in Shlraz.^"
Al-Baydawl*s education
No dates are recorded for al-Baydawi1s education
2
except that the biographer al-Yafi4l (d. 768 A.H.) tells
us that al-Baydawl studied under his father, who was a
student with Mujlr-ad-DIn Mahinud b. Abl-al-Mubarak al-
Baghdadl ash-Shafi'l, who v/as a student with Mu'ln-ad-Din
Abl-Sa'ld Manpur b. 'Umar al-Baghdadi, and the latter was
a student with "the proof of Islam" Abu-Ilamid al-GhazalT.
After the foundation of his education had been laid
down by his father, who was a Shafi4ite-Ash4arite scholar,
it is not surprising that al-Baydawi became a Shafi'ite
and strongly defended Snaxi'ite in
jurisprudence and Ash4 arite in theology1-.
As his father was a scholar, he was normally visited
1.
2 .
Shiraz-Namah, p e 13 6.
M -t r* at al -Janan, IV. 220,
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by the scholars of the districts problems and disputes
concerning religion and law were considered and argued
about, and helped enrich al-Baydawi's education.
Presumably, there were many other teachers who were
responsible for laying the foundation of his education,
besides his father, because al-Baydawi did not only pursue
Islamic sciences, but he also pursued such scientific
studies as logic and metaphysics. If al-Baydawi had only
received education from his father, he would not have
achieved the distinction he did. It is not easy to find
a person, like him, who has gained such distinction in a
particular craft, and at the same time, has mastered
another.1
His occupation
It was traditional that the sons of scholars would
follow in the footsteps of their fathers. Al-Baydawi,
like his father, held the office of Chief Justice of Fars.
2
According to a statement given by Ibn-Zarkub Shirazi
(d. after 7^8), al-Bayd3wi was appointed Chief Justice of
Fars after his father's death (d. 673 A.H.).
1.
2




As a matter of fact, to be appointed to the office of
Chief Justice requires a very wide knowledge of Islamic
sciences, especially jurisprudence, and sometimes, it also
needs considerable understanding of the government's policy.
Al-BaydawT, undoubtedly, had fulfilled all requirements,
otherwise, he would not have held the office of Chief
Justice. It was under the reign of Abaqa that al-BaydawT
succeeded to the office of Chief Justice.
Abaqa, who was not a Muslim, was influenced by the
great Shi'ite scholar Nasir-ad-Dln Tusl.^ It is not
surprising that he was very sympathetic towards Shi'ites
2
rather than Sunn.ites,
Al-BaydawT became Chief Justice of Fars for a
considerable period of time and afterwards, in accordance
with as-SubkT, was dismissed from his judgeship and went
to Tabriz. He entered a school there and took one of the
back seats, because no-one there knew him. The instructor
posed a question to those present which he said none of
those present could solve or repeat. Then al-BaydawI
started to answer. The instructor said, "I will not
listen until I know that you understand the question."
1. J.A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the
II-Khan" in CHI. V, 355.
2, Nizam at-Tawarikh, p. 136.
\
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Al-Baydawl said, "You may choose whether I should repeat
the question word for word or give the sense of it." The
teacher was surprised and said, "Repeat the question word
for word." Then al-Baydawl. repeated it and then gave the
solution and showed that the teacher had not stated the
problem accurately. Then he confronted the instructor
with a similar problem and requested him to solve it, but
the instructor begged to bo excused. The vizier happened
to be present and called al-Baydawl to his side and when
he found out who he was he had al-Baydawl restored to his
position in Shlraz.^"
If this story is true, the object of al-Baydawl's
visit to Tabriz was obviously "to be appointed to the office
of Qada'. Yet we still do not know the reason for his
dismissal. Perhaps it had some connection with religious
antagonism that existed between Shi'ite and Shafi'ite in
which the ruler himself, even though not a Muslim, was
influenced by Shi'ite opinions which often contradicted
with Sunnites in general.
2
Another source mentions that al-Baydawl, having
increased his knowledge of Islamic sciences and Arabic
grammar, went to Tabriz in order to be appointed to the
1. As-Subkl, Tabaqat, V, p. 59.
2. Anon. Br. Mus. MS., fol. 201a.
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post of Qada' . Apparently his first attempt was not very
successful. It was through the intercession of Shaykh
Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Kaykha.nl (d?) that he succeeded
to the office of Qada'. Shortly aften;ards, he left the
post, because he had been impressed by the Shaykh's remark
that being a judge, he was doomed to purgatory along with
the commander (arnr)? If this account is correct, his
"seeking the intercession" might have been connected with
political motives; because politics entered into appoint¬
ments, as said W.M. Watt "It is normal for a government or
ruler whether autocratic or democratic to support those
2
views which promise to gain the greatest volume of support."
His journey to Tabriz after his dismissal was possibly
due to the fact that Tabriz was made capital city of Fars,
3
instead of Shlraz, by Abaqa in which appointments may
have normally passed through the central office. Yet we
know nothing about the time when he was dismissed from his
judgeship in Shlraz, and decided afterwards to spend the
whole of his life in Tabriz. Based on a statement given
by 'All b. 'Abd-Allah b. AbG-l-Kasan b. Abu-Bakr al-Ardablll,
best known, Taj-ad-Dln (The Crown of Religion) AbH-l-Hasan
1. Kashf az-Zunun, I, 186-7.
2. cf. Muslim Intellectual, p. 100.
3. Boyle J.A. "Dynastic and Political History of the
Il-Khans" in CHI, V, 356. cf., Islamic Dynasty, p. 150.
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at-Tabrlzl (d. 7^6 A.H.) it is presumed that al-Baydawl
had moved to Tabriz before the year 683 A.H. In his
statement, he writes that he had met al-Baydawl in Tabriz,
and had sat with him without learning anything from him.^"
It was during his stay in Tabriz that he composed his
2
great commentary called Anwar at-Tanzil wa Asrar at-Ta'wil.
Al-Baydawl*s abandonment of the worldly position makes it
seem likely that he was unable to conceal his identity
altogether, and that many important people in Tabriz took
advantage of the presence of this great scholar.
The reason for his writing Anwar at-Tanzil
Al-Baydawl states that the idea of writing his
tafsir Anwar at-Tanzil which would consist of the important
views of the Companions of the Prophet, and the technicalities
of reciting the Qur'an (wujuh al-qira'at) had long been
his ambition, but the task was delayed for a while due to
3
his personal circumstances. Other evidence tells us that
it was suggested by Shaykh Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Kaykhanl
to write his commentary of the Qur'an while he was in Tabriz.
1. Abti-l-Ma' all, Muntakhab al-Mukhtar, 1^8}
Ibn-Hajar, Dural al-Kamina, III, 63-5*
2. Kashf az-Zunun, I, 186-7.
3. Anwar, I, 6.
Anon. Br. Mus. MS. fol. 201a,
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Al-Baydawi's death
The information available about the year of his death
is vague and contradictory. There are various opinions
given regarding al-Baydawi's death. According to
Tashkciprtizade, * al-Baydawl died in 64l A.H. ; but this
account does not seem to be correct, because in 674 A.H.
al-Baydawi was still alive in which year he had written a
book called Nizam at-Tawarikh and about the same year he
was appointed to the office of Chief Justice of Fars.
Other evidence suggests that Taj-ad-Din at-Tabrizi had
2
me t al-Baydawi before he left Tabriz in 683 A.H.'
3
Hamd-Allah Mustawfi held that al-Baydawi died in
4
685 A.H. in Tabriz. Haji Khalifa gives the same year as
Hamd-Allah Mustawfi, while Isnawi^ and al-Yafi'i give the
year of al-Baydawl's death as 691 A.H. and 692 A.H.
7
respectively. According to Br. Mus. Manuscript,
1. Miftah as-Sa'ada, I, 436, (without mentioning the
place of his death).
2. Muntakhab al-Mukhtar, p. 148.
3. Tarlkh Guzidah, p. 811.
4. Kashf az-Zunun, I, 186-7.
5. Tabaqat, I, 283-4.
6. Mir8at al-Janan, IV, 220.
7. Anon. Br, Mus. MS. fol. 201a.
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al-Baydawx died in Tabriz in 716 A.H. Ibn-ZarkTib
ShTrazx, however, maintains that al-Eaydawx died in
Tabriz in 708 A.H., and was buried at a place called
Jurundab,^
Al-Baydawx's works
The—works—of al—Baydawi can be classified into those
that have survived, and those that are missing. Of those
that survive the following can be said:
2
1. Anwar at-Tanzil wa Asrar at-Ta'w"!
(The Light of Inspiration and Secret of Interpretation)
A commentary on the Qur'an which has been
considered as the most valuable work of al-Baydawx
and it has been recognised even by non-Muslim scholars.
The reason for al-Baydawx1s great fame is that his
book has received more careful study by later Muslim
scholars than has that of any other commentator. As
a matter of fact, there have been more than eighty
different books by Muslim commentators based on
3
that of al-Baydawx.
1. Shxraz-Namah, p. 136.
2. As-Subkx, Tabaqat, V, 59j cf. Shiraz-Namah, p» 136:
Bughya, II, 50.
3. Calverley, Edwin E. "Al-BaydawTsMatali* al-Anzar"
in Muslim World, h"} (1963 ) p. 2 93 •
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This work was printed in many places:
I Cairo in 12 63 A.H. by Btilaq (on the margin of*
Shaykh Zadah's gloss), 1282 A.H. (with super-
commentary by Shaykh Zadah), 1283 A.H. (on the
margin of al-Khafaji's gloss, A.D. (1865), 1330 A.H.
by Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyya al-Kubra (with the
commentary of Kazaruni in the margin) also with the
same commentary was printed by Dar al-Kutub al-
Misriyya al-Kubra, (n.d.), 1339 A.H. printed in type
used by students in the advanced classes on theology
at al-Azhar University.
II Tehran ? 1856 A.D. (with a super commentary by
Baha' ad-DTn al-'Amili).
III Bombay, 1861-62, (with marginal glosses),
Lucknow, (lithographed) 2 editions, 1282 A.H.,
Delhi, 1855 A.D./1271 A.H. (with marginal glosses).
IV Leipzig, 1846 A.D., edited by Germany's great
Arabic scholar H.O. Fleischer. The Index was afterwards
published separately by W. Fell, in Leipzig in 1874.
(Edited with a preface, and a table of errata , to the
text of al-Baydawx's commentary by H.O. Fleischer.)
V London, 1894, translated and explained by
Margoliouth of Oxford on Surah Three of the Qur'an,"*"
1. GAL, I, 530-532.
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1957 (Glasgow) translated by Eric Francis Fox,fJ>ioWoy ,
on Surah twelve of the Qur'an, then in 19^3 (London)
and 197^ (Oxford) both translated by Beeston, A.F.L.
on the same Surah (Surah twelve).
VI Constantinople, 1285~86 A.H. (super-commentary to
al-Baydawl*s commentary accompanied on the margin by
a second commentary by Ibn-at-Tamjld, 1300 and
1303 A.H. (with the commentary of the Jalalayn on the
margin).
2. Tawali' al-Anwar"*"
A book on scholastic theology. It has been
printed from type in Cairo in 1305 A.H./1888 A.D.
and printed from type in Cairo in 1323 A.H./1902 A.D.
These include the commentary of Abu-l-Thana' Shams
ad-Din Mahmud al-Isfahani. (d. 7^0 A.H) and also
printed in Constantinople together with Matali* al-
Anzar 'Ala Matali' al-Anwar of Mahmud al-Isfahani,
.
2
and gloss by Sharif al-JurjanT.
1. As-Subki, Tabaqat, V, 59; Bughya, II, 50.




(The Lamp of the Souls)
A book on scholastic theology which is still in
its manuscript form: British Museum, 171 (Add 7^55)»
Ambrosidna, 319> Escorial, 2 652, Leiden 1545 •"*"
Minhaj al-Wusul ila 4Ilm al-Usul
A book on the principles of jurisprudence. It
has been printed in Cairo in 1326 A.H., bound with
Kitab Musallim ath-Thubut, by Muhib-Allah b. 4Abd
ash-Shaktir, al-Biharl, and Kitab Mukhtasar al-Muntaha
al-UsulI by 4Uthmah b. 'Umar, called Ibn_al-Hajib.
Lubb al-Albab fx 4Ilm al-I4rab
A treatise on Arabic Grammar which is still in
its manuscript form: Qawala, 11, 119, Paris, 4120,
2 3
Cairo, 1IV, 25, 2H, 79 Chester Beatty, no. 43152.
Fx Mawdu'at al-4Ulum wa Ta4arifi-ha
:
Still in its manuscript form, Cairo, VII, 482.
GAL, I, 533, supp. I, 742.
Ibid, I, 533, supp. I, 742.
A Hand list of the Arabic Manuscripts, vol. V, p. 99 •




A commentary on the Masabxh as-Sunna, a
collection of traditions by Abu-Muhammad al-HusaynT
b. Mas'Gd al-Farra' al-Baghawi (d. 510/1117 or
516/1122). Al-Baydawx called it Tuhfat al-Abrar
which is still in its manuscript form in Chester
Beatty Library, no. 3529.1
2
Al-Ghaya al-Quswa fx DirayeC al-Fatwa
A manual book of la^v as an abridgement of
al-Wasit al-Muhxt bi Aqtar al-Basxt, the "medium"4> » e A • • 7
Shafi'ite law manual of Abu-Hamid al-Ghazalx
(d. 505/llH). This is still in its manuscript form:
Chester Beatty Library, no. 3298, and also no. 3821,
Cairo, 1111 2466, Paris 1024.3
Huntaha 1-Muna
British Museum manuscript no. 64l8.**
A Chinese Chronicle
A book on the history of China, tr. (from
A Hand list of the Arabic Manuscripts, vol. Ill, p. 15
Isnawx calls this book Mukhtasar al-Waalt in his
• »
Tabaqat, I, 283-4, as well as TashkoprTIzade in his
Miftah as-Sa'ada, I, 436.
GAL, I, 533; A Hand list of the Arabic Manuscripts, II,
GAL, supp. I, 743.
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Persian text) by S. Weston, B.D.F. V.S.S.A. and
published in London in 1820 A.D., another copy
translated by A. Muller n.p. (1675?)
11. Nizam at-Tawarlkh
A book on the history of the world from the time
of Adam until the year 674 A.H./1275 A.D. It has
been printed in Hyderabad in 1930 A.D. (Persian text)
with explanatory notes in Hindustani by Sayyid Mansur.
From al-BaydawI's works which are missing, the
following can be aaid:
1. Sharh Minhaj al-WusBl ila * Ilm al-Usul"^
An explanatory work to his Minhaj al-Wusul on
the principles of jurisprudence.
2
2. Sharh al-Muntakhab
An epitome of al-Muntakhab of Fakhr-ad-DIn
ar-RazI (d. 606 A.H.) on scholastic theology.
1, Bughya, II, 50; Miftah as-Sa'ada, I, 436;
al-Bidaya, XIII, 309.
2. Bughya. II, 50; al-Bidaya. XIII, 309;
Haft al-Iqlim, vol. I, 176.
-44-
3. Sharh at-Tanblh ( 4 volumes)1
4. Sharh al-Mahsul ^
• ♦ «
A treatise of al-Mahshl of Fakhr-ad-Din ar-Razi
• •
(d. 606 A.H.) on the principles of jurisprudence.
5. Al-Idah fi. Usui ad-Dln3
• • 6
A book on theology.
4
6. Matali4
A book on logic.
7. Sharh al-Matali4 fr-l-Mantiq^
8. Sharh al-Mukhtasar^
• •
An explanatory book to Mukhtasar al-Muntaha.
al-Usuli of 'Uthman b, 4Umar called Ibn-al-Hajib
1. Al-Bidaya, XIII, 309; Haft al-Iqllm, I, 176.
2. Ibid.
3# Bughya, II, 50.
4. Khawand-Amir, Hablb as-Siyar, III, 134;
Haft ai-Iqllm. I, 176.
5. Bughya, II, 50; Miftah as-Sa4ada, I, 436.
6. Ibid.
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9. Mukhtasar al-Kafiya li-Ibn-al-Hajib.^"
A book on grammar.
10. Mirsad al-Afham fl Mabadi* al-Ahkam.^
• •
1. As-Suyutl called this book Sharh al-Kafiya;
Bughya. II, 50; GAL, I, 534.
2. Tarxkh Guzidah, 811; Haft grl-Iqllm, I, 176,
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONCEPT OF GOD'S ATTRIBUTES
The attributes of God
The question whether terms predicted of God in the
Qur'an, such as living and knowing and powerful, imply the
existence in God of life and knowledge and power as real
incorporate beings, which though inseparable from the
essence of God, are distinct from it, 1§ not to be found
in the Qur'an itself.^* Presumably these terms were later
the invention of the theologians (mutukalllmun). Afterwards
it became the centre of one of the chief disputes between
. the
the Mu'tazilites and'Ash*arites.
According to ash-Shahrastanl, the Mu'tazilites utterly
reject (the ascription of) eternal qualities, saying that
He is knowing, powerful and living as part of His essence;
not that knowledge, power and life are eternal attributes
or personal subsistences (ma'ani) inherent in Him. For if
the qualities should partake of His eternity which is the
exclusive description of His essence, they would partake
1. Wolfson. H.A. "Philosophical implications of the
problem of divine attributes in the Kalam" in JAOS 79




Ash-Shahrastani, however, tells us that the Mu* tazilites
2
reduced the attributes of God to knowledge and power;
perhaps, these two attributes are sufficient to represent
the whole attributes in theological discussion.
Indeed, al-Ash'arl describes that not only most of
the Mu'tazilites and Kharajites, but also Murji'ites and
some Zaydites held that God is knowing, powerful and
living by Himself (bi-nafsi-hi), not by knowledge, power
and life, and they allow the phrase "God has knowledge"
3
only in the sense that He is knowing.
The power of God as presented by az-Zamakhsharl (qudrat
Allah)
Az-Zamakhsharl, like most of his Mu'tazilites'
predecessors, approached this problem byCitirscj "4l:15"
"He was mightier than them," that God is powerful in the
virtue of His essence. In other words, he allows the
phrase "God has power" in the sense that He is powerful by
4
Hxs essence.
1. Milal, p. 30.
2. Ibid. p. 31.
3# Maqalat, I, 224.
4. Al-Kashshaf. II, 329.
A more difficult question arises for az-Zamakhsharl,
in interpreting a Qur'anic verse '2:20* "Truly, Allah is
powerful over everything" (inna-llaha 'ala kulli shay'in
qadir) since the text itself implies two important points:
the impossible things, and the human actions, whereas
az-Zamakhshari affirmatively maintains that they are, at
any rate, not to be connected with the essence of God.
It is reasonably clear from the interpretation that his
main concern is to observe the principle of justice. In
support of his standpoint, az-Zamakhshari had to explain
away this Qur'anic verse, laying stress however, on two
main words: shay' (thing) and qadir (powerful). As far
as shay' is concerned, he says, it can be applied both to
the existent (al-maw.jud), and the non-existent (al-ma' dum)
which is permissible to exist. In defining qadlr, however,
he writes: "He whose deed shall not be impossible."
V/hen God says, "He is powerful over everything" He means
over what is logically possible (shay' inustaqim) and not
the impossible ones."'" There is no specific opinion given
by az-Zamakhshari in interpreting the text, regarding
whether or not God is the author of the human actions,
but it is understood from his interpretation of the verse
by forwarding the word "mustaqlm" that human beings are
free to act whatsoever according to their wills since they
1. Ibid., I, 36, II, 475 (67:1); Cf. al-Kashshaf. II,
329 (41:21), I, 288 (6:18).
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are the authors of their deeds, inconforraity with the
principle of free will which shall be discussed later in
a separate chapter.
As far as the "rationale" of the qudra is concerned,
az-Zamakhsharl says that the impossible things are excluded.
If they were subjected to the power of God, as claimed by
the Mujbirites and the Nawabite®, it would be possible to
describe God as impotent ( ta.jiz) since there is no
"second eternal" (than! 1-qadim) besides Him. Moreover,
az-Zamakhshari declares that there was no such description
that really happened f e^xOieptr as a matter of pride and a
change of the reality"'' made by the Ash'arites.
For al-Baydawl, who has maintained the Ash*arite spirit
of orthodox Islam, asserts that God is the sole agent whose
foremost and exclusive prerogative is unlimited and
gratuitous activity.
As far as a Qur'anic verse '4l:15' is concerned,
al-Baydawl shows no disagreement with az-Zamakhsharl,
In contrast, he affirms that God has power though His
essence.
1. Ibid, I, 559 (17:88).
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Concerning the interpretation of the verse '2:20'
ai-Baydaw1, however, refutes az-Zamakhsharl, starting with
the word shay'. Al-Baydawl, in his definition, gives a
specific meaning to it, saying that shay' is restricted to
the existent and the thing that God wills it to be
existent, thus including the impossible ones since God is
only the sole agent, and creator of all beings. Al-Baydawx
bitterly attacks az-Zamakhshari's definition, and
considers it as weak since the definition by itself still
includes the impossible things, whereas az-Zamakhsharx,
in his interpretation, tried to avoid the obvious meaning
of the text. Al-Baydawx accused him of basing his judgment
(i.e. exception of the impossible thing and human acts in
his definition of shay') only on reasoning without giving
proper consideration to the wording of the Qur'anic text.
In order to strengthen his argument in this respect,
al-Baydawx proceeds to quote verse '39!62' "Allah is the
Creator of everything" and equates this verse with the
previously mentioned verse»2:20'. It is obvious that
al-BaydawX's declaration of the two verses should be
generally understood as referring to all things without
Istithna'.
Another controversial point between the two scholars
is concerned with the etymology of the word qadlr. In
opposition to az-Zamakhshari's definition, al-Baydawx.
defines qadxr as "He who if He wills to do anything does it
-51-
and if He wills to leave it leaves it." Thus, al-Baydawi's
main emphasis seems to be on God's omnipotence, yet without
repudiating the concept of God's righteousness and justice.
Al-Baydawl, however, maintains that human decree (rnaqdur
al -'abd) comes from God, since it can be materialised as
"thing" while referring to the verse '2:20'.^" Moreover,
he emphasises that God's power is connected (yata* allaqu)
with all determined things because these things are possible
(murnkin) and depend for their coming into existence on God's
2
power.
From their arguments, it becomes clear that while
az-Zamakhsharl is defending the Mu'tazilite point of view,
al-Baydawa. is trying to refute him and then establishing
the Ash'arite doctrine.
The attribute of knowledge (al-*ilm)
As we already know, the Mu'tazilites rejected the
external quality of knowledge in order that they would
not partake of divinity.
Az~Zamakhshari, also maintains that God is knowing in
the virtue of His essence. Such a view can be seen from
Anwar, I, 102-3; cf. , vol. IV, p. U (19:9) for
al-BaydawT*s denial of the non-existence (al-ma'dum)
as a "thing".
2. Tawali', pp. 72-3.
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the following verses:
I '21:4' "He saith: My Lord knoweth what is
spoken in the heaven and the earth. He is
the Hearer, the Knower." Az-Zamakhsharl holds
that God is a knower through His essence/
II '23:68' "And if they wrangle with thee, say:
God is best aware of what ye do" means that
2
He is knowing through His essence.
III '3:99* "God is not heedless of what you do" -
3
He is knowing in the virtue of His essence.
4
Commenting on a Qur'anic verse *18:12' "And after¬
wards we raised them up that we might know that (li-na'laina)
which of the two parties would best calculate the time that
they had tarried," a'z-Zamakhshari says that if it is asked
why God created His knowledge depending on their calculation
of the time, the reply is that God has been eternally
knowing through His essence. The connection of God's
1. Al—Kashshaf, II, 40.
2. Ibid, II, 67.
3. Ibid, II, 154.
4. A similar reason also given by az-Zamakhsharl regarding
God's connection of His knowledge to the creatures in
the following verses: I. (2:143) Ibid, 31, 80.
II. (29:3 ) Ibid, II, 174.
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knowledge to their calculation of the time is merely to
bring such a thing into existence. By so doing God meant
to increase their faith, and on the other hand to
demonstrate His grace (lutf) to all the believers at that
time.^" Moreover, az-Zamakhsharl states that God knows
everything in the past, the present and the future; He
knows the states of His servants, the movement of their
2
hearts; belief or disbelief, but he declares that God's
3
forelcnowledge of something has no causative function.
For al-Baydawx, he holds that God has the attributes
of perfection (sifat al-kamal), such as power, knowledge,
etc. He, however, asserts that God has knowledge through
which He is knowing. In defence of his view, al-Baydawx
quotes the Qur'anic verse '7*52' "Verily we have brought
a scripture which we expand with knowledge," and maintains
that this verse clearly declares that God is knowing
4
through His knowledge.
Coming to his views relating to the question in
discussion, al-BaydawT clearly states that God's knowledge
is distinct from His essence. At the same time it
1. Ibid, I, 565
2. Ibid, I, 326 (7:3).
3. Ibid, I, 338-9 (7:89)
^• Anwar, III, 11.
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(knowledge) is an external attribute which is inherent in
His essence, through which He is said to be knowing. In
truth, this problem became the centre of discussion
between the two theologians. The heart of the difficulty
is that to say that God's knowledge is different from His
essence in turn means that the knowledge itself is
eternal, hence there would be gods (each attribute a god)
as the Christians claim that the three Aqanim (persons)
are hypostases of existence, life and knowledge, and God
t
has said this in '5*72*. Those who say that God is the
third of three are unbelievers'! A question arises as to
what is to be thought of those who assert eight god3 and
s o on•••
For al-Baydawi, the Mu'tazilite emphasis on the
oneness of God and their refutation of His attributes,
would not, in any way, impair the view of those who
asserted God's attributes. In replying to the Mu'tazilites'
objection regarding this point, al-Baydawi says that there
is a great difference between the concept of eternal
essence, and the eternal attributes. To explain this
point, al-Baydawi refers to the Qur'anic verse '5*72'
which tells that the Christians are unbelievers for
asserting that God is the third of the three. He points
out that the Christians are called unbelievers in this
verse because they equated the eternal attributes
(sifat al-qadlma) with the eternal essence (dhat al-qadlma)
by means of transferring the Uqnum "logos" (knowledge)
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to the body of Jesus. Thus, al-Baydawi concludes that
the view that the "knowledge" is an eternal attribute
does not lead to belief in two eternal gods.^" Moreover,
al-Baydawi points out the difference between the aspects
of God's knowledge; knowledge in relation to God's essence
which is an eternal attribute and has special connection
with His essence, and the other aspect of His knowledge is
that related to His creatures. Knowledge in this respect
is connected with every known thing (ina* lum) because of the
2
equality of the relationship of all known things to Him.
As far as knowledge is concerned, al-Baydawi, however,
holds that it is eternal, hence God knows every known thing.
His knowledge does not change, what changes is the
relative connection, not the essential knowledge, because
this (knowledge) is necessary for Him. It is proper for
4
Him to know. Everyone that lives can properly know.
After debating that God's knowledge is not identical
to His essence and so on... al-BaydawT proceeds to set
out some proofs which indicate that God is knowing:
1. Tawali', pp. 75-6.
2. Ibid., p. 7k.
3. Ibid., p. 73-
4. Anwar, II, 3 (3:5).
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I God is a free agent (mukhtar), and for every free
agent it is impossible to turn His intention to the
unknown thing. Therefore, every free agent is
knowing (4alim).
II He has performed firm (muhkam) and perfect acts,
and everyone who does the like is knowing by necessity.
Now that He perforins such acts is manifest to whoever
considers His creation such as the heavenly bodies,
animals, etc.
III God's essence is a pure Huwiy.Ma(he-ness) through
which He becomes a knower. He is the agent of all the
object of existences. He who knows the object of the
existences knows everything.
•fUl
IV God is abstracted (mujarrad), and every abstracted v
:1s—necessarv to know His essence and all the abstracted
A
things.
The atribute of will (al-irada)
Az-ZamakhsharT's treatment with regard to the will of
God is nearly the same as his treatment about the human
1. Tawali4, pp. 73-7^.
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will. When God willed something, He disliked its opposite.
This is obvious when az-Zamakhshari defines the meaning of
will (irada) itself. He says that the meaning of will
"is to create for the living a state by which the action
occurs in particular form, not the other.
According to az-Zaraakhshari, the will of God is
originated (muhdath). His views with regard to the will
of God can be seen in the following Qur'anic verses:
I When God says '7*143' "And when his Lord
revealed (His) glory to the mountain", az-Zamakhshari
means that "when God applied His command, and His will
(iradatu-hu) to the mountain." So God's will,
2
according to az-Zamakhshari, is originated.
II When God says '30:25* "And of His signs is this.
The heaven and the earth stand fast by His command"
(an-1 aq uina bi- amr i-hi ) , he means "It was God's will"
3
that made them stand fast.
III When God says *16:40' "And our word unto a thing,
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 48.
2. Ibid., I, 349.
3. Ibid., II, 188.
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when we intend it, is only that we say unto it be!
and it is", it is very clear for az-Zamakhshari that
God's will is originated. When He wills the existence
of something, He just says to it, Be! it happens
immediately. Az-Zamakhshari, further, pointed out
that there was a difference between God's will and
the human will even though His will was originated,
since God's will does not necessitate the object of
the will.
As far as "will" is concerned, az-ZamakhsharT declares
that God does not absolutely will disobedience (ma' si.a) .
He does not will His servants to be disbelievers. On the
contrary, He wills them to be obedient, faithful and so on..
In support of his view, he proceeds to quote some
Qur'anic verses as follows:
I '6:149' "They who are idolaters will say: Had God
willed, we had not ascribed (unto Him) partners
neither had our fathers, nor had we forbidden aught.
Thus did those who were before them give the lie
(to God's messengers) till they tested of the fear of
1. Ibid, I, 526.
2. Ibid, II, 162-3; cf. vol. I, p. 317 (6:l48.)
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us. Say: HaVe ye any knowledge that ye can adduce
for Us? Lo! ye follow but an opinion. Lo! ye do but
guess. *7*150' "Say - for God's is the final
argument had He willed He could indeed have guided all
of you.'
Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhshari branded the
Sunnites as Mujbirites for holding the same opinion as those
who were unbelievers, since they said that all things were
dependent upon God's will, but the fact was that God denied
their beliefs and considered their views as based only on
guess-work.^
II When God says '39*6' "He is not pleased (la
yarda) with thanklessness for His bondsmen",
az-Zamakhshari means that God is not a wilier (murxd)
2
°f His bondsmen's thanklessness.
III When God says '11:3^' "My counsel will not
profit you if I were minded to advise you, if God's
will is to keep you astray." (ighwa')
Az-ZamakhsharT maintains that it is not God's will to
lead people astray.
1. Ibid, I, 316-7.
2. Ibid, II, 293.
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As far as the "connection of God's will" in this
verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari holds that "it is only
to those whom God already knew would never become believers."
For az-Zamakhshari, however, ighwa' is related to those
Alt CL U tfj)
who will not become believers w-hat^s^eve^r, asHstee- the word
"guidance" (hidaya) is applied to those who accept His
favour.^
IV '40:31' "And God willeth no injustice for (His)
slaves."
Commenting on the verse, az-ZamakhsharT equates this
verse in this case with the verse '4l:46' "And thy Lord
is not a,t all a tyrant to His slave." Then he proceeds to
say that If God Himself has had no will of injustice at
all, of course, to do injustice is far removed from Him,
2
sxnce God denied to do injustice to His slave. It is
obvious that az-Zamakhshari1s defence of the originated
will of God, and his emphasis on the applicability of it
(will) only to the righteous things, is merely to observe
his doctrine of oneness and justice of God.
Al-BaydawT's refutation of the main theme of
1. Ibid, I, 44l.
2. Ibid, II, 316
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az-Zamakhshari1s view concerning God's will is that God's
will is not originated, but it is eternal, only that the
object of God's will (raurad) is originated.^"
In support of his view in this respect, he introduces
the following arguments:
I The existence of every originated thing is
completely dependent upon God's will (iradat Allah)
If God's will was originated (muhdath), he argues, it
would have necessitated another will, hence it would
have been an endless chain.
II The existence of quality (sifa) by itself is not
reasonable (ma'qul). and in addition, the specializing
of His essence to His quality is not by the specialize
(mulchassis) because the relation of the quality to all
2
His essence is equal. Furthermore. al-BaydawT
asserts that the connection (ta* alluq) of God's will
with the temporal object (murad) is by the virtue of
W.0










Coming to his views concerning the Qur'anic verses
which are quoted by az-Zamakhshari in this respect,
al-Baydawx sometimes refutes them, and sometimes leaves
them without any comment. This can be seen from the
following statements:
Concerning a Qur'anic verse '6:149' al-Baydawi,
instead of attacking az-Zamakhsharx, had to admit that
God did not will polytheism (shirk) and unbelief.
Furthermore, he says that the verse supports az-Zamakhsharx's
view that God does not even will such a thing.
In connection with the verse '3956' al-Baydawx,
2
does not seem to refute az-Zamakhshari.
Commenting on the verse '11:34', al-Baydawx says
that God's will can be connected with ighwa', since there
3
xs notlixng which could contradxct Hxs will.
As far as the verse *40:31' is concerned, al-Baydawx
gives no detailed explanation about the will of God.
Instead, he states that the connection of God's will to
1. Anwar, II, 212. cf. Misbah fol. 210a, in which he states
that God wills -£&»- unbelief.
2. Ibid, IV, 124.
3. Ibid, III, 108, 148.
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injustice is denied in the verse itself. He seems, in
this verse, to have supported az-Zamakhsharl's view rather
than to criticise him. On the other hand, he appears to
understand the text as referring to the unbelievers.^
In order to explain this, a number of al-Baydawi's
orthodox views regarding "will" are better quoted as follows:
I God is a wilier (murid) to the faith of the
unbeliever and all things which contradict His will
are impossible. In defence of his view, he proceeds to
quote the following Qur'anic verses:
a. •6:108' "Had God willed, they had not been
idolatirous.^
be '6:12' "They would not believe unless God
so willed." Al-BaydawT considers this verse as a
3
clear proof against az-Zamakhshari's.
c. *6:11319 "If thy Lord willed they would not
do so. So leave them alone with their devising."
Al-Baydawi declares that God willed what they were
4










all things willed by Him.*
II The command of God ( amr), according to
al~Baydawl, is sometimes separable from His will,
and it (command) is not the will itself. He proceeds
to refer to some Qur'anic verses as follows:
a. '10:26' "And God summoneth to the abode of
peace, and leadeth (yahdi.) whom He wills to a
straight path." He says that the specializing
of huda (guidance) with mashi'a (will) in this
verse is clearly to indicate that the command is
0
not the will.^
b. '11:118' "And if thy Lord had willed, He
verily would have made mankind one nation, yet
they cease not differing." Al-BaydawT explains
that God did not will Irnan (faith) for everyone,
otherwise all of them would be faithful. So
"command" in accordance with al-Baydawi, is not
the will itself."*
c. '2:70' "They said: LoI if God wills, we
may be led aright." Al-Baydawl points out that,
if there were no difference between the command
and the will, the "conditional" (shart) in this
verse, would give no meaning.
1. Ibid, I, 62.
2. Ibid, III, 90.
3. Ibid, III, 125.
k. Ibid, I, 162 (2:70)
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"The speech of God" (Kalam Allah)
Whatever discussion had taken place between the
Mu4tazilites and the Ash'arites regarding the doctrine of
the Qur'an, whether or not it was created, it should be
faced with the fact that the Qur'an, at any rate, is a
speech of God, and it appeared in tiine.^
Az-Zamakhsharl, like most Mu'tazilites, believes that
the Qur'an was created. To announce that the Qur'an was
created, is implying that the speech of God also was
created. In order to justify his view with regard to the
creativeneas of the Qur* an, az-Zamakhshar a. tried to explain
away a Qur'anic verse '75143' "And when Moses came to
our appointed tryst and his Lord had spoken to him "
by saying that God did not address Moses by Himself;
instead He created His speech in the bush; likewise, He
created it (kalam) in the "preserved tablet" (lawh mahf'uz)
'85521'. Therefore, it was God's speech that addressed
Moses, not God Himself, and Moses listened to it without
O
looking at Him, because He was covered by hijab (veil).
An interesting remark also given by az-Zamakhsharl
1. Watt. "Early discussions about the Qur'an" in
Muslim World (l950)» P» 28.
2. Al-Kashshaf. I, 347-8.
3. Ibid, II, 344 (42:51).
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with regard to the question in discussion, was when he
explained the Qur'anic verse *2:227' "And if they decide
upon divorce (cizamu t-Talaq) God is Hearer, Knower."
As we already know the "intention" (' azm) is something
very internal, and thoroughly different from the speech,
which consists of a word and a voice. So how could God
become a listener to the "intention"? In order to justify
his view, az-Zamakhshari proceeds to say that a sort of
dispute and J5S33b±"G for the intender (* azim) to divorce
are inevitable before the divorce occurs. At least, the
"intender" must have been talking to himself. Az-Zamakhshari
further says that this kind of speech, however, could only
be listened to by God; likewise, He could listen to the
whisper of Satan. Speech, according to him, is something
that can be heard, therefore it consists of a word and a
1
voice.
In dealing with the subject-matter, az-Zainakhsharx
again had to explain away a Qur'anic verse *4l:21* "And
they say unto their skins: why testify ye against us?
They say: God hath given us speech who giveth speech to
all things, and who created you at the first, and unto
whom ye are returned."
1. Ibid, I, 107-8
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Az-Zamakhsharl says that if it is asked how their
skins will testify against them, and how their (skins)
could speak, the reply is that God will make the skins
speak in the same way that He created His speech in the
bush.^"
While interpreting the Qur1anic verse '7:88' "Say:
verily, though mankind and the jinn should assemble to
produce the like of this Qur'an, they could not produce
the like thereof, though they were helpers one with anothe
az-Zamakhsharx, however, declares that the Qur'an was
created. In his arguments, he attacked the Ash'arites
and branded them as Nawabit , since they claimed that
the Qur'an was eternal (qadam) and at the same time they
admitted that it (Qur'an) was mu'jiz (miraculous) •
In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharx proceeds to
explain that 'ajz (inability), in accordance with him, is
absolutely opposite to qudra (ability). Based on this
account it is said that God is qadir (able) to create all
the bodies whereas all human beings are ' a.i iztln (unable)
, . 2
to do so.
1. Ibid, II, 329.
2. Ibid, I, 559.
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&1-Baydawl as an adherent to the Ash'arites
maintains that the speech of God is eternal,^it was God
Himself who addressed Moses, and not His speech that He
created in the bush, as claimed by az-Zamakhshari. In
order to justify his view, he proceeds to say that Moses'
listening to God's speech from all directions indicates
that he listened to His eternal speech, and not to the
originated ones."'"
Of course, speech, according to al-Baydawi, is eternal
2
without consisting of a word and a voice. And the
Qur'an, at any rate, is mu'jiz, eventhough it appeared
in time, since all the creatures could not produce the
like '7:88'.3
According to al-BaydawI, the necessary connection
(muqtada at-Ta'alluq) does not entail the ereat fewness of
the speech; likewise, the connection of God's knowledge to
/ s 4
the object of knowledge (ma*lum). So God's speech is an
idea inherent in His essence which is entirely different
from His knowledge, and His will. Sin&e God contradicted
His knowledge and His will, when He commanded Abu-Lahab to
1. Anwar. Ill, 26 (7:1^3)
2. Ibid, V, 56 (42:51); Tawali*, p. 78.
3. Anwar. Ill, 210-11.
4. Ibid, I, 67-68 (2:6).
-69-
be a believer whereas He had already known eternally
that Abu-Lahab would never be a believer."'"
Al-BaydawT, while winding up his argument in this
respect, confessed that human intellect Caql) however,
is too limited to perceive the essence and the attributes
of God,2
The vision of God (ru'yat Allah)
The doctrine of the vision of God has its origin not
only in the Qur'an but also in the traditions of the Prophet.
According to the commentators the dogma itself cannot
be doubted, because it is based on the Qur'an and the
Tradition. Details, however, are quite uncertain
(muta.sh.abih) ; it is, accordingly, based on the Qur'an,
O
not on reason (thabit bi-n-nass la bi-l-'aql).
In applying their logic to theological matters, the
Mu'tazilites were led to deny that God could be physically




Tawali', p. 79; Misbah, ff.l98a, 198b.
Ibid.
Wensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 229.
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Az-ZamakhsharT maintained that his position as far
as ru'ya (vision) was concerned was exactly as the
Mu'tazilites. The following verses are presented by
az-Zamakhshari in his justification of the doctrine of
the vision of God:
X •6:104' "Vision comprehendeth Him not,
but He comprehendeth (all) vision. He is the
subtle, the aware" (la tudriku-hu 1-absar wa
huwa yudriku 1-absar wa huwa 1-latXfu 1-lchabir),
Commenting on the verse, az-Zamakhshari holds that the
vision of God is impossible since the reality of God cannot
be attained by "vision". On the other hand, "vision"
cannot comprehend Him. The heart of the difficulty,
perhaps, is in the meaning of "basar" itself of which
az-Zamakhshari had his own interpretation. He defines
basar (vision) as a subtle substance (al-Jawhar al-Latif)
which is conveyed by God only to the sense of sight by
which all the seen things (mubsarai) can be comprehended.
Hence his definition, seems to be restricted only to
temporal matter. Since God is neither accident nor body,
he argues, "vision" could not comprehend Him."*"
1. Al—Kashshaf, I, 307.
II ,7sl^3' "He said: My Lord! show ine (Thyself),
that I may gaze upon Thee. He said: Thou wilt not
see Me, but gaze upon the mountain! If it stands
still in its place, then thou wilt see Me. And
when his Lord revealed (His) glory to the mountain
He sent it crashing down. And Moses fell down
senseless. And when he woke he said: Glory unto
Thee! I turn unto Thee repentant and I am the first
of (true) believers." (qala rabbi arinx anzur ilay-
lca qala lan taranx wa lakin unzur ila 1-jabali fa-in
istaqarra makana-hu fa-sawfa taranx fa-1 arum a tajalla
rabbu-hu li-l-jabali ja'ala-hu dakkan wa kharra musa
sa' iqan )
Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharx maintains that
Moses already knew that "vision" of God was impossible.
Being a prophet, he was supposed to know better than his
people. As a matter of fact, az-Zamakhsharx explains that
Moses confessed before God that his people were ignorant
17 155 1 "And Moses chose of his people seventy men for
our appointed tryst and, when the trembling came on them,
he said: My Lord! if thou hadst willed thou hadst destroyed
them long before, and me with them, wilt thou destroy us
for that which the ignorant among us did? It is but Thy
trial (of us). Thou sendest Thou wilt lead astray and
guidest whom Thou wilt. Thou art our protecting friend,
therefore, forgive us and have mercy on us, Thou, the
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best of all who shows forgiveness."
Coming to his view regarding the verse in question,
az-Zainakhsharx, however, declares that they were told
that "vision" was impossible, but they insisted that
Moses ask God to appear before them. As a result, Moses
beseeched God to appear on behalf of his people. Az-
Zamakhsharx adds that,, his (Moses) request was not more
than a rebuke to the ignorant people who wished to listen
to a verse which would prove that "vision" is impossible.
Moreover, az-Zamakhsharl argues that since Moses himself
was denied seeing God, the ignorant people were even
further from seeing Him.
In order to explain, az-Zamakhsharx points out that
a. "Ian" in the verse (1an tarani), is tho eternal
negative for everything in the future. Likewise, the
Qur'anic verse' '23:73' "Lo! those on whom ye call
beside God (will never create) (1an yakhluqu) a fly
though they combine together for the purpose." This
is necessary, according to him, implying that the
vision of God is impossible (forever).
b. The conjunction "but" (lakin) "gaze upon the
mountain", according to az-ZamakhsharX means that
"Looking towards Me" is impossible (muhal), therefore,
do not ask God for a vision, but look to the mountain
which trembles in consequence of your request to see
Me face to face. See how I make it move 1"
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Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharl equates the request
for the vision of God with the claim that God
has a son. '20:90-91'•
c. God connects "vision" with something which is
not possible: The firmness of the mountain in the
state of its crashing down.
d. Moses himself confessed that he was the first
(true) believer who believed that God was invisible.
e. God made a great matter of their seeking for a
vision of Himself. And how God the Almighty made
the mountain tremble because of their seeking for
His vision, and He attached blame to it. After
all, ^z-Zamakhsharl was wondering about those who
claimed themselves Ahl as-Sunna, and how they had
taken this matter "without questioning how"
(bl-la. lcayfa) *
III '75*22-23' "That day will faces be resplendent,
looking towards their Lord." (wujuhun yawmaidhin
n-nadira ila rabbi-ha nazira).• e 7
1. Ibid, I, 3^8; cf. vol. I, p. 418 (I0:l4), vol. I, p. 139
(3sl9) in which he considers those who believe in the
doctrine of the vision of God are not in the religion
of Islajii since Islam is the unity of God and His justice.
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Ccwnmenting on this verse, az-Zamakhsharx, however,
emphasises that the vision of God is impossible. In
order* to justify his view, he interprets His words
"Looking towards their Lord" in regard of expectation
and hope (at-tawaqqu* wa r-rija' ) not of sight.
IV 183:15' "Nay, but surely on that day they
will be covered from their Lord."
Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharl had to explain
away the obvious meaning of the text, saying that "they
will be covered from their Lord" is figurative only.
According to az-Zamakhsharl, the verse indicates their
contempt and disregard before God the Almighty. Further¬
more, az«Zamakhsharx proceeds to exemplify God as a king
on the ground that only those honourable positions are
allowed to see Him, and not the dishonest. Therefore,
the main emphasis of az-Zamakhsharx*s interpretation, no
2
doubt, is to deny the vision of God.
V '4:153' "They asked a greater thing of Moses
aforetime, for they said: Show us Allah plainly.
The storm of lightning seized them for their
1. Ibid, II, 509.
2. Ibid, II, 532.
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wickedness." (fa-qad sa'alu musa akbaru min dhalika
fa-qalG arina-llaha jahratan fa-akhadhat~huinu-s~sa'iqatu
bi-zulmi-him) .• 7
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari
asserts that God had disdained the children of Israel,
because "vision" of Him is impossible. Moreover, he says
that if they had not asked the impossible, they would not
be called wicked (az-zaliinin). In order to strengthen his
view, he referred to the story of the prophet Abraham who
asked God to show him how to give life to the dead, so—far
as—he was not called wicked, and the storm did not seize him.
VI '42:51' "And it was not (vouchsafed) to any mortal
that God should speak to him unless (it be) by
revelation or from behind a veil, or (that) He sendeth
a messenger to reveal what He will by His leave. Lo!
He is exalted, wise."
According to az-Zamakhshari, the event of God's
addressing Moses actually took place, but Moses could not
see Him since His essence was invisible. In order to
justify his arguments, he proceeds to quote two traditions
as follows:
1. Ibid, I, 237, I, 57-8
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a. The Prophet is reported to have said that
Moses had not seen God.
h. 'A'tsha, the wife of the Prophet, is also
reported to have said that, "He who claimed
that Muhammad had seen his Lord, was a great
liar." Then she said, "Why do you not listen
to your Lord when He says: '4:153'• "
VII '10:27' "Those who do good shall receive
a most excellent reward (al-husna) and a super
abundant addition (ziyada). Neither dust nor
ignominy cometh near their faces."
Az-ZamakhsharT hewevar maintains that al-husna
■* •
is a most excellent reward, and it is obligatory that eve
true believer should receive it as a result of his good
work. However, ziyada is interpreted by az-Zamakhshari
as a grace (tafaddul) which not every true believer will
receive. In defence of his view, he proceeds to refer to
the Qur'anic verse '5:173'. "Then as for those v/ho
believed and did good works, unto them will He pay
their wages in full, adding unto them of His bounty."
1. Ibid, II, 344.
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As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari
mocked the Sunnites, and branded them as Mujbirites,
because they believed that ziyada meant the vision of God,
In commenting on a prophetic tradition which was used
by the Sunnites, such as: "When the believers enter Paradise,
the veil will be uncovered, and they will look at their
Lord." Az-Zamakhsharx considered such a tradition to be
marfu1 .
For al-BaydawI, the meaning of the vision of God is
that He reveals Himself (yankashlfu) to believing creatures
2
on the last day like the uncovering of a visible full moon.
In refuting az-Zamakhsharx, al-BaydawI., however,
emphasises that "vision" is possible (mumkin) in the next
world. He goes on to say that the arguments given by
az-Zamakhsharx with regard to the Qur'anic verse '6:104'
are weak. He points out that ru'ya is more particular
than idrak (perception) since idrak has a general meaning.
Of course, al-Baydawx, at any rate, admits that a vision
of God by all moans of His essences and attributes
(kulli dhawati-hi wa sifati-hi), is impossible. As for
al-BaydawI, he maintains that it is not necessary for the
1. Ibid, I, 421.
2. Tawali*, p. 80; Misbah, fol. 201a
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denial of a "vision" in the sense of generality (ihata)
implies the denial of vision absolutely, since "vision",
according to him, is more particular than idrak. The
verse, however, according to al-Baydawx, means "vision"
(all) comprehendeth Him not (la tudriku-hu jaml' al-absar).
Therefore, he concludes that the verse does not contradict
if "vision" (some) (ba'd al-absar) comprehends Him.
Al-Baydawx also affirms that the "negative particle" in the
verse is not always applicable. He presumably means that
"vision" in this world is impossible, but it is possible in
the next. Al-Baydawx. again declares that the "negative
particle" is not for all the people, because only the
believers, according to him, will be able to see their God."*"
Concerning the verse '17:1^3'» al-Baydawx, however,
maintains that Moses asked God to appear in a vision before
him. If it were impossible, he argues, his request would
be ignorant and worthless, especially about God of whom
Moses should know better what is impossible and possible
in relation to Him. So Moses cannot have asked his God
what was impossible, hence the "vision" is possible.
Moreover, he points out the reason why the "vision" of God
was impossible in this world by saying that the "vision"
absolutely depends on the preparation of the seer (mu*idd
li-r-ra'x). It is implied that if the preparation was
1. Anwar, II, 202; Tavali4, p. 81.
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existent, "vision" would be possible. Presumably, he
tries to solve the problem of Moses who fell down senseless
in which az-Zamakhshari strongly supports that it was an
indication of the impossibility of the vision of God.
Al-Baydawl, however, criticised az-Zamakhshari who claimed
that Moses had asked the "vision" on behalf of his people,
in order to rebuke them for their stupidities, for Moses
already knew the impossibility of "vision". Al-Baydawi
in denouncing this view, says that if the "vision" was
impossible, it would be necessary for Moses to ignore
their request, and to dispel their uncertainties as he
actually did for them when they said: '75138' "0 Moses!
make for us a god even as they have gods." Another verse,
*7sl^2' "Do right, and follow not the way of mischief-
makers." As far as these verses are concerned, al-Baydawi
emphasises that Moses, however, did not follow their
request since it was impossible. Moreover, al-Baydawi
maintains that to assert the impossibility of "vision"
altogether is to commit a great mistake, since there is no
information which states that the invisibility of God to
Moses means that God is invisible forever, and none will
ever see Him, especially if we remember that ru1 ya is more
particular than idrak - therefore, it is not impossible.
After all, he makes a bitter remark to az-Zamakhshari
asking whether he knew the reality of vision (haqlqat ar-
ru' ya) and claimed it to be impossible. In this case,
he is doomed to be arrogant or else he did not know it
-80-
(the reality of vision). In this case, he is ignorant
about it.
As far as the standstill of the mountain in the verse
is concerned, al-Baydawi holds that God was capable of
rendering the mountain firm by which, if He had done it,
Moses would have seen Him. On - the ~oth«sr=^hand^ lo connect
"vision" with the possible, it becomes possible.^" And
Moses said: Glory unto Theel I turn unto Thee repentant."
Al-BaydawT, however, emphasises that Moses had asked God to
see Him without His previous permission. As a result, he
fell down senseless, and confessed that he was the first
2
believer who believed that God was invisible in this world.
Commenting on the interpretation of verse '75522-23'
al-Baydawi, however, affirms that God can be seen in the
next world with the sight of eyes where all the things will
be forgotten except Him. But, this situation will not remain
very long. Of course, the vision of God, according to
al-Baydawi, is the most precious of the gifts lavished
upon believers in the next world. Al-Baydawi strongly
attacked az-Zamakhsharl who said that the verse meant the
regard of expectation for reward by saying that God cannot
mean in the virtue of the verse the regard of expectation,
1. Ibid, III, 26-27; Tawali', p. 80
2« Anwar, III, 27.
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since it was connected to "face". The verse, therefore,
must have meant the vision of the eyes.
Secondly: To interpret "it" (looking) in its general
meaning is contrary to the fact.
Thirdly: It is not correct to say "towards" with
reference to the regard of expectation, since the regard
of expectation does not become transitive by the preposition
"towards".^
Coming to his view relating to the Qur'anic. verse
• 73s15* al-Baydawx endeavours to refute az-Zamakhsharl's
arguments, and claims that only the "faces" of the non-
believers will be covered from seeing their Lord, but not
the believers. Moreover, al-Baydawx proceeds to say that
az-Zamakhshari who denied the vision of God, even by
believers, made the verse in discussion, as an example
for their contempt, as those who were not being allowed to
2
see their king.
Commenting on the interpretation of verse '4:153'
al-Baydawx, however, pointed out two main reasons which
made the "vision" impossible:
I Their wickedness, not because the "vision" was
1. Ibid, V, 163
2. Ibid, V, 178
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impossible.
IX Their request at that time was impossible,
because they were not granted "preparation" to
see their Lord. Furthermore, al-Baydawx concludes
that even though the vision of Him was impossible
in this world, it does not mean to deny the "vision"
in the next."*" But the vision of God "without asking
how" (bi-la kayfa), according to him, happened to
some prophets in certain states (ahwal) in this
world, and the same will happen to the believers
2 _
in the next. It is presumaby that al-Baydawx
tried to support that the Prophet Muhammad must
have seen his Lord.
Refuting the interpretation of verse '42:51'
al-Baydawx asserts that the verse is clearly to indicate
that the vision of God is possible.
Concerning verse '10:27' al-Baydawx, instead of
attacking az-Zamakhsharx, maintains that his position,
so far as this verse is concerned, is exactly the same
3
as that of az-Zamakhsharx„
1. Ibid, II, 126.
2. Ibid, I, 154. Al-BaydawT did not state the names of
the prophets who had seen God in this world.




The problem of the relation between Reason (4 aql)
and Revelation (shari* a) is the point of conflict between
the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites in pursuing the
knowledge of God (ma'rifat Allah) since "knowledge" in the
Mu'tazilite view means "rational insight religion".'''
The question at issue now is whether knowledge of God
becomes incumbent upon man as soon as he acquires a mature-
capacity (mukallaf) for reasoning; or whether it becomes
incumbent upon him only after a messenger has been sent to
his community to inform it of all that is necessary for a
man to know. To this, az-ZamakhsharT supports the former,
saying that the knowledge of God is obligatory upon man
since he is a rational being. He maintains that Reason is
a guide to the truth and capable of comprehending the
knowledge of God. Therefore, Reason, in accordance with
az-ZamakhsharT is self-sufficient in making the knowledge
necessary. However, it is implied that the "sending of
the prophets" is not necessary since Reason alone can
1. Vensinck, Muslim Creed, 135•
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grasp what is there to be grasped intellectually (i.e. the
knowledge of God). So what is the purpose of sending the
prophets? To find out the answer let us examine az-
Zaraakhshari's viewpoint concerning the following Qur'anic
verses:
I '.17s 15' "We never punish until we have sent a
messenger." (wa ma kunna mu'adhdhibin hatta nab'atha
rasulan).
Az-Zamakhshari says that the purpose of "sending the
prophets" was to remind people of what they had forgotten
about the necessity of reflection (nazar).^" This verse,
however, has little implication for az-Zamakhsharl, in
denying the occurrence of divine punishment before the
coming of the law, since he states that, "Even if God does
not send the prophet, it is still incumbent upon man to
believe in God and His unity," because Reason has the
potentiality to know Him through His signs '64:10', "But
those who disbelieve and deny our signs (ayati-na) are
the inmates of the fire, they will abide therein - a
2
helpless journey's end!" Another reason for the sending
of the prophets, according to az-Zamakhshari, is as a
1. Al-Kashshaf. I, 544.
2. Ibid, I, 53.
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refutat-ion to disbelievers' presupposed argument against
God after the messengers.^ The more extreme views of
az-Zamakhsharx regarding Reason can be seen from his
interpretation of the verse '3550', "I come unto you with
signs from your Lord" that the prophets themselves deduced
the truthfulness of their message through Reason in which
God created for them signs leading them to know their own
2
message. According to az-Zamakhsharx Reason can even
conceive the need of repenting the sin even though it was
committed by the unbeliever, but Revelation restricts it
3
to the believer only. The tradition, the consensus and
the analogy, however, should come after the proofs of
Reason (adillat al-hql).^
Az-Zamakhsharx's main emphasis as far as Reason is
concerned is that Reason has the potentiality to know the
creator of this world even though there is no Revelation.
And his view that the "sending of the prophets was to
remind their people" cannot'be considered as of secondary
importance to Reason since it—ia^inevitably relevant to each
1. Ibid, I, 240.
2. Ibid, I, 148; cf., vol. I, p. 396 (9:43), vol. I, p. 444.
3. Ibid, II, 9 (19:47).
4. Ibid, I, 490 (12:111); cf., vol. I, p. 30 (2:16),
p. 59 (2:6l), p. 221 (4:56), vol. II, p. 227 (24:13)
p. 388 (48:29), p. 431 (56:62), p. 22 (20:16);
Atwaq adh-Dhahab, p. 46.
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other, because the performance of the orders of the shari * a
such as as-sala (the prayer) according to him, is dependent
upon iman. By iman, he means Revelation."*"
Perhaps what he means by reflection (nazar) is to
know the creator of this universe grossly. If a man dies
without hearing about the messenger and consequently has
not believed in God, according to az-Zamakhsharl, he will
be punished because in his lifetime there has been the
condition necessitating iman, and that condition is Reason.
Another question is, "What is the value of iman based
merely on the authority of others rather than on reasoning
and logical proof, such as the common people who were not
trained at all in reasoning and the art of dialectics?"
Before going any further it is, perhaps, relevant to
quote the important 'passage from al-Baghdadx concerning
the Mu'tazilite views on the' belief in the authority of
others:
The Mu'tazilites are divided on this point. They who
1. Ibid, I, 544; cf. vol. II, 345 (52:52), az-Zamakhsharl
explains that iman consists of many things; part of
them can be grasped by Reason, while others can be
obtained by Revelation.
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consider knowledge as being of a primary nature say that
he who believes the truth, believing it as something
axiomatic, and not marring this condition by mortal sins
\S faithful. If such a one should, however, mar his
condition by mortal sins, he would be fasiq, that is,
neither faithful nor infidel. Whoever believes the truth,
but does not regard it as something of a primary nature,
is under no obligation to believe. Those Mu'tazilites,
however, who say that knowledge regarding Allah, His
books and His Apostle, is knowledge acquired by reasoning
and deduction, are of different opinions concerning him
who believes the truth on the authority of others. Some
say that he is fasiq on account of his neglect of reason
and deduction; and a fasiq according to them, is neither
faithful nor infidel. Others say that he is an infidel,
whose repentance is invalid through his neglect of one of
his legal obligations."'"
*
As far as taqlxd is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl, however,
is in opposition to it since from the very beginning, he
emphasises that reason is capable of comprehending the
knowledge of God. In strengthening his view, he alludes
to the Qur'anic verse '20:16' "Let none bar thee from it,
1. Usui, p. 225
2. Ibid, II, 22.
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that believes not in it but follows after his own caprice,
or thou wilt perish," saying that the destruction (al-halale)
and the peril are always due to taqlxd and its followers.
Az-ZamakhsharT, however, conceives that not all people can
avoid the taglid. By this, he means that taqlid, to some
extent, is permissible. For instance, he opposes the
muqallid who does not know what he does 117:36' "(o man),
Follow not that where of thou hast no knowledge,""'" For
az-Zamalchshari, a muqallid is obliged to some extent to
use his reason (i.e. to know whom he follows) in order to
follow the right ♦ alim (al-'alim al-muhtadl) .
As an advocate of al-Ash'ari, al-Baydawi, however,
maintains that the knowledge of God is made obligatory by
Revelation or the divine lav/. The obligatory nature of
the knowledge of God, al-Baydawi asserts, has nothing to
do v/ith Reason. The most important proof-text for al-
Baydawi is the verse '17il5*» never punish until we
have sent a messenger." This verse evidently denies the
occurrence of divine punishment before the coming of the
law. Al-BaydawT argues that as far as this verse is
concerned, there can be no obligation at all before God's
sending a messenger and before the prophetic call reaches
1. Ibid, I, 5^9.
2. Ibid, II, 172
-89-
the ears of the people,"'"
Concerning the Qur'anic verse '4:165*, al-Baydawx in
strong opposition against az-Zamakhsharx, says that the
sending of the prophet is necessary (darura) since Reason
2
has insufficient potentiality to know God, (i.e.
especially the naive belief of the common people).
Therefore, the sending of the prophets, according to
al-Baydawx, is a completion of God's Revelation since the
obligatoriness is based solely on the evidence of divine
words.
Al-Baydawx emphasises that the prophets did not know
the truthfulness of their message except through Revelation.
For al-Baydawx, this Qur'anic verse '52:52' "Thou
(Muhammad) knewest not what the scripture was, nor what
the faith" provides strong proof to criticise az-Zainakhshari's
argument that the prophets knew their message by means of
%
3
Reason. A question arises that if the prophets themselves,
according to al-Baydawx,did not testify their message
except through Revelation, what about the common folk?
Did they know God before the "sending of the prophets,"
through Reason?
1. Anwar, III, 198, vol. IX, p. 183 (6:19);
Misbah, fol. 218a.
2. Ibid, II, 129; Tawali4, p. 12.
3. Ibid, IV, 57.
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Acc.ording to al-Ash'arl, he who believes the truth
on the authority of others (taqlidan) is neither a
polytheist nor infidel. Yet al-Ash4ari. does not in
general apply the qualification "faithful" to such a one,
and his doctrine compels him to admit that the sins of
such a one may be forgiven, since he is neither a polytheist
nor an infidel.^"
Al-Baydawi maintains that the belief in the authority
of others is not permissible for a mukallaf who is capable
2
of reflection (nazar) ' 7 :36' but he does not consider
the mukallaf who follows a prophet or a mu.j tahid as
muqall id. In fact, he calls him the "follower of what
3
has been revealed. It is very clear that al-Baydawi
does not wholly share al-Ash4ar"I's view, since he
affirmatively declares that the following of the right
4 alim is permissible.
%
Good, evil and the best
As we already know, the problem of reason and
revelation is one of the most persistent problems in
1. Usui, p. 255.
2. Anwar, III, 202, 218 (l8:15)
3. Ibid, I, 209 (2:170), II, 172 (5:104)
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theological discussion between the Mu'tazilites and the
Ash'arites, since the opinions differ as to the right
precedence of the criterion of reason and revelation.
According to the Mu'tazilites, reason is the criterion
of good and evil. God is good. He is all-wise. The wise
can only do what is best for His servants,^ Therefore,
evil (qabxh) cannot be the negation of His wisdom, since
the existence of it (i.e. evil), is incompatible within
a God who is at once omnipotent and benevolent.
rfy 'jj
\)r> ■ —
Az-Zaraakhshari is in line with the view held by the
majority of the Mu'tazilitos when he says that a thing is
good or bad in itself (qabxhun aw hasanun bi-dhati-hx)
through the judgement of reason. For instance, to fill up
the measure (al-mizan) is good while to decrease it un-
2
justly is bad according to reason. Similarly lying
(al-kidhb) is also bad in itself as even the unbelievers
'
o
realised who did not know the law (shari* a.)
Even the goodness of God is judged by the same standard
1. Milal, p. 30.
2. Al-Kashshaf. I, 451 (ll:85)
3. Ibid, II, 147 (27:49). This verse refers to the story
of the people of the prophet Salih who planned to kill
him, but then did not allow themselves to do so, owing
to their unwillingness to become liars (al-kadhibxn).
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as that of men. He maintains that God's deeds (af'al
Allah) are all good and wise, even if there are some
aspects of the goodness still hidden to human intellect.
Az-Zamakhsharl alludes to the Qur'anic verse •2:30-31'•
He said: "Surely X know that which ye know not. And He
1
taught Adam all the names." God does not will polytheism
(ash-shirk) and disobedience (al-ma'sia). In contrast,
2
He encourages them to do good things (.1 amxli-ha) .
As regards evil (al-qabxh), az-ZamakhsharT maintains
that God did not even will evil acts, it was only the
3
Mujbirites who attributed such acts to God. He interprets
the Qur'anic verse '7*180' ".... and leave those who
blaspheme His names...." by saying leave those who
4
attribute the evil acts to God alone, since it is
inadmissible for God to do any act of evil (la yajuzu
Ef
•alay-hi 1-qabih). The inadmissibility of Him to do such
an act is due to His having no incentive (ad-da'!)/
1. Ibid, I, 51.
2 . Ibid, I, 526 (16:35); cf., vol. I, 316 (40:3l).
3. Ibid, I, 556-7 (17:75), I, 136 (6:148-9)
4. Ibid, I, 360-1.
5. Ibid, vol. I, 403 (9*7).
6. Ibid, I, 326 (7:28). cf., vol. II, pp. 188-9 (30:27)
in which az-ZamakhsharT equates qabTh (evil) with
rauhal (impossible) since both of them could not be
applied to God.
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Takllf - (The imposition of duty)
Does God impose some responsibility on man in
consideration with the principle of good and evil?
In order to avoid the attributing of evil to God,
az-ZamakhsharT, like other Hu'tazilites, maintains that
God does not impose duty on man beyond his capacity. He
bases his view on the Qur'anic verses such as '50:29' "I
wrong not my servants." Of course, for az-Zamakhsharx, God's
praising Himself that He can do no evil, would be useless if
He imposed duty on man beyond his capacity."'" Another point
given by az-Zamakhsharx refers to the Qur'anic verse '16:90'
"Surely Allah bids to justice and good doing..." in which he
maintains that contained in the justice of God is the non-
imposition of duty beyond His servants' capacity (fawqa
taqati-him).
• »
As regards "the best", az-Zamakhshari in defending his
Mu'tazilite view, maintains that God would not do anything
for His servants but the best. He alludes to some Qur'anic
1. Ibid, II, 404.
2. Ibid, II, 535? cf., II, 303 (39s60) in which az-Zamak¬
hsharx considers that those who maintain that God
imposes on human beings the impossible things at«.
great liars against God.
-94-
verses as follows:
I '16:9' "And Allah is the direction of the way
(wa' ala-llahi qasdu s-sabll), and soino (roads) go
not straight (wa min-ha ja' irun) . And had He willed
He would have led you all aright."
Az-Zamakhsharl says that the direction of the way
leading to the truth is necessary for God. He clarifies
the passage by citing •92:12' "Lol ours it is (to give)
the guidance (huda)."
Az-Zamakhsharl places emphasis on the words wa min-ha
ja'irun. A question arises, why did God not say wa 'alay-
ha ,1a' irun? In answer to this, az-Zamakhsharl states that
such words are to declare that the unstraight way should
not be attributed to God. If it wei'e true, as the
Mujbirites said, he.continues, God would say wa *alay-ha
ja'Irun. As far as the proof-text is concerned az-
Zanialchsharl seems to have considered himself in this respect
as a victor against the Mujbirites. Furthermore, he
interprets the verse, "And had He willed He would have
led you all aright" as meaning "by force" (qasran), but
God did not will to do so, since He granted them "free will"
to distinguish between the right and the wrong as clearly
stated in the verse. Therefore, God does only what is good
for His servants.^
1. Ibid, vol. I, 522.
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IX '21:23' "He will not be questioned as to that
which He doeth, but they will be questioned."
(La yus'alu 4 amnia yaf'alu wa hum yus'alun).
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari
tries to draw our attention to every day life. He says
that if it is customary not to question kings concerning
their rules even if they do injustice (fasad)t God the
Almighty would not be questioned as to that which He does.
It is especially conceivable that His deeds are reasonable
(ma'qul) and are motivated by His wisdom (al-hikma).
Therefore, any mistake or act of evil cannot be attributed
to Him."'"
Ill '64:2' "He it is who created you, but one of you
is a disbeliever and one of you is a believer."
(Huwa-lladhT khalaqa-kum fa-min-kum kafirun wa
min-kum mu'minun).
Az-ZamakhsharX maintains that human beings are the
authors of their unbelief (al-kufr) and their being
unbelievers should not be attributed to God, since He is
the wise the knower of all evils, then all His deeds should
be considered good. Therefore, His creation of the author
1. Ibid, II, 43; cf. vol. II, p. 351 (43:33-35),
vol. II, p. 32 (20:88), vol. II, p. l49 (27:62)
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of evil should be considered good and even if the aspect
of goodness still cannot be conceived by human intellect,
yet it does not impair His goodness. In order to make it
clear, az-Zamakhshari sets forth an example by saying that
"Likewise our ignorance of knowing God's motivation in
creating some beautiful creatures, does not impair their
goodness.""*"
IV '91i7-8' "By the soul, and that which shaped
it and inspired it to lewdness and godfearing!"
(wa nafsin wa ma sawwa-ha fa-alhama-ha fu.jura-ha
wa taqwa-ha).
Az-Zamakhshari states that the right and the wrong
have been inspired (alhama) by God, so it is up to Reason
to distinguish between the two, and choose willingly. In
supporting his view, he refers to the Qur'anic verses
' 91:9-10' "Prosperous is he who purifies it, (qad aflaha
man zakka-ha), and failed has he who seduces it"(wa qad
khaba man dassa-ha). He says that Reason is the cause
of growth or the stunting of it, not God, The basis of
his argument is that the "doer" (al-fa*il) in "zaklca-ha
and dassa-ha" is Reason (al-'aql) not God. Furthermore,
1. Ibid, II, 463.
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he says that only the Mujbirites attributed such a thing
to God who is the exalted.^"
According to the Ash'arites, Revelation is the
criterion of good and evil. Reward and punishment are
only the consequences of God's being well pleased or
2
displeased.
Al-Baydawx maintains that a thing is good or bad when
it is proved by law (sharx'a) and not judged by Reason.
As regards the taklxf, al-Baydawx maintains that God
can impose duty on man beyond his capacity (taklxf ma la
yutaq). He bases this view on the second part of the
Qur'anic verse '2:285' "..... our Lord, do Thou not
burden us beyond what we have the strength to bear." He
says that if taklxf is inadmissible, the invocation (du'a')
in the verse would be useless, while in his interpretation
of the first part of the verse "Allah charges no soul
save its capacity" he maintains that God will not impose
4
^ie taklxf on man beyond his capacity, although He could.
1. Ibid, II, 546.
2. Milal, p. 30.
3. Anwar, III, 7 (7:28) cf. II, 212-13 (6:148-9) in which
al-Baydawx admits that the verse supports the view of
az-Zamalchsharx that God does not will the evil acts
(f»lu 1-qaba*ih).
4. Ibid, I, pp. 273-4; cf., vol. I, p. 244 (2:233).
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Judging from his two statements, al-Baydawx tries to
balance his view between the attributing of evil to God by-
means of imposing duty on man beyond his capacity and the
"rationale" of the taklxf itself as understood by az-
Z amakhsharl.
Al-Baydawx strongly attacks az-Zamakhshari's view
regarding "the best" (al-islah) by saying *16:9' that
it is not necessary for God to guide people to the right
way (tarxq mustaqxm). If He does so, it is a mere grace
(fadl) and mercy (rahma) from Him, because if He had willed,
He would have guided them collectively to the right way.
Al-Baydawx argues that it is God's unwillingness that made
them disbelieve, and not any misuse of their Reason.
Therefore, God is not bound to do what "is best"
As far as verse '21:23' is concerned, al-Baydawx says
that God will not be questioned as to what He does because
He is almighty and is the sole agent of power. Hence, He
can do what He wills even if the act involves evil (i.e.,
the creation of unbelief). For al-Baydawx, it seems that
Good and evil are relevant only to human acts and cannot
be attributed to God whether the consequence of His deed
1. Ibid, III, 176.
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is good or not for His creatures since He will not be
questioned about what He does."*"
Concerning the Qur'anic verse '64:2', al-Baydawx
believes that God already created human beings whether
disbelievers or not. If God willed someone to be a
believer, He would have created something which would lead
him to become a believer and so on. Therefore, the principle
of "the best" according to al-Baydawx, remains as no
2
obligation to God.
As regards verse '9157-8', al-BaydawT, however,
maintains that the inspiration of the wrong (fu.jur), and
the right (taqwa) is dependent upon Revelation, not Reason,
since the "doer" (al-fa'il) in the said verses refers to
God while az-Zamakhsharl believes that it should refer to
3
Reason.
In the light of the above arguments between az-
Zamakhshari and al-Baydawx, it can be concluded that
az-Zamakhsharx., who was a supporter of the Mu'tazilites,
believes that human reason is capable of knowing the
hasan and the qabxh without the assistance of any
1. Ibid, IV, 38.
2. Ibid, V, 134.
3. Ibid, V, 187.
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prophetic revelation. In order to correspond to this
principle, az-Zamakhsharx has to say that God is bound to
do what is best forhuman beings. Goodness, according to
az-Zamakhsharl is a real quality inherent in things which
are rationally known to be good. Similarly badness is a
quality that is inherent in things which are rationally
known to be bad. Al-Baydawx, however, believes that
goodness and badness are determined things (i.e. by God).
Furthermore, the goodness or badness of a thing is not a
real quality of things inherent in them but a function of
the divine will. Therefore, the principle of "the best"
has no place in al-Baydawl's theology.
Sustenance (rizq)
As far as "sustenance" is concerned, az-Zamakhsharx
maintains that God would not produce an "unlawful sustenance",
since He attributes the rizq to Himself, and it is only that
sort of thing (i.e. lawful sustenance) which is called
"sustenance". *2:3' "... and spend of that we have
bestowed upon them.""'' Az-Zamakhsharx argues that God has
granted everyone his own "sustenance" including food,
drink etc. in the right way so that sustenance can only
be called "lawful sustenance". Az-Zamakhsharx's argument,
1, Al-Kashshaf. I, 18; cf. (8:22) vol. I, 495.
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therefore, is taken to imply that God can grant no
"unlawful sustenance"."'" It is very clear that az-Zaraakhsharl1 s
strong defence that only "lawful sustenance" can be attributed
to God, is to avoid attributing evil things to Him since He
is the wise, and the wise always does what is best. On the
other hand, his treatment of the subject is rather peculiar
which can be seen through his interpretation of the verse
* 11j6* "And there is not a beast in the earth but the
sustenance thereof dependeth on Allah" (♦ala-llahi rizqu-
ha).
The obvious meaning of the verse is that it is
necessary for God to sustain His servants. Az-Zarnakhshari,
however, tries to explain the text by saying that the
words "*ala-llahi rizqu-ha" mean a "grace" from God.
Having assured that He would sustain them gracefully,
however, it became obligatory (wa,jiban) s.s when someone
2
makes a vow. Of course, its obligatory nature, according
to az-Zamakhsharl, is due to His promise that He would
sustain them gracefully, since God is truthful, az-
ZamakhsharT argues, He will fulfil His promise.
Al-BaydawT, however, maintains that "sustenance" can
be both lawful and unlawful sustenance, since it is God who
1. Ibid, II, 350 (53:32)
2. Ibid, I, 436.
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a&fc§#stins them both. God's attribution of sustenance to
Himself, does not mean that only the lawful ones can be
considered as "sustenance". Moreover, he says that the
attributing of sustenance to God is merely for exaltation
(ta'zim), and encouraging people towards "charity". As
far as the verse '11:3' is concerned, al-Baydawx admits
that the sustenance is taken to mean "lawful sustenance"
because God admires it. Thus what really concerns
al-Baydawx is not the verse itself, but the concept of
rizq in general, and whether or not it can be used in its
general meaning. Al-Baydawx, however, declares that the
term rizq can be generally applied to both the "lawful"
and the "unlawful sustenance". He alludes to a prophetic
tradition saying that "God has sustained you by what is
good (tayyiban) then you have chosen what has been
prohibited by God from His rizq in place of what has been
made lawful to you."
Al-Baydawx argues that if it were not called rizq
(sustenance), the consumer in the whole of his life, would
not also be called "one sustained" (ghayra marzuqin),
since God said '11:6' "And there is not a beast in the
earth but the sustenance thereof dependeth on Allah."
For al-Bayclawx, as far as rizq is concerned, there is
nobody who will escape from being sustained by God whether
the rizq is lawful or not."''
• Anwar, I, 58.
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More evidence given by al-Baydawl is that *5:881
"Eat of that which Allah has bestowed on you as food .
lawful (halalan) and good (tayyiban),
« «
Al-Baydawx says that if the rizq does not imply
"unlawful" (al-haram) the mention of the word halalanX • 7 •
(lawful) in the verse would be useless."'"
The questions of the superiority of angels and prophets.
Before going any further it is, perhaps, relevant to
quote the important passage from al-Baghdadi concerning the
angels and the prophets:
"The large majority of our friends maintain
the superiority of the prophets over the angels;
they do not, however, mention anyone individually.
The followers of Tradition do not teach the
superiority of the angels over the prophets
except al-Hasan ibn-al-Fadl al-Bajall. The
Mu'tazilites are divided on this point. The
majority of them are of the opinion that the
angels are ntoce superior to every prophet.
Others, however, say that those angels who
have committed no sin are more excellent than
1. Ibid, II, 166; cf., vol. V, 60 (53:32).
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th.e prophets, whereas those who have committed
even the slightest sin, such as Ifarut and Marut,
are inferior to the prophets. This is the
opinion of al-Asamm."
Az-Zamakhsharx asserts (positively) that the angels
have superiority over the prophets by referring to the
following Qur'anic verse :
I '4:172' "The Messiah will never scorn to be a
slave unto God nor will the favoured angels;who¬
so scorneth His service and is proud, all such
will He assemble unto Him." (lan yastankifa 1-
maslhu an yakuna 'abdan li-llahi wa la 1-mala'ikatu
1-muqarrabun.....)
Commenting on the text, az-Zamakhsharl, however,
concentrates on the words "nor will the favoured angels"
wa la 1-mala'ikatu 1-muqarrabun. By this, he means that
"not even those (angels) who are superior to the Messiah."
The source of this interpretation which we have just
mentioned, however, is based on the science of rhetorics
( ' ilin al-ma' an".) because it necessitates this particular
interpretation of the verse. On the other hand, this verse
was revealed to invalidate the Christians' claim of the
1. Usui, p. 295 Sq; cf. , p. 166 Sq
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raising of Jesus' position beyond "slavery standard"
(al-manzila al-4ubudiyya). If this occasion of revelation
(sabab an-nuzul) was correct, he argues, the verse should
be interpreted to mean that even the favoured angels who
are not too proud to worship Him, will never escape from
being called "slave" (4ubudiyya), let alone the Messiah.
Therefore, it is a clear proof for az-Zamakhsharl that the
specializing of al-muqarrabun in the verse was to indicate
a special privilege given to them (bestowing superiority
on them over other creatures). Finally, az-Zamakhshari
makes a short remark concerning the technicality of
reciting the word *abd(slave) in the verse. He says that
the caliph 4All himself has his own technicality which
differs from the text. 4All, however, is imported to have
styled it (4abd) into "diminutive noun" (ism at-Tasghlr),
therefore the word becomes 4Ubayd.It is obvious from his
interpretation that az-Zamakhsharl•s attempt to denounce
the superiority of ^he Messiah over the angels involves all
of the other prophets in the text, and this has become a
major discussion as contained within the Mu'tazilite and the
Ash4arite theology.
II "And those who dwell in His presence
are not too proud to worship Him, nor do they
weary" (wa man 4inda-hu la yastakbirun 4 an
4ibadati-hl wa la yastahsirun).
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 2hl - Sq
Concerning this verse, az-Zamakhsharx says that
man *inda-hu are the angels, favoured and honoured by God.
The reason for their being honoured and highly regarded,
he argues, is a result of their constant obedience and
humility to God as shown by the text. The prophets,
however, have not possessed such behaviour. Moreover,
az-Zamakhshari proceeds to argue that all the descriptions
given to them were indicative of their superiority over
other creatures/ Therefore, it is suitable, according to
az-Zamakhsharx, that they are positioned nearest to the
kings where they are favoured, and preferred over others.
Ill '12:31' "This is not a human being. This is no
other than some gracious angel." (ma hadha basharan
in hadha ilia malakun karxmun).
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharx
tries to draw our attention to the handsome and even
*
beautiful physical appearance of Joseph. He also points
out that the ladies were surprised to find Joseph
physically attractive. As a result of this, he explained
that they denied his "manhood" (al-bashariyya) and affirmed
that Joseph's beauty was not that of a human being but that
of an angel. Az-Zamakhshari. even goes further by
1. Ibid, I, 42.
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describing the basic nature of the creation of the angels
and Satan which will lead us to his principle of good and
evil. However, he states that there will be no more
beautiful among His creatures than the angels, and their
beauty, he argues, is by nature. Likewise, there will be
no more hideous than Satan by nature. Therefore, it is
not surprising that God always sets out examples of good
and evil with the angels and Satan respectively. Implicit
in his statements is the very fact that he tried to make
a fair justification between Reason and Revelation.
Having explained all the points with regard to the
verse, az-Zamalchsharl began attacking the Sunnites for
their concept of the superiority of the prophets over the
angels, and accusing them of changing the realities
(haqa'iq), and denying "immediate 3oi.ondc«s" ('ulura
ad-Dctrhra) .
»
IV '14:10' "They said: Ye are but mortals like us.
(QalG in an turn ilia basharun mithlu-na)
Their main argument in this respect is based on
Reason ('aql); in other words "what they have already in
mind" regarding the superiority of the angels over the
prophets. For az-Zamakhsharl, the text this time is a
1. Ibid, I, 471.
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clear proof to support his opinion. For example such an
unsatisfactory attitude showed by the unbelievers asserts
that they are mortals like them. If there is no difference
between us and the prophets, they argue, why have they been
chosen as prophets and not us? Their doubts, according to
az-Zamakhsharl, at least, could be removed by sending a
prophet from the angels.
After a careful study of his interpretation in this
respect, az-Zamakhshari, however, does not realise that
what they had in mind concerning the subject matter did
not occur (i.e. there was no prophet from the angels).
So far as az-ZamakhsharX1s explanation of this verse is
concerned, his main emphasis is obviously to strengthen
his view of the superiority of the angels over the prophets."*"
V '7*20' "We said! Your Lord forbade you from this
tree only lest ye should become angels or become of
*
the immortals." (wa gala ma naha-kuma Rabbu-
kuma 'an hadhihX sh-Sha.jarati ilia an takuna\nw-n
mina 1-khalidTn).
Az-Zamakhsharl'a rational interpretation of the verse
in this case is chiefly dependent upon the success of
IblXs in persuading Adam and his wife Eve to eat the
1. Ibid, I, 502j cf., vol. II, 442 (54:24)
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forbidden fruit. The reason for "God's forbidding the
fruit" according to Iblxs, is clear from the text that
"Lest they should become angels (malakayni) or immortals
(khalidayni)." According to az-Zamakhsharx, Adam, however,
has already conceived that by being an angel he will be
superior than his present position as a prophet. Adam's
desire, and his act of transgression of the limit of God,
according to az-Zamakhsharx, shows clearly that "angelhood"
(al-malakiyya) is superior to the "manhood" (al-bashariyya).
VI '21:26' "And they say: The Beneficent hath taken
unto Himself a son. Be He glorified! Nay, but
(those whom they call sons) are honoured slaves."
(wa qalu t-talchadha r-Rahmanu waladan subhana-hu
bal 'ibadun mukramun).
As far as this Qur'anic verse is concerned, az-
Zamakhsharx maintains that the angels with their excellent
gifts and characteristics (viz. lack of pride, and lack
of weariness) make people think that they are the sons of
God. But the very fact is that their claim was wrong as
"strongly denied by the text." "Nay, but they are honoured
slaves." However, az-Zamakhsharx's objective is merely to
reflect the beauty of the angels by nature which is,
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 32U.
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therefore, superior to other creatures/
VII '17:70' "Verily we have honoured the children of
Adam;we carry them on the land and the sea, and have
made provision of good things for them, and have
preferred them above many of those whom we created
with a marked preferment." (wa laqad karramna bani
Adama wa faddalna-hum 'ala kathxrin mimman
• e
khalaqna taf'dxlan).
Az-Zamakhsharx's strong defence of his view concerning
this verse is mainly centred on the words "and we have
preferred them above many of those whom we created"
(wa faddalna-hum *ala kathxrin mimman khalaqna). To
him the words "kathlrin mimman khalaqna" do not include
the angels (al-mala' ilea) . Perhaps, the same reason can be
referred to the things we have already explained. Az-
Zamakhsharx's bitter attack on the Sunnites with regard to
%
the subject-matter leads to his falsifying some of the
prophetic traditions. For example, the tradition which is
narrated by Abu-Hurayra who reported that the prophet said
that the believer is more honourable before God than the
angels. However, he accused the Sunnites, in this respect,
of being prejudiced towards their "manhood" (bashariyya).
Another main controversial point is referred to the word
1. Ibid, II, 44.
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katliir (many). For the Sunnites, they mean ,j ami' (all of
His creatures, including the angels). Az-Zamakhsharx,
however, considers the case as a crime. Moreover, he
points out that the Sunnites' committing of the crime is an
act of their antagonism towards the angels. On the other
hand, he says that they have no feeling at all. As a
result they have defied the real meaning of the verse."'"
VXII '38:75' "He said: 0 Iblxs! What hindereth thee
from falling prostrate before that which I have
created with both my hands? Art thou too proud
or art thou of the high exalted?" (Qala ya Iblxsu
in a mana' a-ka an tas.juda lima khalaqtu bi-yadayya
astakbarta am kunta mina 1-'alxna).
This Qur'anic verse is concerned with az-ZamakhsharX's
assertion that there are two main reasons which made Iblxs
refuse to prostrate before Adam.
Firstly: Iblxs' sole objective was to worship only God.
One would suppose that Iblxs would have considered bowing
down to Adam to be a deviation from his ultimate goal of
worship.
Secondly: This idea is justified by reference to the
different nature of his creation compared to Adam, for he
1. Ibid, I, 555.
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was created from fire whereas Adam was created from clay,
because of this, he (iblls) considered himself better than
Adam. If this is so, why should he fall prostrate before
Adam?
Az-Zamakhsharx, however, considers Iblis' arguments as
improper, since he has misunderstood God's command. For
az-Zamakhsharx, God does not command anything without any
purpose. He points out that the su.jud in this respect,
was not for 'ibada (worship) as conceived by Iblxs, but it
was for respect and homage (takrjm ) to the new creature
(i.e. Adam). According to az-Zamakhsharx the bowing down
(sujud) does not imply that the person to whom the
prostration was made (i.e. Adam) (al-masjudu la-hu) is
superior to the prostrators (as-saj idun) since the sujud
was made out of respect (takrxin wa tab.jxl). The angels,
who are favoured by God, he argues, made sujud without
any objection, because they merely followed the command.
In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhsharx gives an example
of everyday life. He equates God's command to Iblxs and
his refusal with that of a minister who has been commanded
by his king to visit some areas which are full of poor
servants. The minister refuses to do so, because he thinks
he is better than them in rank, while they are in a low
position. As a result the king becomes angry with him and
says to his minister: What prevents you from visiting them
as both you and they (the poor) are my subjects?"*"
1. Ibid, II, 290.
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We may deduce from this discussion that az-Zamakhsharx's
view of the angels is that they are superior to the prophets.
However, from his treatment of the verse concerning Adam
and Iblxs, it seems that az-Zamakhsharx considered Adam as
even inferior to Iblxs.
The Ash'arites, with the exception of Abu-Bakr al-
Baqillanx (d. 403/1013)"*" and 'Abd-Allah b. al-Halxmx (d. ?)
held that the prophets were superior to the angels.
Al-Baydawx's view regarding this point and whether or not
he was a true adherent of the Ash'arite view, can be found
in his criticism of az-Zamakhsharx.
Concerning the Qur'anic verse '4:172', al-Baydawx
in his refutation, concentrated on the occasion of revel¬
ation of the verse since it became a central point of
az-Zamalchsharx's treatment of the subject-matter. Al-
Baydawx, however, makes a fierce attack on az-Zamakhsharx
*
by saying that the verse was to refute those who worshipped
Jesus and those who worshipped the angels, and not to
refute the concept of Christianity which raised Jesus
from "slavery standard".
However, al-Baydawx's account relating to the occasion
of revelation is very relevant to the verse which came before
1. cf., Tawali', p. 92.
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it, arid is presumably correct. The verse runs as follows:
•4:171' "0 people of the Scripture! Do not
exaggerate in your religion nor utter aught
concerning Allah save the truth. The Messiah,
Jesus, son of Mary, was only a messenger of
Allah, and His word which He conveyed unto
Mary, and a spirit from Him. So believe in
Allah and His messengers, and say not 'Three' -
Cease! (it is) better for you! - Allah is
only one God. Far is it removed from His
transcendent majesty that he should have a son.
His is all that is in the heavens and all that
is in the earth. And Allah is sufficient as
defender."
Supposing that this verse were to deal with the
concept of the Christianity or raising the standard of
Jesus from the "slavery level" as claimed by az-Zamakhsharl,
he argues that the conjunctive particle (hurf al-4atf)
"and" (al-waw) in the verse: wa la 1-rnala' ikatu l-muqarrabttn
which is connected to lan yastankifa 1-MasIh an yakuna
'abdan li-llah would possibly give an emphatic meaning by
means of increasing the numbers (li-t-takthir), and not for
the magnlficaticailll-t-takbTr) . Nevertheless, this does not
serve az-Zainakhsharl's argument. Therefore, the meaning of
the verse runs:
The Messiah will never scorn even if he is alone (sliakhsun% 6
-115-
wahidun) to be a slave unto God nor will the many persons
(al-ashkhas al-kathxra )among the favoured angels. In order
to make it clear (i.e. li-t-takthxr), al-Baydawl, however,
gives an example from everyday life. He states that when
people say that "he has become the commander in chief, in
T
which case neither the president nor his subjects oppose
A
him," they only mean to multiply the numbers. Another
supposition with regard to the emphatic meaning in the
sense of takbxr is also inevitably exposed to al-Baydawx*s
criticisms. If the "conjunctive particle" in the verse
was projected to emphasise the takbxr, he argues, its object
would lead to the concept of the superiox'ity of the favoured
angels over Jesus. So far, al-Baydawx concludes, it still
does not, in any way, entail the superiority of the angels
in general over the prophets.^"
Evidence given by az-Zamakhsharl regarding the
Qur'anic verse '21:19' "That their humble, and their
constant obedience etc.." makes them superior to the
prophets, has been unacceptable to al-Baydawx when he
2
definitely confesses that they were favoured and honoured.
However, he states that such evidence - even though in
1. Anwar, II, 131«
2. Ibid, IV, 37.
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iV
one sense fis correct - is not a strong proof compared to
the arguments against their superiority over the prophets
Al-Bai'dawi's view with regard to the interpretation of
the Qur'anic verse '12:31' in one sense, is likely to
support az-Zamakhsharx. For instance, his illustration
concerning the special characteristics of Joseph or the
angels; namely that they have admirable beauty, excellent
CIAA\ \ f"V^ Sio,
perfection and ^in£aJ;Jfctb±£iiry (' isma) . But all of these
attributes are, perhaps, not those which make the angels
superior to the prophets. However, so far as this Qur'anic
verse is concerned, al-Baydawx makes an indirect reference
2
to az-Zamakhsharx's views.
Concerning the Qur'anic verse '14:10', al-Baydawi
explained that it only refers to the unbelievers' view
that they would not accept a messenger unless he was an
angel. Thus, it seems that al-Baydawi is following
3
az-Zamakhshari's explanation of the verse.
Commenting on the verse '7*20', al-Baydawi rejected








desire of- Adam and Eve to become angels as in indication
of their superiority to the prophets. According to al-
Baydawx, such a desire was not realised."'" Al-Baydawx,
however, confesses that the Qur'anic verse '7:20' implies
the superiority of the angels over Adam only at the time
of speaking (i.e. between Adam and Iblxs). When Adam
realised that such a remark was only a story related to
Iblxs, the verse (i.e. the superiority of the angels) no
2
longer had signxficance. Therefore, it does not support
az-Zamakhsharx's view.
Al-Baydawx's view with regard to the Qur'anic verse
'21:26' is exactly as az-Zamakhsharx*s, even though he
does not clearly state the reason why the unbelievers
3
considered the angels to be superior to the prophets.
Al-Baydawx's emphasis on the verse '17570' about the
superiority of the angels over the prophets in general
indicates his adoption of the moderate view between the
Sunnites (the Ash'arites) and the Mu'tazilites. However,
he confesses that the archangels (khawwas) are superior to
human beings (i.e. the prophets). Al-Baydawi in this
agrees
respect, has agreed with az-Zamakhsharx, but the general-
1. Ibid, III, 6.
2. Misbah, fol. 227b.
3. Anwar, IV, 38.
-118-
ization of angels as a whole made by az-Zainakhsharl was
the centre of controversy. Al-Baydawx, however, refuted
it (i.e. the generalization) by saying that it is not
necessary to consider the superiority of a group of the
angel3 (ba'du-hum) over the prophets in the verse infers
looking down on some of the prophets who are superior to
the angels.
A1-Baydawi's disagreement with the view held by the
majority of the Ash'arites in this case, can be drawn from
his statement regarding the word kathlr (many) in the verse.
He states that kathir does not mean al-lcull (all) as
claimed by the majority of the Ash'arites. Moreover, he
considers the interpretation given by the Ash'arites as
contrary to the obvious fact (khilaf az-Zahir). On the
other hand, the allocation of kathir, instead of kull. has
no significant meaning at all (ta'assuf).■
*
Al-Baydawa.'s attack on. az-Zamakhsharl's view regarding
Iblxs' refusal of sujud in the verse '38:75' is mainly
2
based on his view that Adam is superior to certain angels.
Another reason he refers to is the nature of Adam's
creation itself which consists of lust, etc. which is,
according to him, better than the creation of the angels.
1. Anwar. Ill, 207.
2. Ibid, V, 22.
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For al-Baydawi, the bowing down (sujud) implies inferiority
such as the inferiority of the commanded angels (al¬
ma' murun bi~s-su,jud) to Adam."*" He points out that the
Wise one (al-haklm) would not command those who were
excellent to serve those who were inferior to them
(la ya'mur al-afdal bi-khidinati 1-mafdul). Bearing this
view in mind, however, al-Baydawi unconsciously follows the
Mu'tazilite principle of good and evil. So far as the
verse in our discussion is concerned, al-Baydawi's
description of Iblis4 refusal of sujud is proper (sahih),
since God has the power of commanding those whom he likes
in the same way as a master who has the authority of asking
his slaves to serve his other slaves, because they are (all)
in the same position before their master. On the other
hand, al-Baydawi asserts that Adam who has more prestige
than certain angels (i.e. the prostrators), deservedly
_ 3
received the sujud. Whatever reasons are given about
Xblis' refusal of su^ud, al-Baydawi maintains that Iblis
was obliged to do so (i.e. su.jud) since he is also a slave
of God. However, the fact is that, as al-Baydawi insists,
Adam is superior to some of the angels.








of the .prophets to the angels, he proceeds to refer to
some Qur'anic verses as follows:
X *2:31' "And He taught Adam all the names, then
showed them to the angels saying: inform of the
names of these, if ye are truthful."
Al-Baydaw! affirms that Adam is superior to the
commanded angels (i.e. who fell prostrate) since he (Adam)
knew better than them. Then al-Baydaw! proceeds to refer
to the Qur'anic verse '39*9* "And those who ltnow equal
with those know not?""*"
II '2:3^' "And when we said unto the angels prostrate
yourselves before Adam, they fell prostrate, all
save IblTs. He demurred through pride, and so
became a disbeliever."
%
Al-Baydaw! maintains that Adam is superior to the
angels who fell prostrate before him. (a1-ma'murun bi-s-
su.jud) . This, however, implies that some angels are
superior to Adam. His moderate view in this respect is
perhaps, due to the fact that there are among the angels
»'VKVV-A'A^L, vV^ ^,/v
those who are not infalrlirble (ghayra ma'sumln) even though
the majority of them are. Likewise some people are also




infallible while the rest are not.
III A prophetic tradition declaring that the works of
worship)? (* ibada) most worthy of reward are those
which are difficult to perform.
Since human beings were not created naturally to be
obedient like the angels, it would be difficult for them
to fulfil the religious obligations. Therefore, their
2
deeds are highly appreciated, and deserve great reward.
IV *3'33' "Lo! God preferred Adam and Noah and the
family of Abraham and the family of 'Imran above
(all His) creatures."
Al-Baydawo. declares that those who were mentioned in
this verse including Jesus and the Prophet Muhammad, are
3
superior to the angels. It is implied that those who were
%
not chosen, are inferior to the angels.
Judging from his arguments with az-Zamakhsharx about
1. Ibid, I, l4lj Tawali', p. 92.
2. Tawali*, pp. 92-93; Misbah, fol. 226b.
3. Anwar, II, l4; Tawali*, p. 93; Misbah, fol. 226a.
It is noted that az-Zamakhsharx explains away this
verse without referring to the superiority of either
the angels or the prophets. cf. , al-Kas'nshaf, I, 1^3.
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the superiority of the prophets over the angels, al-
BaydawT firmly takes a moderate view between the Mu'tazilites
and the Ash'aritos. The opinion that al-Baydawl is a true
Ash'arite, however, is not compatible with his own view
and therefore, does not seem to be correct.
The miracles of the saints (karamat)
In fact, the Mu'tazilites strongly oppose the view
that the karama is possible for the saints (awliya1). They
say that if the karama is granted, it will be confusing to
distinguish between the prophets and the non-prophets. On
the other hand, karama is against the natural course of
things, and no human being can cause any disorder in the
course of nature. While the Ash'arites affirmatively
maintain that the karama is possible for the awliya'
since it is not meant to silence opponents. Therefore it
%
is quite different from the mu' .1 iza as the mu* ,j iza sought
to silence opponents, and it was usually faced with
opposition (tahadda) and da'wa (claim). On the other hand,
for the Ash'arites, karama is a favour from God which He
can bestow on the awliya' .
1. Ar-RazT, Kitab al-Arba'in, pp. 384-88; Usui, pp. 170-
185.
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In order to investigate az-Zamakhshari*s view
regarding the karama, we had better refer to his inter¬
pretation of some Qur'anic verses related to this point
I '3*^2' "And when the angels said: 0 Mary!
Lo! God has chosen thee and made thee pure, and
has preferred thee above (all) the woman of
creation."
Az-Zamakhshari places emphasis on the incident which
took place between the angel and Mary. He says that the
incident was the result of Zachariah's miracle or the sign
foretelling the prophecy of Jesus, and not Mary's karama.
II '3 :371 "Whenever Zachariah went into the
sanctuary where she was, he found that she had
food. He said: 0 Mary! Whence cometh unto thee
this (food)? She answered: It is from God. God
giveth without stint to- whom He will."
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhshari
tried to explain away the verse, and left it without
referring to whether or not the food which came to Mary
2
was a result of her miracle or Zachariah's.
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, l46 .
2. Ibid, I, 145.
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XIX '72:26, 27' "He is the knower of the unseen,
and He revealeth unto none His secret, save unto
every messenger (rasul) whom He hath chosen, and
then He malceth a guard to go before him, and a
guard behind him."
Commenting on this verse, az-Zamakhsharl, however,
emphasises the words "Save unto every messenger whom He
had chosen" (ilia man irtada min rasul), He points out
that though the saints were chosen by God, yet they were
not His messengers. Therefore, they are excluded from the
obvious meaning of the verse. Moreover, he says that this
verse was to repudiate the miracles of the saints, since
they were not the messengers of God, and God gives the
miracles only to His messengers.
In order to make it clear, az-Zamakhshari proceeds to
give us an example by saying that this verse is also to
*
repudiate the divination (al-kahana), and the astrology
(at-tan.jim) . The reason for God's repudiation, according
to az-Zamakhshari, is due to the fact that both the
diviner and the astrologer have not been granted the
sanction of God (al-irtida'), instead, they are subject to
the wrath of God."*"
1. Ibid, II, 497.
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Al-Baydawx, in agreement with the Ash'arites
concerning the miracles of* the saints, maintains that the
karama is possible for the saints.
Concerning the Qur'anic verse '3: 42 ' , al-Baydawx
maintains that the angels "talking to Mary face to face"
was the result of her karama and not Zachariah's miracle
as claimed by az-Zainakhsharx. However, he asserts that
2
the karaiaa xs not impossible for the saints.
Al-Baydawx's criticism regarding the Qur'anic verse
• 3 s 3 7 * is obvious. He says that the verse itself, however,
3is indicative of the possibility of karama for the saints.
Al-Baydawx, in his interpretation of the Qur'anic
verse '72:26, 27'* strongly repudiates az-Zamakhsharx's
view. He points out that the word rasul (messenger) in
the verse, means the angel (al-malak), and not the prophet
as claimed by az-Zamakhsharx. On the other hand, he
argues that the significance of using the words "ilia man
irtada inin rasul" is to show that there is no intermediary









chosen them to know the unseen (al-ghayb). In order to
make his view clear, he states that the karama of the
saints on the unseen (al-mughayyabat) is through the
intermediary of the angels. Likewise, our knowledge of the
eschatological matters, he continues, is dependent on the
intermediary of the prophet."'" Inevitably al-BaydawT's
interpretation of the word rasul to mean the angel, however,
implies that the karama is not impossible for anyone who has
been chosen by God, even though he is not a prophet.
Therefore, the karama, based on al-Baydawi's argument, is
also possible for the saints.
1. Ibid, V, 156.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTERMEDIATE POSITION, PROMISE AND THREAT
This chapter is to examine az-Zaraakhshari1s view
regarding the fundamental Mu'tazilite principles of
"Intermediate Position" (al-Manzila bayn al-Manzilatayn),
hand, it is to expose al-BaydawT's criticism of az-
Zamakhsharl's regarding the fate of the grave sinner (murta -
According to a widely accepted the doctrine of
the intermediate position started with Wasil or'Amr
declaring that the grave sinner was in an intermediate
position and then withdrawing from al-Hasan's circle."'"
Az-Zamakhshari1s support to this doctrine of the
intermediate position can be seen from his interpretation
of certain Qur'anic verses:
I .'17*9-10' "Surely this Qur'an guides to the
way that is straightest, and gives good tidings to
• Milal, p. 33; cf. , Mas'udi, Muruj adh-Uhaiiab, vol. VI,
p. 22, and repeated in vol. VII, p. 23^; al-BaghdadT,
Farq, pp. 97-8; al-Khayyat, Kitab al-Intisar, pp. 118-
9; Watt, Formative Period, pp. 209-11, 229-30.
Promise and Threat" (al-Wa'd wa 1-Wa'id). On the other
kib al-Kabira), the concept of Iman, etc.
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the believers who do deeds of righteousness, that
theirs shall be a great wage, and that those who
do not believe in the world to come we have
prepared for thein a painful chastisement."
The verses integrally deal with two categories of
people; the believers and the unbelievers without even
mentioning the wicked. To this, az-Zainakhshari maintains
that people at that time belong whether to believers or
hypocrites, then come the follower of the intermediate
position.However, az-Zamakhshari*s view suggests that
the "doctrine" was not known during the revelation.
II '2:26' "He leads none astray save the wicked."
(wa ma yudillu bi-hi ilia 1-fasiqin)
Az-Zamakhshari emphasises that lasiq is in the
intermediate position since he is disobedient to the law
»
of God by committing grave sins. Therefore, he should be
eternally punished • Az-Zamakhshari states that there are
two verses in the Qur'an which have been used regarding
fasiq; I *49:11' "An evil name is ungodliness after
belief."
II *9:67' "The hypocrites - they are the ungodly."
!. Al-Kashshaf. I, 543.
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Az-Zamakh.3harx states that this doctrine is taken from
Wasil Ibn-'Ata'
• #
Al-Baydawx agreed with az-Zamakhsharx in defining
fasiq as a man who commits an act of disobedience against
the command of God, but he disagreed with az-Zamakhshari
about the fate of fasiq or the grave sinner in which
az-Zamakhshari strongly maintains that he is in the
intermediate category; neither a believer nor an unbeliever,
and he will remain forever in the fire if he does not
repent.
In order to make his refutation clear al-Baydawi
divided the grave sinner (al-fasiq) into three categories
I / /He who commits grave sin and considers it
, J ^ , . _abominable \mustaqbihan). To this, ai-Baydawi calls
it at-taghabx.
II He who commits grave sin habitually without
considering the consequence is called al-inhimak.
III He who commits grave sin and considers it licit
(mustahillan) is called al-juhud. At this fasiq,
1. Ibid, I, k9.
1
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al-BaydawT admits that he is no longer to be ca.lled
a believer, while the other two are still believers
since the name of a believer could not be removed so
long as it was ascribed to the tasdiq of which was
called iman.Implicit in his statement is that the
grave sinner is not in the intermediate category.
Therefore, the fate of him is not forever in the fire.
The third category of fasiq, however, will eternally
be punished on the basis that he is an unbeliever,
not because he commits grave sin.
- -
» Jp\ ^> )
/ j)
"Grave" (kaba' ir) and "venial" sins (sagha' ir) C <
The demarcation between grave and venial sins as well
as their punishment (*iqab) was the object of serious
controversy in early Islam. However, the term "kaba1ir"
itself has its origin in the Qur'an "53s33" "kaba'ir al-
ithm wa. 1-fawahish" (heinous sins and indecencies) which
has become the pivotal basis of the distinction of sins.
- :P\jl/ J
2
Perhaps, its first stage, as Vensinck says, may be
found in the traditions in which the Prophet is asked
about the greatest sin. The answer is: polytheism (shirk).
1. Anwar, I, 127.
^• Muslim Creed, p, 36,
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Then it is asked: What next? The answer is: Killing one's
own child, or: inhuman treatment of parents. The third in
the list is either adultery or false witness.^"
According to al-Ash*arl, the Mu'tazilites in general
recognised the basic demarcation between "grave" and
"venial" sins by saying:
"Everything for which there is a threat (wa'Id) is
"grave", whereas any act of disobedience for which there
is no wa'id is "venial". Others took the view that not only
everything which is the direct object of wa*id is "grave"
but so is also everything which is similar to it in degree,
and that everything for which there is no wa'ld or anything
analogous to it can be either entirely or partly "venial"
and partly "grave", but it can never happen that such an act
should be neither "venial" nor even partly "venial". Ja'far
b. Mubashshir of the Baghdad School taught that all intention
(to commit a sin) v/as a "grave" sin, all those who committed
2
an act of disobedience intentionally were grave sinners.
Az-ZamakhsharT had as somewhat different definition to
give about the distinction between these two kinds of sins.
He clearly states that a "grave" sin is one whose punishment
1
2
Muslim, Sahlh, vol. I, p. 4l;
115-6, (25:68).
Maqalat, vol. I, p. 306.
cf., al-Kashshaf, II,
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could not be pardoned except by repentance (tavba).^
Whilst al-Baydawi declares that the definition of
"grave" sin (kabira) is that for which a definite legal
punishment has been fixed by the lawgiver (ash-shari'),
/ \ 2
or the lawgiver threatens a punishment jwa'ld).
Having explained the position of "grave" sin, it has
become clear that az-Zamakhsharl lays stress on tawba.
Later on, his definition will become the fundamental basis
of his judgement about the fate of the "grave" sinner
(murtakib al-kablra) as we shall discuss later.
-\Y\e
The fate of "grave sinner" (murtakib al-kabxra)
I
As a continuation of the concept of "al-manzila bayn
al-manziiatayn", the Mu'tazilites maintained that the
"grave" sinner would remain in fire forever unless he
repented. WhiAre the Ash'arites asserted that he would not
be eternally punished since sin did not remove the sinner
from his belief.
1. Al-Kashshaf, II, 4l8 (4:3l); cf. vol. I, 20k (k:3l) in
which az-Zamakhsharl considers "grave" or "venial" sin
when it is compared to the disobedience or reward or
punishment of its doer (fa'ilu-ha).
2. Anwar, II, 82.
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In both his "Ibana" and "Maqalat",al-Ash4ar1
representing the people of Truth and Sunnah, declares
that, "We profess that we do not exercise TakfTr against
any member of our community because of a sin he has
committed. Like adultery, drinking wine etc. while in
his "Ibana" he adds that, "We teach that whoever commits
a "grave" sin, or anything like it, holding it to be
allowed, is an unbeliever, since he does not believe in its
prohibition."
2
According to al-Baghdadx, people in the life-hereafter
are divided into three categories
I Sabiqun Muqarrabun (The outstrippers who are near
stationed to God.)
II Ashabu l-Yamin (The Companions of the Right).
III Ashabu sh-Shimal (The Companions of the Left).
Al-Baghdadi explains that the first category belongs
to those who will go to Paradise without accountance (bi-la
hisab). The second category consists of believers while
the third consists of unbelievers. Moreover, al-BaghdadX
1. Ibana, p. 11; Maqalat, vol. I, p. 322.
2. Usui, p. 2^3.
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maintains that the grave sinner among Muslims either
belongs to the first category or the second one. At any
rate, he will finally go to Paradise with the mercy of God.
The dispute between az-Zamakhsharx and al-Baydawx
about "grave" sinners, whether they will be eternally
punished or not, can be seen through the following verses
I '4:48' "God forgives not that aught should be
with Him associated; less than that He forgives to
whomsoever He will, whoso associates with God anything,
has indeed forged a mighty sin." (inna llah la yaghfiru
an yushraka bi-hi wa yaghfiru ma duna dhalika li-inan
yasha' wa man yushrik bi-llahi faqad iftara ith-
nian 1 aziman)
• 7
The explanation of az-Zamakhshari in terms of the
Mu'tazilite creed is that God would forgive the person who
had associated some other deity (ash-shirk) provided that
the person guilty of association repented (ba'da an yatuba),
and that He did not forgive the remaining grave sins,
except when the guilty person repented. Az-Zamakhsharx,
however, conceives that the fate of the unrepented grave
sinner remains the same as the polytheist. Xn interpreting
this verse, az-Zamakhsharx concentrates on the words, "Less
than that He forgives to whomsoever He will" (wa yaghfiru
ma duna dhalika li-man yasha'). According to az-Zamakhshari
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the first part of the verse "God forgives not that aught
should be with Him associated" (inna llaha la yaghfiru an
yushralca bi-hi), refers to him who does not repent, while
the second part "less than that He forgives to whomsoever
He will" (wa yaghfiru ma duna dhalika li-man yasha'),
refers to the person who repents (li-man taba). Az-
Zamakhshari proceeds to give an example from everyday life.
For instance, a person might say: The ruler (amir) does
not spend even a single dinar for one person, but he spends
a heap of gold for another person, if he wishes. This
implies that the ruler does not spend a dinar on a person
who does not deserve it, but he is prepared to spend even
a heap of gold for another who is really deserving.
Al-Baydawx refutes the above argument of az-Zamakhsharx
and claims that the Qur'anic confirmation that God for¬
gives all else except association with Himself (ash-shirk
bi-hi) includes both "grave" and "venial" sins whether
before or after repentance (qabla at-tawbati aw ba'da-ha),
and God's assertion that li-man yasha* (whomsoever He will)
denotes that He forgives all the sins (i.e. except ash-shirk),
not for all persons but for some since His pardon is not an
obligation, but a "grace" (tafaddul), and "beneficence"
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 210; cf., I, 167, Siddxqi, Mazher-ud-
Din, "Some aspects of the Mu'tazili interpretation of
the Qur'an" in Islamic Studies, vol. II, March, 1963,
pp. 103-10'*.
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(ihsan). Moreover, he considers that az-Zanakhsharl's
interpretation of the first part of the verse "Inna llaha
la yaghfiru an yushraka bi-hi" as a reference to him who
does not repent (huwa man lam yatub) and the second part
wa yahfiru ma duna dhalika li-man yasha' refers to the
person who repents (li-man taba) as "reservation" without
having substantiated it by burden of proof (taqyid bi-la
dalil), therefore, it implies weakness. In his Tawali' al-
Anwar (p. 100), al-BaydawI states that wa yaghfiru li-man
yasha' should be interpreted as qabla at-tawba (before
repentance), otherwise, it makes no difference to the first
part: Inna llaha la yaghfiru an yushraka bi-hi. In doing
so, the verse '4:48' is in complete opposition to verses
concerning threat (ayat al-wa'id) v/hose meaning imply
universality ('amma), such as the verse * 4:93' • Again,
al-Baydawi assumes that the interpretation of az-Zamakhsharx
regarding the above proposition contradicted the Mu'tazilite
viev/s; the necessity of punishment (wujub at-ta'dhib) before
repentance, and the necessity of forgiveness after repentance
(ba'da at-tawba) since both cases entirely depend on the
will of God (mashiat Allah) as clearly demonstrated by the
verse, "Whomsoever He will" (li-man yasha'). Moreover,
al-Baydawi argues that since their claim entails God's
forgiveness of all else except association with Him from
him who repents (li-man taba) is also dependent upon the
will of God, therefore, there is no obligation upon God
to forgive the repented grave sinner.^
1. Anwar, II, 92.
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XI . 1 4 :93 1 "And whoso slays a believer wilfully,
his recompense is Gehenna, therein dwelling forever,
and God will be wroth with Him, and curse him, and
prepare for him a mighty chastisement.
(wa man yaqtul mu'minan muta* amniidan fa-jaza'u-hu
Jahannamu khalidan fi-ha, wa ghadiba-11ahu 'alay-hi
wa la'ana-hu wa a'adda la-hu 1 adhaban ' azirna) ,« '
Prom the outset of his approach to the verse, az-
Zamakhsharl clearly states that the verse is loftily
intended to warn "believers" (mu'minin) not to cause any
bloodshed to their fellow-brothers by design (muta'ammidan),
since, by doing so, it constitutes a "grave" sin, and thus
will result in severe punishment for eternity. Az-
Zamakhshari, however, conceives that the verse in dis-
cussion strongly subotltu-tes his claim, and emphasises
that "it" has great importance (amrun 'azim) to the
believers. In explaining the text, az-Zainakhsharl lays
stress on the assumption of the universality of the threat,
and asserts that the personal pronoun "man" (whomsoever)
in the verse should include "any killer" (ayyu qatil kana),
whether he is a believer or unbeliever, repentant or
unrepentant. But the repentant, az-Zamakhsharl assures, is
excluded frcm the effect of the universality of the verse
by the previous verse '4:48'. In order to make his view
very clear", he refers to a few traditions:
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a. Ihn-'Abbas is reported to have said that the
repentance of him who kills a believer (muta'amniidan)
will not be accepted.
b. Sufyan ath-Thawrx is also reported to have said,
"The 'people of knowledge' if asked (about the killing)
said, 'His repentance will not be accepted', etc. "
*
f
Az-Zamakhsharx grea-tTy presumes that such judgement
(from them) is taken from the Sunna of the Prophet, other¬
wise, he argues, all sins are forgiven by Tawba.
Having explained the traditions, az-Zarnakhsharx mocked
the Ash'arites who believed that God would forgive him who
killed a believer by design, even if he did not repent, and
accused them of wanting more than their right; either they
did not study the Qur'an and the traditions or their hearts
were sealed. Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharx challenged them
»
to bring such stronger proof than the verse '4:93' to
refute his view."*"
Commenting on the verse, al-Baydawx states that the
verse is purported to hira who did not repent. For the
repentant, he explains, God will forgive him. He alludes to
a Qur'anic verse as a proof '20:82' "Yet I am all-forgiving
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 223.
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to him who repents." A question arises, why such a state¬
ment comes from an Ash4arite who affirmatively maintains
that the grave sinner (sahib al-lcabxra) will not be
eternally punished? In settling the question, al-Baydawx
explains that the verse is absolutely for him who kills a
believer by design and considers it licit (mustahillan la-
hu). According to al-Baydawi, this view is strongly
supported by the occasion of revelation that Maqis b.
Dababa found his brother, Hisham dead in the place of Banu
ah-Najjar without having any knowledge about the killer,
then the Prophet (peace be upon him) asked Banu an-Najjar
to pay blood-money (diyya) to him. Afterwards, he (Maqxs)
suspected a Muslim of killing his brother, then killed him,
and went back to Mecca renegade (murtaddan). According to
the Islamic point of view, he who considers illicit things
as licit o-r- else, is uneligible to be a member of the
Islamic community. In other words, he is an unbeliever.
Therefore, the verse.should be attributed in accordance
with al-Baydawx's view as wa> man yaqtul mu'minan muta4
ainmidan mustahillan (considers it licit) fa-jaza4u-hu
Jahariam. . . . )
Another interpretation presented by al-Baydawx in his
refutation with az-Zamakhsharx is that the word "khalidan or
al-khulud" in the verse means "for a long stay" (al-makth
at-tawxl), not forever. Furthermore, al-Baydawx affirms
that there are many proofs which indicate that the grave
-iko-
1
sinners will not be eternally punished as we shall discuss
1ater.
Ill *2:275' "God has permitted trafficking, and
forbidden usury. (wa ahalla-llahu l-bay4a wa harrama
ar-riba). Whosoever receives an admonition from his
Lord and gives over, he shall have his past gains, and
his affair is committed to God; but whosoever reverts
(wa man'ada) those are the inhabitants of the fire,
therein dwelling forever, (fa-ula1ika ashabu an-nar
hum fx-ha khalidun).
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharx
emphatically affirms that "grave" sinners will remain
forever in fire. However, he clings to the words "fa-
ula' ika ashabu an-nar hum fx-ha khalidun" and declares
• •
it as a clear proof to support his view. Moreover, he
interprets the words "wa man'ada" as a reference to "usury"
(ar-riba). Therefore, whomsoever reverts to "practising
usury" he will be eternally punished, whether he considers
it licit (istihlal) or not, since "committing usury" itself
2
xs a grave sxn.
While- ^1-Baydawi strongly opposes az-Zamakhsharx*s
Anwar, II, p. 109; cf., vol. I, p. 166 regarding the
word al-khulud; Tawali', p. 98.
2. Al-Kashshaf. I, 129.
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view and maintains that only the "grave" sinner who
considers "usury" as licit will remain in fire forever.
Al-Baydawi interprets the words "whomsoever reverts" as a
reference to him who considers "usury" as licit. Therefore,
he who commits "usury" alone, will not remain forever in
fire as long as he is a believer/
After refuting az-ZamakhsharT about the fate of the
"grave" sinner, al-Baydawx proceeds to provide his proofs
which indicate that the "grave" sinner will not be
eternally punished as follows
I 199:7' "Whoso has done an atom's weight of good
shall see it (fa-man ya'mal mithqala dharratin
khayran yara-hu).
Al-Baydawi explains that he who has done an atom's
weight of good, should not see it except after his
punishment (ba'da 'iqabi-hr). This statement, however,
implies that even an atom's weight of good done by a "grave"
sinner, will be rewarded, but this reward will take place
2
after his being punished in the fire. Whirls ^z-Zamakhshari
maintains that it is only "true believers" (su'ada') who
1. Anwar, I, 268.
2. Tawali', p. 99; Misbah, fol. 233b.
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can se.e "it", not the "grave" sinners. Az-Zamakhshari
attributes the verse as fa-man ya'mal mithqala dharratin
khayran min fariqi as-su'ada' / therefore, the "grave"
sinner, in accordance with az-Zamakhshari, will be
eternally punished.
II '3 : *18' "God forgives not that aught should be
with Him associated; less than that He forgives to
whomsoever He will, whoso associates with God anything,
2
has indeed forged a mighty sin."
III '3:25' "But how will it be, when we gather them
for a day whereon is no doubt, and every soul shall
be paid in full what they have earned, and they
shall not be wronged?."
Al-Baydawi maintains that the fulfillment of the
believer's faith and his work will not take place in the
fire or before entry into it, therefore, it should come
3
after salvation.
IV '49:9' "If two parties of the believers fight,
1. Kashshaf. II, 556.
2. Tawali', p. 99.
3. Anwar, il, 11.
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put things right between them."
He maintains that the grave sinner is still a believer.
It is on these grounds that Muqatil Ibn-Sulayman and
Murji'ites hold that they will not be punished."'"
V The Prophet said that he who uttered there was no
2
god but God, would enter Paradise."
VI Consensus (ijma') that God was forgiving one.
In order to show His forgiveness, He omits the
3
punishment from the grave sinners.
The concept of Iman
— 4
Az-Zamakhshan defines Iman as follows:-
The true Iman 'consists in a man being convinced of
the truth, then expressing his inner conviction by the
tongue, and then confirming it by his deed. Therefore, a
1. Ibid, V, 88, I, 127; Tawali', p. 98.
2. Tawali', p. 99.
3. Misbah, fol. 233b.
4. For the Mu'tazilite views regarding Iman cf. Maqalat,
11 303-5; Iq dam, p. 474; Watt, "The conception of
Iman" in Per Islam 43 (i960), P. 1; cf., Watt,
Formative Period, pp. 134-36.
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man who lacks the inner conviction is a hypocrite, however
much he may confess verbally and do good works. He who
lacks the verbal confession is an unbeliever, while he
lacks "doing" is a fasiq .
Az-Zainakhsharx, however, maintains that Iman which is
accompanied by good work alone will deserve "divine guidance".
_ 2
He bases his view on many Qur'anic verses such as '10:9'
"Surely those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness,
their Lord will guide them for their belief (bi-imani-him)
beneath them rivers flowing in gardens of bliss."
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharx
concentrates on the words "for their belief" (bi-imani-him)
in- which Lfe- should be understood as referring to good deeds
since it is mentioned clearly after the words "Iman and
good work".
■ *
In fact, the definition of good work (*amal salih)
given by az-Zamakhsharx is controversial to the Ash'arites
in which he defines it as "what is fairly right, as given
1. Al-Kashshaf. I. 18 (2:3)
2. Ibid, I, 417, I, 267, verse (5:65); cf., II, 4l0
(51s5) in which he considers good work and Iman as
inseparable from one another. cf., 1^, 413 (52:2l).
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evidence by reason, the Qur'an and Tradition.""'" Al-BaydawT
gives a different definition by saying that "good work" is
2
what the law has approved and considered it to be good.
At any rate, al-BaydawT stresses the good work on shari'a
while az-Zamakhshari on reason first, then the Qur'an and
Tradition.
Az-Zamakhsharx's stress on good work inevitably leads
to saying that the right to enter Paradise is not as the
result of tafaddul (grace) any more, since it totally
depends on merit (i.e. good work).
iUe tW.
In fact, al-Ash'ari as an eponym of Ash'arites, has
two definitions of Iman:
In his Luma', he defines Iman as an assent (tasdxq).
Al-Ash'arl maintains no "saying" nor "doing" as part of
—
_ 3 _ - _" Iman. While in his Ibana, he defines Iman in the Hanbalx
—
• » - •
tradition as "word" (qawl) ^md work. Perhaps, his former
definition was to refute the Mu'tazilites who maintained
that confession and work are included in Iman, while with
the latter, he tried to please the Kanbalites.
1. Ibid, I, 43 (2:25)
2. Anwar, I, 118 (2:25)
3• Luma', p. 75.
4. Ibana, p. 11.
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However, later Ash'arites attribute to him the
definition of Iman in different ways. Al-Ba^daVl states
that Abu-Hasan al-Ash'ari says, "Iman is an assent to God,
and to His rusul (messengers) with regard to their reports;
Kci: • -
but this tasdiq (assent) is .sound unless accompanied by
"knowledge of God"."'" Whri-l-e 4sh-Shahrastani defines Iman
in accordance with the Ash'arite view in his "Milai" that
Iman is an assent to God while saying and doing are only-
its branches.^
Al-Baydawi's definition of Iman is that "Iman is an
assent to what is known to have come from Muhammad (peace
be upon him) such as the unity of God, the prophethood, the
resurrection, and the reward. In order to attain the
perfection of Iman, al-Baydawl concludes that Iman should
3
consist of inner conviction, confession and work. Yet
1. Usui, p. 248. cfFarq, p. 343, in which he points
out that the central controversy refers to the question
whether Iqrar and the acts of obedience should be calle
Iman.
2. Milal, p. 73. cf., Iqdam, p. 472. Ash-ShahrastanI
sometimes defines Iman as "knowledge of God, pre-
existence and the attributes of the Creator and
sometimes, he defines it as mental speech (qawl bi-nafs
which contains the knowledge of God.
3. Anwar, I, 55; Misbah, fol„ 234b.
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"work" for al-BaydawT is not part of Iman. In strengthen¬
ing his view, he alludes to several Qur'anic verses which
indicate that Iinan is only tasdlq as follows:
— O'A
The inscription of Iman fro- the heart:
a. '58:22' "Those - He has written faith
upon their hearts."
b. '16:106' "Whoso disbelieves in God, after he
has believed - excepting him who
has been compelled, and his heart
is still at rest in his belief."
c. '5:4-1' "0 messenger, let them not grieve
thee that vie with one another in
unbelief, such men as say with their
mouths 'We believe but their hearts
believe not.' "
d. '49:14' "The Bedouins say, 'We believe'.
kayJ 'You do not believe' ; rather ^c>u
say, "We surrender.*' ( aslama) .
1. The meaning of /Jslama is discussed by M.M. Bravmann
under the title "On the spiritual background of early
Islam and the History of its principal concepts" in
Meseon 64 (1951) pp 8-27; cf., The spiritual background
of early Islam by the same author, pp. 7-26;
Watt, Formative Period, pp. 130-1.
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II The accompaniment of "good work" with Iman in
many places such as '2:25' "Give thou good tidings
to those who believe and do good work."
III The link of the faith (Iman) with the sins in
the same verse such as:
a. ^tiyS' "0 believers, prescribed for you is
retaliation, touching the slain..."
b. '6:82' "Those who believe, and have not
confounded their belief with evil
doing...nl
IV A prophetic tradition saying that Iman consists
of seventy odd parts, the most excellent of which
is the testimony that there is no god but God and
the lowliest is the removal of harm (imatat al-adha)
from the road."* According to al-Baydawi, this
tradition means "branches of Iman"(not part of it);
because the removal of harm is unanimously agreed
_ - _ 2
by Muslim Ulama' to be not a part of Iman.
All these verses, he says, even though, they are
slightly different indicate that Iman is only an assent
(tasdiq).
1. Anwar, I, 55; Misbah, fol. 23^b.
2. Tawali4, p. 102; Misbah, fol. 23^b.
Al-Baydawl's emphasis on the essentiality of tasdiq
is similar to al-Ash'ari's definition of Iman in his
"Lunia'". This, however, raises a question. Is tasdxq
alone sufficient to be called a mu'min or should it be
accompanied by confession (iqrar)?
Al-Baydawx1s solution to this question is that
"confession" is inevitable for him who is capable of
professing himself publicly. The very basis of his view
is due to God's condemnation of the obstinate (al-mu'anid)
1
being more than the negligent ignorant (al-jahil al-muqassir).
Even though al-Baydawx maintains that "work" is not
part of Iman, only as a token (dalxl), he admittedly
states that it, sometimes, includes "work", because "work"
3
comes to confirm Iman. In another word, work for al-
Baydawx is a perfection of Iman. It is on these grounds that
Iman varies in degrees, increases and decreases.
*
Since al-Baydawx believes that work is inevitable,
as part of Iman, it is not surprising that Iman, for him,




Ibid, I, 55 (2:2)
Tawali', p. 99 .
Misbah, fol. 23^b.
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There is no disagreement"'' between al-Baydawi and
az-Zamakhsharx regarding the increase or the decx-ease of
Iman, since al-BaydawT maintains that the avoidance of
work is almost inevitable.
The real centre of controversy between him and
az-Zamakhsharl as far as the conception of Iman is
concerned refers to the question, who is a mu' min?
Certainly al-Baydawx's concentration on tasdxq is to
include the grave sinners in the community, therefore, it
is an attempt to reject az-Zamakhsharx1s view of the
Mu4tazilite influence.
1. Anwar, II, 5^+ (3:173); cf., al-Kashshaf, I, 178
(3:173).
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The concept of Ihbat and Takflr.
The general meaning of the Mu4tazilite•s concept of
ihbl§.t and takfTr concerning "obedience"^ (ta'a) and
"disobedience" (raa'sia) is given by 4Abd-al-Jabbar al-
Mu4 tazilX. (d. 102*0 in his book " Usui al-Kharasa". He
states that a mukallaf has two alternatives; either he
deserves to be rewarded, or else punished. In both cases,
he explains, if the "act of obedience" is greater in quality
than the "act of disobedience" or the contrary is the case,
2
the smaller will be removed by the greater.
Az-ZamalchsharT, in conformity with the Mu4 tazilite
view, declares that takflr is the removal of a punishment
from him who deserves to be punished either by means of
increasing his reward or due to his repentance.
As to the definition of ihbat, az-Zamakhsharl states• . 1
1. According to al-BaghdadX, ta'a means that a man acts
in conformity with what somebody else has commanded
him to do. Anyone who does so is "obedient" (muti1),
while ma'sia means that a man acts against what he
has been commanded to do, and does what he has been
prohibited to do." UsTil, pp. 251-252; cf. Izutsu,
The Concept of Belief, p. 36.
2. Ustil al-Khamsa, p. 624.
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that, "It is the removal of the reward (which is opposite
takflr) by means of increasing his punishment, or duo to
his regret for his "act of obedience"
It is obvious for az-Zamakhsharl that the concept of
ihbat and takflr plays a major role in deciding the fate of
grave sinners. However, az-Zamakhsharl1s view can be seen
through his interpretations of certain Qur'anic verses:-
I *2:25' "Give thou good tidings to those who
believe and do deeds of righteousness, that for
them await gardens. .n (anna la-hum jannatIn. . . )
In his interpretation of the verse, az-Zamakhsharl
maintains that the mukallaf will deserve his reward by his
C\\s^ A
"faith" and "good" work. Moreover, he states that there
are two things which can fail man's reward: "unbelief"
(kufr) and "grave" ,sins (kabira) . On-the other hand, he
should not regret what he has done for the act of obedience
and his unperformed act of disobedience. Concerning ihsan
(the act of righteousness), az-Zamakhsharl conceives that
he who performs "it" will definitely deserve a reward and
praise (thana') so long as he avoids what will damage his
2
ihsan. In order to strengthen his view, az-Zamakhsharl
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 204 (4:3l)
2. Al-Kashshaft I, 43.
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proceeds to refer to another Qur'anic verse '39*651 MIf
thou associatest other gods with God (la-in ashrakta ),
thy work shall surely fail (la-yahbatanna 4 axnalu-ka. . )
Az-ZamakhsharX asserts that, if this verse was
intended for the Prophet, who is the noblest of creatures
of God, in order not to associate other gods with Him, what
Prophet would never associate other gods with God and his
work would never fail. But, he states that the verse is a
hypothetical one though it is impossible for the Prophet.
Moreover, az-Zaniakhsharl states that such "impossibility"
can be presumed for certain purposes. Furthermore, he
interprets the words (wa 11-takunanna mina 1-kliasirXn)
(thou wilt be among the losers) as a reference to the




the Prophet's voice, and be not loud in your speech
to him, as you are loud one to another, lest your
works fail (an tahbata a'raalu-kura), while you are
'49*2' "0 believer, raise not your voices above
not aware (wa antum la tash'urun),
In his explanation of the verse, az-ZamakhsharX
1. Ibid, II, 305, regarding az-Zaraakh3harX's remark
following the verse (39*65).
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clearly states that the verse concentrates mainly on two
things: the act of committing grave sins will fail the
work, and some of the sins which are not being realised,
also will fail the work. Therefore, believers should be
very careful in their daily life; likewise those who walk
on a "thorny way" (tarlq sha'ik). Vhat az-Zaraakhsharl
really means is that if a believer commits a grave sin, it
will fail his "good work", therefore, he shall be eternally
punished even if he did not repent."'"
XII '47:33* *0 believers, obey God, and obey the
Messenger, and do not make your own works vain
(wa la tubtilG a'mala-kum).
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl
lays stress on the words wa la tubtilH a'mala-kum. He
says that the verse should be interpreted as "Do not fail
your works by committing "grave sins" (la tuhbitD at-
ta'at bi-l-kaba'ir). In order to support his view, az-
Zamakhshari proceeds to refer to some sayings of the
Companions of the Prophet as follows:
I Abu-l-'Aliya is reported to have said that the
Companions of the Prophet maintain that sin does not
1. Ibid, II, 391.
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dp any injury where there is "faith", just as acts
of obedience are of no use where there is shirk
until the verse was revealed "wa IS tubtilu a4mala-
kum". Then the Companions of the Prophet became
afraid of "grave sins" that would fail their works.
IX Qatada is reported to have said that God will
bless His servant as long as his bad work does not
1
fail his good work, etc.
Al-BaydawT refutes az-ZamakhsharT regarding the
concept of ihbat •2:25' by saying that grave sins will not
fail a believer's work. Therefore, he is not eternally
punished. Al-BaydawT has strong grounds for believing
that since "faith" (iman) in accordance with him does not
include "work" it is only an assent (tasdTq). Al-Bayd&wT
also maintains that God is not bound to reward the believer
even if he does "good" work since "reward" (thawab) is a
mere "grace" of God (fadl Al-lah). But he believes that God
will grant His reward on the basis of His promise. As far
as the concept of ihbat is concerned, al-BaydawT declares
that it only happens to a man in his state of unbelief.
In strengthening his view, he refers to the verso '2:217'
"And whomever of you turns from his religion, and dies
1. Ibid, II, 381.
-156-
disbelieving (fa-yamut «a huwa kaflrun) their works have
failed (fa-ula'ilca habitat a'malu-hum).* © • '
Al-Baydaw! says that God has restricted him who dies
disbelieving - his work has failed but not the grave sinner.
Furthermore, he concludes that since God did not mention
the ihbat in the verse in discussion '2:25'» it means that9 9 . 7
grave sins will not fail their works.
Concerning the verse ' U9s2* al-Baydawl clearly states
that the verse concentrates on those who raised their
voices above the Prophet's voice scornfully, since such an
act leads to unbelief. According to al-Baydawl, this
2
verso, however, has nothing to do with other grave sins.
Commenting on the verse '47 03' al-Baydaw! strongly
refutes az-Zamakhsharl by saying that this verse has
nothing to do with az-Zaaiakhsharl's claim, since "unbelief"
*
and hypocricy of course failed their works, not the grave
3
sins.
The following are some of the examples presented by
Anwar. I, 118-119, I, 108 (2:2l), cf., vol. V, 32
(39?65) in which al-Baydaw! declares that this verse
is definitely for the Prophet only..
2. Ibid, V, 86.
3. Ibid, V, 80.
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az-Zamakhsharl in conformity with the Mu'tazilite concept
of takflr:
I *4:31' "If* ye avoid the grave oins which ye are
forbidden, (in tajtanlbu kaba' Ira ma tunhawna 'an-hu)
we will remove from you evil deeds (nukaffir 'an-kum
sayyl* ati-kum)."
Az-Zamalchsharl affirmatively maintains that the
avoidance of grave sins nullifies divine punishment for
venial sins. In order to strengthen his view, he interprets
the words "nukaffir ♦ an-kum sayyi'.ati-kum" as to mean "we
will remove from you what makes you deserve to bo punished
among the venial sins by increasing the reward as a result
of your avoidance of grave sins. However, az-Zamakhsharl's
remark seems to imply that it is necessary for God to
forgive a man's venial sins just when he avoids the grave
sins
1
II '29s7' "And those who believe, and do righteous
deeds, we shall surely remove from them evil deeds
(id-nukaffiranna 'an-hum sayyi'ati-him).
A3 far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl
1* Al-KashshHf. I, 204; cf., vol. II, p. 4l8 (53:33).
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states that the verse is intended either for the believers
who do good works then commit venial sins, or it is
intended for the polytheists who become believers and do
good works. For the former, az-Zamakhsharl maintains that
their (venial) sins are forgiven by their avoidance of the
grave sins, while for the latter, he states that God will
remove their previous sins; unbelief, disobedience, etc.
by increasing their reward after being Muslims.^"
As we already know, the Ash'arites deny the concept
of takfir. Al-Baydawx, however, maintains that it is not
necessary for God to forgive the venial sins when the
grave sins are avoided. In strengthening his view, he
interprets the verse '4:31' "nukaffir 'an-kura sayyiati-kum"
as to mean "naghfir lakum sagha'ira-kum" (we will forgive
your venial sins). His interpretation, however, implies
that "forgiveness" is up to God. Therefore, there is no
obligation for God t,o forgive. Al-Baydawl, however, does
not deny that God will forgive the venial sins when the
2
grave sins are avoided,since it is dependent upon God's will.
Commenting on the verse '29:7* al-BaydawT maintains
that God will remove evil deeds from a believer when he
i. Al-Kashshaf. II, 174.
2« Anwar. II, 82; cf. vol. V, p. 103 (53:33).
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performs the acts of obedience. Likewise He will remove e-»"l
from an unbeliever, when he becomes Muslim."*" Al-Bayd§wl • s
interpretation of the verse, at this time, however, seems
to support az-Zaraakhaharl's view, but if his previous
interpretation of the verse '4:31' is justified, it is
certain that God has no obligation to forgive him who
commits even venial sins.
After refuting az-Zamakhsharl's arguments, al-Baydawx
refers to quote a Qur'anic verse in order to support his
view '3:25' "When every soul shall be paid in full what
it has earned and they shall not be wronged." (wa wuffiyat
kullu nafsin ma kasabat wa hum la yuzlamun).
Al-Baydawx maintains that "obedience" will not be
failed by "disobedience" and the grave sinner will not be
punished forever, since the fulfilment (tawfiyya) of his




1. Ibid, IV, 135.
2. Ibid, II, 11, cf., vol. Ill, p. 202 (17:36) in which
he maintains that a mere intention to do the act of
/ y \disobedience (ma'sia) is even sinful.
LL
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The concept of Repentance (Tawba)
As we already know from the Mu'tazilite concept of
ihbat and takfTr, a mukallaf has two alternatives: either
his "act of obedience" is greater in quality than his
"act of disobedience" or else the contrary is the case.
For the former, it is not necessary for him to repent since
he is not a grave sinner. For the latter, it is necessary
for him to repent in order to escape from the fire, and
God is bound to forgive when a repentance is made.
Az-ZamakhsharT, in conformity with the Mu4tazilite
creed, defines tawba as return from the evil (al-qabTh)
and the breach of what is necessary in Islamic law
(ilchlal bl-l-wa,iib) with regret (nadam) and the determin¬
ation not to return to it in future (an la yu'awida)
Repentance, for az-Zamakhsharl, is the only way to
escape the grave sinner from the punishment. Az-Zamakhsharl
maintains that if he dies unrepentant, he should remain
forever in the fire since there is no difference between
him and the unbeliever. In strengthening his thesis, he
proceeds to quote a Qur'anic verse ,4:l68,s /
"Surely those who disbelieve and act wrongfully
(zalamu), God would not forgive them, neither guide
them on any road..."
1« Al-Kashshaf. II, 3^0
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Az-Zamakhsharx, hot/ever, asserts that the verse is
mainly intended for the unbelievers and the grave sinners
since there is no difference between them without tawba.^"
Az-Zamakhsharl*s arguments concerning tawba can be
seen through his interpretation of the following verses:
I '39S53' "Say: 0 my people who have been prodigal
against yourselves, do not despair of God's mercy;
surely God forgives sins altogether; surely He is
the All-forgiving, the All-compassionate."
Commenting on the verse, az-Zamalchshari maintains
that God is not disposed to grant forgiveness except to
those who repent. He emphasises that the condition of
"repentance" is frequently mentioned in the Qur'an, even
though it i3 not stated in this particular verse, yet it
has been a common judgement (hukm) since it is impossible
to be contradictory to one another. In strengthening his
argument, he proceeds to refer to the technicality of
reciting (qira'at) of Ibn-'Abbas in which he has a slightly
different interpretation. He reads yaghfiru dh-dhunuba
jam!'an li-man yasha' by adding the words li-man yasha'
(whomsoever He will) to the original verse, then interprets
1. Ibid, I, 2kl
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it to mean "11 -man taba" (those who x-epent). Az-ZamakhsharX,
however, gives a special reason for his own reservation of
tawba in the verse by saying that the "willing of God"
follows His wisdom, and His justice, not His ownership and
His sovereignty.^
IX *13i6' "Thy Lord is forgiving to men, for all
their evil doing (*ala zulmi-him), and thy Lord is
terrible in retribution."
Az-ZamakhsharX interprets the words "' ala zulmi-him"
to mean "zalimXn li-anfU3i-him". Then he gives three
alternatives for its interpretation:-
a. God would forgive the venial sins if the grave
were avoided.
b. God would forgive the grave sins after a
*
repentance was made.
c. Maghfira (mercy) in the verse was to mean
2
"concealment" (as-satr) or "delay" (iinhal).
1. Ibid, II, 302.
2. Ibid, I, 491.
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Az-ZamalchsharT, however', lays stress on tawba,
since it is inevitable. Otherwise, they are included
among the zalimln.
With regard to the repentants who remember their sins,
az-Zamakhshari maintains that they should renew their
W.
repentance since az-Zamakhsharl believes that the repentants
should remain in a state of constant regret until their
death. Even though az-Zamakhshari did not mention the
repentants who returned to their normal states, it is
understood that it is more necessary for them to renew
their repentance when they returned to the sins. It is on
these grounds that az-Zamakhshari was probably among those who
maintained that those who repented, and then returned to
their former state, should repent of their sins from the
2
beginning.
According to az-Zamakhshari, a true repentant is one
who has to fulfil three conditions:
a. To give up all the acts of disobedience.
b. To regret his sins constantly.
3
c. To do good work.
1. Ibid, II, 91 (24:31)
2. Maqalat. I, 307.
3. Al-Kashshaf. H, 116 (25»7l).
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Al-Baydawl's definition of tawba is as follows:-
Confession of the sins (al-i*tiraf). regret for
them and a firm determination not to return to them again.^
Al-Baydawl's definition of "repentance" is "to return"
but when it is described to God's servant, it means "to
return" from tho act of disobedience, and when it is
described to God, it means "to return" from punishment to
forgiveness (al-maghfira).
Al-Baydawl, however, states that repentance is not
, from
the only way for the grave sinners to escape/the fire,
since it is dependent upon God's will whether or not He
forgives the repentants since "His will" follows His
sovex-eignty and Hi3 omnipotence. Al-Baydawl quotes certain
Qur'Unic verses as proofs:
X '48:l4' "God's is the kingdom of the heavens
and the earth. He pardons whomsoever He will and






Anwar. I, 143 (2*37)
Ibid, I, 144 (2:37)
Ibid, V, 83.
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II '3*129' "His is all that the heavens and the
earth contain. He pardons whom He will and punishes
whom He pleases. God is forgiving and merciful."
Al-Baydawx refutes az-Zamakhsharx regarding the
necessity of tawba in order to escape from punishment. He
says that the two verses are contradictory to the necessity
of punishment before a repentance is made as well as
forgiveness aftei- repentance.^
Commenting on the verse '39:53'» al-Baydawx refutes
az-Zamakhsharl by saying that it is not true that for
forgiveness of sinsf tawba is necessary. However, ,A1-
Baydawl declares that tawba is only required for shirk.
Moreover, al-Baydawl says that to restrict tawba for
forgiveness is contradictory to the obvious meaning of
the text which gives the universality of its meaning
except shirk.^
%
With regard to the verse '13*6', al-Baydawl affirm¬
atively maintains that the text is a clear proof to show
the possibility of forgiveness before repentance, since
3the repentant, he argues, is like one who has no sin.
1. Ibid, II, 42.
2. Ibid, V, 30.
3. Ibid, III, 147.
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Therefore the verse should mean that forgiveness before
tawba is permissible for the grave sinners.
Al-BaydawT did not mention the repentants who
returned to their former state. Perhaps he agreed with
the Ash'arite view that "They should renew their
repentance from the second commitment, since the first
commitment had already been forgiven.^
Intercession (Ash-Shafa*a)
It has been maintained by the Mu'tazilites and the
Ash'arites that the intercession should take place in
the next world since the idea of intercession occurs in
the Qur'an many times. But the question is to whom it
would be granted and what its objective would be.
Vensinck suggests that the orthodoxy's adoption of
the doctrine of intercession is due to the need for some¬
thing to counter balance predestination and the influence
2
of Christian idea, while Professor Watt maintains that,
"It is to serve the purpose of relieving the despair
3
caused by excessive moral earnestness.
1. For instance* Irshad, p. 230; cf., Tuhfat al-Murid,
pp. 122-3.
2. Vensinck, Muslim Creed, p. 180.
3. Watt, The Formative Period, p. 138,
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In fact, az-ZamakhsharT does not reject the nature
of intercession, but what has become a central discussion
is the Ash'arites* excessive use of the intercession for
all Muslims including the grave sinners.
To study his views on the matter, let us examine his
interpretation of certain Qur'anic verses
I '2:48* "And beware of a day when no soul for
another shall give satisfaction, and no intercession
shall be accepted from it, nor any counterpoise be
taken, neither shall they be helped."
(wa t-taqu yawman la tajzT nafsun 'an nafsin shay'an
wa la yuqbalu min-ha shafa'atun wa la yu'khadhu inin-
ha 4adlun wa 1a-hum yunsarun),
Az»Zaraakhshari, in conformity with the Mu'tazilite
creed, maintains that the intercession shall not be
accepted for the grave sinners (al-'usat) since God clearly
states that the soul (an-nafs) fails to give satisfaction
to another (soul) (la ta.jzX nafsun 4 an nafsin). This,
however, implies that the soul has a limited capacity
which is sufficient for itself when it does reach the
standard needed, otherwise it will suffer and hope for no
intercession. Therefore, it varies in degree in accordance
with its deed. Another statement given by az-Zamakhsharl
is that God denies the acceptance of any intercession for
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the grave sinners and nor should any counterpoise be taken
(wa la yuqbalu min-ha shafa'atun),
In order to strengthen his view, he tries to explain
pronoun "it" in the verse "nor intercession shall be
accepted from it" can be referred either to the second
soul (an-nafs ath-thaniya) "nor soul for another (soul)"
(nafsun 'an nafsin) which is the "disobedient soul" (an-
nafs al-'asi'a) which deserves no intercession, or it•
. ' '
refers to the "first soul" because if it were interceded
for, it would be rejected by God. In both cases, az~
ZamakhsharT argues, the intercession is impossible for
the gz^ave sinners.^"
II ,3sl92* "The evildoers shall have no helpers"
(wa ma li-z-zalimTna min ansar),
• *
As far as this verse is concerned, az-ZamakhsharT
maintains that there will be no helper (nasirun) for the
2
evildoers, neither by intercession nor by others. For
az-Zamakhsharx, since God Himself has denied any sort of
help (nusra), intercession is impossible. God's denial of
Al-Kashshaf. I, 55-6.
2. Ibid, I, 119.
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nusra (help) implies also His denial of* intercession since
the word nusra is universal.
Ill *2:54' "0 believer, expend of that wherewith
wo have provided you, before there comes a day
wherein shall be neither traffic, nor friendship,
nor intercession (wa la shafa'a); and the unbelievers
— they are the evildoers."
Az-Zamakhsharx asserts the impossibility of having
friend or intercessor to intercede for the grave sinners,
as the intercession on that day will be only to increase
the grace. By this, he means that the intercession will
not free the grave sinners from punishment, because there
will be no intercession for them at all on one hand, and
on the other the intercession on that day will be to
increase the grace for the believers,^"
XV *40:18* " and the evildoers have not one
loyal friend, no intercession to be heeded."
The hypothesis given by az-Zamakhsharl regarding the
impossibility of intercession is that the intercessors, in
accordance with az-Zamakhsharl, are the friends of God
(awliya' Allah). and they will only love and sanction
1. Ibid, I, 183.
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those whom God loves and sanctions. Indeed, God will not
love the evildoers, hence they will not help and intercede
for the grave sinners. Moreover, he says that the purpose
of intercession is to increase the grace for the adherents
of reward (i.e. believers). He bases his view on a
Qur'Snic verse •24:37' "..... God may recompense them for
their fairest works and give them increase of His bounty.."^"
*74:48• "Then the intercession of the intercessors
shall not profit them."
Az—Zaraakhsharl maintains the complete rejection of
all sorts of intercession for the grave sinners, whether it
comes from the angels, the prophets or others, by saying
that it will be worthless, since the intercession in the
next world is only for those whom God sanctions, and in
order to increase the grace.^
VI '78:39* "Upon the.day when the spirit and the
angels stand in ranks they shall speak not, save
him to whom the All-merciful has given leave, and
who speaks aright."






that since the spirit (ar-RTih) ana the angels who are the
noblest, the most respectable and the closest creatures to
God, should not speak before Him, what will be the position
of others among the natives of heaven and earth! Of course
az-Zaraakhsharl's remark is to ridicule the Ash'arites who
declared that the intercession is possible for all Muslims
including the grave sinners. However, az-Zaraakhsharl
explains that there are two conditions for the intercession
to be accepted as follows:
a. The speaker (al-mutakallim) should be given a
sanction to speak.
b. He should speak the truth.
The implication of these two conditions is that the
intercessors should receive leave from God beforehand, and
they should not intercede for those to whom God does not
*
give His sanction. '21:27' "They intercede not save for
him with whom he is well-pleased.."^"
Before examining al-BaydawT's view regarding the
1. Ibid, II, 520; cf. vol. II, p. 300 (39^*0 in which
az-Zamakhsharl affirms that the two conditions for
the intercession are not eligible for the grave
sinners.
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intercession, it will be better to know the main body of
orthodoxy's idea of intercession. AbU-Hanlfa in his
Fiqh Akbar II, art 20, states that the intercession of
the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is a reality for
all those who belong to the inhabitants of Paradise, even
if they should be guilty of mortal sins.^" Al-Ash'ari in
his "Maqalat" firmly maintains that God will release a few
out of Hell, on account of Muhammad's intercession after
2
they have been scorched there.
Al-BaydawX, as an Ash'arite, maintains that th©-
intercession is for the grave sinners. This view, however,
contradicts az-Zamakhsharl's, and becomes the central point
of disagreement between the two scholars.
crf
To study al-BaydawT's refutation against az-ZamakhsharX,
we have to go through the above-mentioned verses.
In referring to the verse ' 2s48', al-BaydawX refutes
az-Zamakhsharl by saying that the denial of nusra (help)
does not negate the intercession since nusra is rather
specific. Another argument given by al-BaydawX is that the
verse in discussion is specially intended for the unbelievers
1. Wensinckj Muslim Creed, p. 130.
2. Maqalat, vol. I, p. 322; cf. , Macdonald, Musiini
Theology, p. 296.
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as it was shown to refute the belief of tho Jews who
claimed that their ancestors would intercede for them,
but not the grave sinners among the Muslims.^
A somewhat similar argument is also pointed out by
al-Baydawl concerning the verse '35192' in which he
recognises that the reason for their being in Hell, and
cut off from receiving the help (nusra) is due to their
wrong deeds (zulmi-him). But he disagrees with az-
Zamakhsharl's conclusion of denying the intercession for
the grave sinners. He argues that the denial of nusra
in the verse, however, does not imply the negation of the
intercession since nusra, according to al-Baydawl., is to
mean "a forceful prevention" (daf'un bi-qahrin), therefore,
it differs from "intercession".
As far as the verse '2:25^' is concerned, al-Baydawl,
however, maintains that the intercession for the grave
sinners is not impossible by the sanction of God since the
intercession is to free the grave sinners from the punish-
3
ment, and not to increase the grace of the believers.
1. Anwar, I, 152.
2. Ibid, II, 520.
3. Ibid, I, 257.
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Al-BaydawT's commentary on the verse '40:48'^" as
2
well as the verse '74:48' is that they were specially
revealed for the unbelievers, and nothing to do with the
grave sinners whatsoever.
With reference to the verse '78:39'» al-BaydawI
holds that this verse is to confirm the verse which
preceded it, '78:37' "Lord of the heavens and earth, and
all that between them is, the All-merciful of whom they
have no power to speak." Nevertheless, it does not imply
the rejection of the intercession for those to whom God
3
gives His sanction.
To refute az-Zamakhsharl's views about the intercession
in general, al-BaydawT states that the intercession is not
for all people nor for all time. Moreover, he says that
if the intercession is general as considered by az-
Zamakhshari, he believes that "it" is restricted by virtue
4
of certain Qur'anic verses. •
In strengthening his views, al-BaydawT quotes certain
Qur'anic verses and prophetic traditions as follows:
1. Ibid, v, 37.
2. Ibid, V, 161.
3. Ibid, V, 171.
4. Tawali', p. 101; cf., Matali* al-Anzar, p. 460.
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I God ordered the Prophet to implore His pardon
on behalf* of* his community (umma) for their sins*
'47:19' "Ask forgiveness for thy sin, and for the
believers, men and women."
II The grave sinner is a believer,^ hence the
Prophet implored God for pardon for the sins in
order to show obedience, and al-Baydawx concludes
that God will accept his seeking pardon in order
to fulfil His good pleasure. '93:5' "Thy Lord
shall give thee, and thou shalt be satisfied."
III The Prophet is reported to have said that his
intercession shall be on behalf of those of my
community who have committed grave sins.2
IV The "honourable station" (al-maqam al-MahmTid)
is the station of intercession (inaqam ash-Shafa'a)
'17:79* "It may be that thy Lord will raise thee
up to an honourable station." The Prophet is also
reported to have said that the "honourable station"
was the station at which he would intercede for
3








that the intercession is among the duties of the
Prophet to intercede for the grave sinners.^"
Conclusion. In az-Zamakhsharl•s view, intercession
will be granted only to the believers whom God sanctions.
It is understandable that any intercession for the grave
sinners will be rejected as they are in the intermediate
position, and the purpose of the intercession, for him, is
only to increase the grace among the believers. Al-Baydaw!,
however, maintains the intercession is for the believers
including the grave sinners, because the grave sinners,
according to him, are believers also, therefore the
intercession should be accepted for the grave sinners to
free them from punishment.
An interesting remark given by al-Baydawl is that
"intercession" is among the duties of the Prophet. However,
*
this implies a great hope for the idea of intercession.
1. Ibid, II, 97 (4:64).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE OF GOD
Free will (Huriyyat al-Irada)
The principle of justice (al-* adl) is one of the five
Mu4tazilite principles which stands primarily with the
doctrine of free will. Their self-entitlement "People of
Justice and Unity" (Ahl at-TawhTd wa l-*Adl) is closely
connected with this principle.
Az-Zamakhsharl follows this principle and praises
the Mu'tazilites for their strong defence of "justice and
unity" by means of introducing very clear proofs and
rational evidence.^
1. Al-Kashshaf. II, 139 (3:18). "Allah (Himself) is
witness that there is no God save Him. And the angols
and the men of learning (ulfi l-'ilm) (too are witness)
main His creation in justice. There is no God save
Him, the Almighty, the Wise." Az-Zamakhsharl,
however, interprets "ulTi l-'ilm" as the people of
justice and unity. For his praise for them cf.
vol. I, 121 (2:225), vol. I, 271 (5:77), vol. I, 326
(7:28) in which he also defines "justice" as what is
uprightly good (mustaqimun hasanun) commonly held by
reasonable persons. cf. vol. I, 556-7 (17:75), vol. II,
240 (4:165), vol. II, 568, for his invocation (du'a')
for the part of the Surah 112.
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In accordance with his belief in tho freedom of
human will, az-Zamakhsharl sought to explain away the
verses of the Qur'an which stressed God's omnipotence
God.-3^ and make man a self-sufficient being.
It will suffice to examine az-Zamakhsharl's view by
giving some passages which are regarded as adverse to the
principle of human will as follows:
I '6:126-7' "And whomsoever it is Allah's will to
guide, He expandeth his bosom unto the surrender
(yashrah sadra-hu li-l-Islam), and whomsoever it is
Hi3 will to send astray (wa man yurid an yudilla-hu),
He maketh his bosom close and narrow (yaj'al sadra-hH
dayyiqan harajan) as if he were engaged in sheer
ascent. Thus Allah layeth ignominy upon those vuWfe
believe not. This is the path of thy Loi*d, a straight
path.11
t
The meaning of the text plainly describes the
almightiness and the omnipotence of God while men are
completely subordinate to this over-ruling power of God.
Whether they are to become believers or not, that is not
their question since it is God alone who determined their
inner feelings. This text, of course, contradicts the
majority of the Mu'tazilite view which maintains that
faith (1man) i3 a man's acquisition, and not a divine gift.
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Az-Zamalchsharl, however, tries to explain away the obvious
meaning of the text by saying that whosoever God wills to
grace, He expands his bosom to Islam by granting to him
His grace (al-lutf) whioh will make him love Islam and
feel at ease to it in order that he accept it (islam).
Contrary to whom God abandons (yukhdhilu-hu), He discontinues
His grace by making his heart hard to accept it, then goes
away from the reality in order that ho will not become a
believer. Az-Zamakhsharl goes on to explain the words
"This is the path of thy Lord" by saying that this is the
path of God which always follows the wisdom and custom for
succour (t&wflq) and abandonment (khidhlan).^"
2
For az-Zamakhsharl "guidance" (huda) or "leading
O
astray" (dalal) should not be really attributed to God,
1. Ibid, I, 311.
2. Az-Zamakhsharl states that God's guidance must bo
taken to mean God's succour and His grace. cf.,
vol. I, 500 (l4:4), II, 292 (39:3). cf., the
Qur'anic verse (2:2), vol. I, 16. However, az-
Zamakhsharl maintains that the Qur'an is to be said
as a "guidance" (hudan) only for those who are on the
point of accepting the guidance, and not those whose
hearts have already stamped "unbelief" (al-kufr).
3. Similarly the word "leading astray" means "takhliya"
and prevention of the grace. cf., vol. I, 500,
I, 526 (16:37).
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sinco it implies the invalidity of human freedom. In order
to maintain his view, he replaces the words "guidance" and
"loading astray" with "grace" and "abandonment" respectively.
As far as the verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl seems to
have difficulty in defending his Mu'tazilite view since the
text is self-sufficient to stand against the view of human
freedom. Anyhow, his self-styled interpretation could come
a little bit closer to his view of human responsibility.
II ifjikl* "He whom Allah wills to expose to trial,
(wa man yuridi-llahu fitnata-hu) thou (by thine efforts),
wilt avail him naught against Allah. Those are they
for whom the will of Allah is that He cleanse not
their hearts (lam yuridi-llahu anyutahhira qultiba-hum)
theirs in the world will be ignominy, and in the
hereafter an awful doom."
This verse is concerned with the sins (al-ma'asi )
which though committed by man, are due to the will of God
(iradat Allah) and His predetermination. Therefore, a man
has no alternative to do what he really wants to, since God
already pre-ordained his destiny. In strengthening his
Mu'tazilite view, az-Zamakhsharl maintains that God does not
will anyone to be a sinner (al-'asl), in contrast, He wills
him to be obedient (al-rautl4 ) and have a clear heart.
According to az-Zamakhsharl, the sin "committed" is a result
of his own deed, therefore, he is held responsible for it.
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Moreover, az-Zamakhsharl states that his commitment of the
sin occurred by means of God's exposing him to the trial
(fitna) and his abandonment (khidhlSn) of him and not by
directly making him do it. He whom God does not will to
cleanse his heart, He will not grant His grace since He
already knows that His grace for him would be in vain,
because he would not make use of it.^"
Ill '3:8' "Our Lord! Cause not our hearts to stray
after Thou hast guided us, and bestow upon us mercy
from Thy presence. Lo! Thou, only Thou art the
Bestower." (Rabba-na la tuzigh qulQba-na ba'da
idh hadayta-na wa hab la-na min ladun-ka rahmatan...)
Implicit in this text is that it is God who leads
astray a man or guides him while a man just follows the
will of God. Az-Zamakhsharl's interpretation of this
Qur'anic verse "Our Lord! Cause not our hearts" is that
Our Lord! do not withhold your grace from us since you
have already granted it to us. It is obvious that az-
ZamakhsharT's explanation is merely to correlate it with
his view of human will. The idea of attributing "evil
1. Ibid, I, 258. cf., vol. I, 31? (6:148) in which he
states that whoever says that the evil of unbelief
and ma'asl are the result of God's will is a liar
against God, His books and His prophets.
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things" to God can, however, be avoided since He is not
the directly responsible agent (i.e. for unbelief).^"
IV '2:272* "The guiding of them is not thy duty
(0 Muhammad), but Allah guideth whom He will."
(laysa 4alay-ka huda-hum wa lakinna-llaha yahdl
man yasha' ) .
This verse describes the function of the Prophet as
limited to conveying the message to people. The Prophet,
however, could never have the power to guide them by means
of making them believers since God is the only sole agent
who can guide whom He likes to the truth.
Az-ZainakhsharT, in consistence with his view, states
that God will guide whomsoever He already knows that His
grace would be fruitful for them (by granting to them His
grace). For az-Zamakhsharl, the "granting of the grace"
is a matter of completion of their good deed. Moreover,
"huda" is not the creation of God, but is for the men
2
themselves who have to acquire it.
V '18:17' "He whom Allah guideth, he indeed is
led aright, and he whom He sendeth astray, for him
1. Ibid, I, 137
2. Ibid, I, 127? cf., vol. I, 500 (1*1:4).
}
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thou wilt not find a guiding friend."
(man yahdi llahu fa-huwa 1-muhtadi wa man yudlil
fa-1an tajida la-hu waliyyan murshidan).
Az-ZamakhsharT maintains that this verse is concerned
with the "people of the cave" who arebeing praised by God
for their hard struggle and full submission to Him. As a
result, God granted His grace to them and led them aright.
Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharl emphasises that whoever chooses
the way adopted by "al-muhtadin" will attain the salvation
(al-falah). On the contrary, whosoever is opposed to
"khidhlan", will not find a guiding friend who will lead
him (after God's abandonment). According to az-Zamakhsh&rl,
a man cannot have a guiding friend when he is abandoned by
God, but it is not God who leads him astray.^ Therefore,
the factor leading to going aright or astray is the attitude
chosen by man himself; and the involvement of God's will
cannot be described as arbitrary. God's pre-knowledge,
however, does not affect his being led astray since he goes
2
astray by his own choice and is provoked by Satan.
VI '16:93' "Had Allah willed He could have made
you (all) one nation, but He sendeth whom He will
astray and guideth whom He will, and ye will indeed
1. Ibid, I, 565.
2. Ibid, I, 326 ( 7 :30)
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be asked of what ye used to do."
(wa law sha' Allahu la-ja'ala-kura ummatan
wahidatan wa lakin yudillu man yasha' wa
yahdl man yasha' . . . )
Az-Zamakhsharl*s interpretation of the verse is that
had God willed, He could have made you (all) one nation by
force (qasran), but God had not willed to force them to
believe even if He could do so since He gave them "free
choice". Moreover, he declares that God will grant His
grace to those whom He already knows will choose the faith
(iman). On the contrary, He will abandon (yakhdhula) those
whom He already knows will choose the "unbelief" (al-kufr).
For az-Zamakhsharl, the faith or unbelief is a matter of
man's choice and not already predestined.
The last words "Ye will indeed be asked of what ye
used to do" is a strong proof for az-Zamakhshari in
»
defence of human responsibility. Ho points out that if
God had forced people to believe or disbelieve, what is
the point of asking their deed when they had been forced
to !
Az-Zamakhsharl's rational argument, however, has
led to the concept that God is bound to do what is best
for man. Therefore, it would have been unwise for God to
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punlsh anyone whom He had forced to disbelieve.^"
Al-Baydawi on this problem represents the view
attributed to AhL.ySunna. According to ash-Shahrastani,
the people of the Sunna maintain that the justice of God
lies in His dealing as possessor and Lord, and in making
decisions according to His will as He pleases. Justice,
in fact, consists in giving things their place, and this
implies acting as Lord according to His own will and
knowledge. The opposite is injustice and it is inconceivable
that He should be wrong in His decisions and unjust in His
2
dealings. Al-Ash'arT himself says.... Allah, therefore,
is master of His croation. He does what He wishes and
decides what He desires, and if He were to send all created
beings to Paradise there would be no injustice done, or if
He sent them all to Hell there would be no tyranny. Wrong¬
doing (zulm) consists of disposing of things one does not
own or misplacing them. But since He is the absolute
owner, no wrong-doing can be imagined of Him, nor can
3
injustice be ascribed to Him.
As far as the verse * 6:126-7' is concerned, al-BaydawI
1. Ibid, I, 536. I, 433 (10:100), I, 459 (11:118-9),
II, 411-412 (51:56).
2. Milal, p. 28.
3. Ibid, p. 73 f.
affirmatively holds that he whom God wills, He guides him
to the truth (al-haqq), and makes him accept it. For
/ ""
al-BaydciwT the words "yashrah sadra-hu li-l-Islam" have
metaphorical meaning since they refer, in fact, to God's
malting the soul accept the truth. In explaining the real
meaning of the verse, al-BaydawI alludes to a prophetic
tradition saying that, "It is a light which God has thrown
into the heart of the believer through which he becomes a
believer." On the contrary, al-Baydawi continues, whomso¬
ever it is God's will to lead astray H© sways away from
accepting the truth and then he will not accept it.^"
However, al-BaydlwT maintains that belief or unbelief is
already predestined by God. Therefore, there is no room
for human freedom in choosing the right or the wrong.
Al-BaydawT's bitter attack on az-Zamakhsharl's view
of human freedom is obvious in this verse '5:^1' maintaining
that he whom God dooms to "stray" (dalal) or "disgrace"
(fadlhatu-hu), will be unable (la yastati') to refuse it
since it comes from God. Al-BaydawT, however, has a firm
reason for refuting az-Zaraakhsharl saying that "ula'ilca-
lladhTnclain yuridi llahu an yutahhira qulhba-hum" is a clear
proof for invalidating az-Zamakhsharl's view. According
1. Anwar. II, 207, HI, 8 (7:30); cf,, V, 2 6 (39:18)
in which al-BaydawI states that "guidance" is obtainable
by the act of God and the readiness of the soul to
accept it.
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to al-Baydawi if God had willed it he could have been a
believer.^ Al-Baydawi's interpretation of removing the
rationalistic view of az-Zamakhsharl makes the scope of
understanding the verse more orthodox, dependent merely
on God's will, without giving new effort to man to improve
his own responsibility.
As far as verse '3*8' is concerned, al-Baydawi
maintains that it is God who leads man astray so a man
has always to pray to God for His "guidance" in order
that He will not discontinue it (i.e. guidance). It is
understandable that without the continuity of His guidance,
human effort in keeping it will be in vain. For al-
Baydawi guidance is a divine gift, and not acquired. In
order to strengthen his view, al-BaydawI refers to a
prophetic tradition saying that the heart of the believer
2
is between the fingers of the Merciful. Therefore, it is
1. Ibid, II, 150; cf., II', 207-8 (6:126) in which al-
BaydawT maintains that everything that happens in this
world is due to God's predestination since the able
is God alone. cf., IV, 91 (25J20), al-BaydawT states
that "fitna" (test) to particular people such a3 the
prophets etc. is already predestined by God.
2. Ibid, II, 5.
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not surprising that al-BaydawT denies the concept of
human freedom since he believes that all things are
already fixed by God while man only follows what has been
predetermined.
Commenting on the Qur'anic verse '2:272' al-BaydawT
says that "guidance" comes only from God, and He guides or
leads astray whom He likes. The task of the Prophet is
restricted to telling people the truth and cannot make
them become believers since God alone is the mainstream of
guidance.^"
As far as verse '18:17' is concerned, al-BaydawT,
however, places emphasis on God's succour (tawfxq). He who
is granted the succour will become a believer, otherwise,
he will be led astray.^
With regard to the verse '15 :93' al-Baydawl maintains
that God had not willed all people to be believers, other¬
wise they could have been Muslims. Al-BaydawT'3 inter¬
pretation of the words, "And ye will indeed be asked of
what ye asked to do" is rather peculiar compared to
previous ones, since he understands that the verse should
1. Ibid, I, 2.66; cf. , III, 1^7 (13:7), al-Baydawl
states that God did not will to guide them because they
were already predestined to be disbelievers. cf. IV,
156 (32:13).
2. Ibid, III, 218.
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be taken as metaphorical expression and as a matter of
rebuke.^ While az-Zamakhshari has interpreted the verse
in discussion literally, it is obvious that al -Bayd awT • s
avoidance of such interpretation is primarily to widen
the way to the omnipotence of God by narrowing it to
human freedom.
Here are some passages from the Qur'anic verses
used by az-Zamakhsharl in conformity with his view of
the human free-will and al-Baydawi's refutation against
it:
I '25*17-18' "Upon the day when He shall muster
them and that they serve, apart from God, and He
shall say, 'Was it you that led these My servants
astray, or did they themselves err from the way?'
(fa-yaqulu a antum adlaltum 4ibadT ha'ula'i am hum
dalin s-sablla?) They shall say, 'Glory be to Thee J
it did not behove us to take unto ourselves protect¬
ors apart from Thee; (qalu subhana-ka ma kana
yanbaghi lana an nattakhidha min duni-ka min awliya')
but Thou gavest them and their fathers enjoyment of
days, until they forgot the remembrance, and were
a people corrupt.' "
1 Ibid, III, 190.
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These verses clearly show that the angels, the
prophets, etc. are not responsible for t-he-^e=atss^=^- leading
people astray (idlal). It is up to them to decide their
own destiny. This, however, gives a real support to
az-Zamakhshari in which he maintains that if the attribu¬
tion of leading astray is strongly denied by the angels,
the prophets and what they serve apart from God (wa ml
ya'budun) in their own words, "Glory be to Theet it did
not behove us to take unto ourselves protectors apart
from Thee" while replying to God's question, "Was it you
that led my servants astray..? az-Zamakhsharl argues, God
is definitely far removed from it (idlal). According to
az-Zamakhsharl, the very nature of God's question followed
by their own answer is to show the falsity of their
attributing dalal to their worshipped things (ma'bTidati-
him) since God already knows everything from its eternity.
Az-Zamakhsharl, however, maintains that God does not lead
people astray in reality (haqlqatan) because it is a man's
own choice besides the initiative of Satan. If dalal is
applied to God, it should be understood as metaphorical.
Further, az-Zamakhsharl argues that if God does lead man
astray in reality, the answer to God's question in the
verse should be, "It was You (God) who led them astray"
(bal anta adlalta -hum). Therefore, man must have free
will in determining his own destiny.^"
1. Al-Kashshaf, II, 105
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II •14:22* "And Satan says, when the issue is
decided, God surely promised you a true promise;
and I promised you, then I failed you, for I had
no authority over you, but that I called you, and
you answered me. So do not blame me, (fa-lS tallimli-
nl), but blame yourselves; (wa lTJma anfusa-kura) I
cannot aid you, neither can you aid me. I disbelieved
in you associating me with God aforetime."
As far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl
strongly maintains that man is a free agent to act
according to his own choice; whether to choose "bad luck"
(ash-shaqawa) or "good luck" (as-sa'ada). God plays no
major role in deciding man's fate as well as Satan.
Az-Zatnakhshari calls the role played by God as " at-Tamkln"
(to make it able) while the role played by Satan is called
" at-Tazyln" (to decorate). The pivota.l point of az-
ZamakhsharT*s concentration, however, is on the words
v*"So do not blame me, but blaine yourself" in which he
argues that if the case, as it was claimed by the Ash'arites,
that God is the creator of dalal and so on, Satan would• *
have said, "So do not blame me and yourselves" (Pa-la
talumhnl wa la anfusa-kum) since God had predetermined
your unbelief and compelled you to it. To prove that
Satan has, at lea3t, the role of tazyxn, az-Zaraakhshari
equates the words, "I had no authority over you" (wa ml.
kana II ' alay-kum min Sultan) with the verse ' 15 s42 My
}
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servants thou shalt have no authority, except those that
follow thee, being perverse (ilia man ittaba'a-ka minal-
ghawln)."^ However, az-Zaraakhsharl is convinced that
Satan's argument in the verse is real and supports his
view of human free will.
Al-Baydawl in confrontation with the verses which
indicate human free will, tries to use the intermediate
cause between God and man as a means of finding a solution
to his predestinarian view. This is what he calls
o
"al-kasb" (acquisition).
As far as the verse '25*17-18' is concerned, al-
Baydawl maintains that the attribution of dalltl to God as
well as to the unbelievers through their own deeds (bi-
kasbi-him) in the verse, is the belief of the Ash'arites.
Therefore, it does not fully support the view of human
3
free will since dalal is a product of both God and man.
However, al-BaydawT seems to have difficulty in defending
his view of God's pre-ordination, and has to admit that
1. Ibid, I, 505; cf. vol. I, pp. 316-17 (6:148-9), for
az-Zamakhshari's rejection of the causative role of
Satan, cf., for instance, vol. I, 144-5 (38;82-3),
vol. I, 134 (2:386).
2. Anwar. I, 273 (2:86), III, 93 (10:44), III, 98 (10:74),
III, 189-90 (16:90).
3. Ibid, IV, 91.
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the verse in discussion is against the pure prodestinarian
view.
The same difficulty faces al-Baydawi concerning the
verse^ 114:22' in which he says that the verse is not a
good proof for the Mu'tazilites in supporting their view.
Perhaps it refers to the fact that man's capacity in
choosing dalal, according to al-Baydawx, is endowed by
God to man while man acquires it, therefore man is not an
absolute agent of free will.
Human acts (af'al al-'ibad)
As ash-Shahrastanl says: The Mu'tazilites are agreed
that man can and does create his good and evil deeds, so
as to merit reward or punishment in the next world.
Therefore, the Mu'tazilites had to deny that God wills all
the acts of men, good as well as evil, for they maintained
that God cannot will the disobedient acts of men.
As far as human acts are concerned, az-Zamakhshari
1. Ibid, III, 159, cf., vol. II, pp. 312-313 (6:148-9)
in which al-Baydawl admits that the verse is a good
proof for the Mu'tazilites in supporting their' view of
free will.
2. Mllal, p. 30.
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maintains that man is jki£ author t-e his ovm deeds since he
is to be hold responsible for reward or punishment. The
main focus of concentration regarding the subject-matter
refers to the Qur'anic verse '37*96', "When Allah hath
created you and what ye make." (wa ma ta'maltin). In order
to explain this, az-Zamakhsharl endeavours to set forth
the verse before it '37595'• "We said? Worship ye that
which ye yourselves do carve (raa tanhattm). After all,
he declares that this verse '37s95' is equivalent to the
verse '21:56' "He said: Nay, but your Lord is the Lord of
thy heavens and the earth, who created them (idols)
(alladhl fatara-hunna); and I am of those who testify
unto that."
Az-Zamakhshari's main purpose in bringing the two
verses together is to maintain that "ma" in the verse
'37196' as "al-mawsuliyya" (definite conjunctive) -as
similar to "alladhl fatara-hunna" in the verse '21:56*
and not "al-masdariyya" (infinitive noun) as understood by
the Ash'arites. Therefore the verse should mean God
created you and created your idols in particular, not (all)
that you do (i.e. your acts). Az~ZamakhsharI admits that
the substance of the idols was created by God, while man
only carved them.
In order to maintain that "ma" in the verse as
"al-raawsTiliyya" and not "al-masdariyya", az-Zamakhsharl
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introduces the following arguments:
I He says that it is contradictory to Reason
(al-'aql) and the Qur'an, since if it is thought
that God has stated that the worshipper (al-'abid)
and the worshipped (al-ma*bud) (i.e. idol) are His
creation, how can a creature (al-makhluq) worship
another creature (al-makhlPq) while one of them
carves and decorates the other!
II To say that "God has created you and (created)
your deed" is not reasonably since it is not an
argument against them (i.e. disbelievers). On the
other hand, it has no conformity (tibaq) with what
you have already said, especially the words "wa ma
ta'malun" which are an interpretation of the words
"wa ma tanhatGn"♦ Furthermore, az-Zamakhsharl
considered that those who mako "ma" as the "al-masdariyya"
are prejudiced without having enough knowledge of the
science of rhetoric and the style of the Qur'an.^
In contradistinction to the Mu4tazilites, the Ash'arites
reduced human acts to the point where it became almost
1. Al-Kashshaf. II, 266-7; cf., vol. I, p. h9k (13x6)
II, 477 (67:13).
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illusion; they maintain that an act is created by God and
acquired by man, then they call it "acquisition" (al-kasb) .**"
As far as the verse '37s96* is concerned, al-BaydawT
asserts that acts of man are created by God while man is
empowered to do the acts, but his acts are dependent on
incentives (dawa'a) and the materials (al-*udad). On the
other hand, he says that if the particle "ma" in the verse
is for "al-raasdariyya", it should be understood in a
metaphorical sense. Al-Baydawl goes on to maintain that
the words "ma ta'malun" are to mean the "event" (al-hadath).
Moreover, he says that if the acts of men are God's
creation, that- such acts whicii are dependent upon them
(i.e. men) are also created. Al-Baydawl emphatically states
that the last meaning (event) is the most reasonable, by
2
which he means "al-kasb".
To strengthen his view, al-BaydawT tries to refute
the Mu'tazilites regarding human acts as follows!
I If in the time of action, a man is not able to
leave the act undone, he will be compelled (majbtSran)
1. UsTil, pp. 134-7 5 cf,, Watt, "The Origin of the Islamic
Doctrine of Acquisition" in JRAS, 1943» especially
pp. 246-7.
2. Anwar, V, 8.
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and not frae to act. If he is able to leave it undone,
that means that he needs a specializer (inukhassis) to
make him able to do the act, and not leave it. In
this case, this specializer will need another special—
izer and so on... which is impossible.
II If a man were a creator of his acts out of free
choice, he would have a detailed knowledge of the
acts, but this is not the case in man's action.
III If a man is a free agent, and his will contradicts
God's will, either the two wills would be fulfilled
or both wills would not be fulfilled, or one of them
fulfills the other without "propendorator" (murajjih).^
It seems for al-BaydawI that all the alternatives
are impossible.
According to al-Baydawi, human acts result from the
2
power of God and the acquisition of man. However, he
admits that his preference for his theory of Al-Kasb is
due to the fact that Al-Kasb is a moderate position between
compulsion ( al-.j abr) and free will (al-qadar)
1. Tawali', p. 82; Misbah, fol. 206a, 207b.
2. Tawali', p. 84; Minhaj al-Wusul, 73; Anwar. Ill, 93
(10:74), III, 15 9~~TT4:22).
3. Anwar, III, 189 (l6:90). He maintains that God always
asks his servant to be moderate, especially regarding
tjae doctrino.
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Tho "sealing of the heart" (al-khatm)
Tho sealing of tho heart is one of the main issues in
az-Zamakhsharx*s theology since it is against the principle
of justice. Az-Zamakhsharl as a Mu'tazilite, tries to
transcend God from any act of evil because God already
knows that such a thing would not necessitate Him. How¬
ever, a question arises when God says, *2:7' "Allah has
sealed (khatama) their hearing and their hearts, and on
their eyes there is a covering, theirs will be an awful
doom."
Whether they are warned or not, this verse clarifies
that it is all one for the disbelievers, since God has
sealed their hearing and their hearts. Again, this verse
shows that the basis of their disbelief was due to God's
will.
A3 far as this verse is concerned, az-Zamakhsharl
tries to explain it carefully by saying that the meaning
of the khatm should be taken to imply metaphorical sense
(majaz). According to az-Zamakhsharl, the word "khatm"
has two alternatives. When it is applied to God, it will
give a metaphorical meaning, and while applying to His
creatures, it will mean literal ones (haqxqa).
In order to avoid the real attribution of khatm to
God, he has to set forth various ways cf its interpret—
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ation as follows:
I Due to their (disbelievers) stubbornness and
denial of the truth, God told them that their hearts
were sealed as if they were characterised to behave in
such a way. In other words, "khatm" was a result of
disbelievers' action, and not prior to it.
II Khatm should be taken as a metaphorical expression,
since their hearts were empty of intelligence (fitan),
so it does not mean to prevent them from believing
or force them to disbelieve.
III The real author of khatm was Satan or disbeliever.
God attributed such a word to Himself, because it is
He who empowered Satan or disbeliever to do so.
IV The impossibility of being believers for them,
are not existent except by force (qasran), so God
expressed their "impossibility" with "khatm" as the
ultimate aim of their stubbornness and their disbelief.
V It should be read in conjunction with the
declaration of the Jews that '^1:5' "Our hearts are
protected from that unto which thou (0 Mohammad)
callest us, and in our ears there is a deafness, and
between us and thee there is a veil. Act, then, lol
we also shall be acting." Likewise '98:1' "Those
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who disbelieve among the people of the scripture and
the idolaters could not have left off (erring) till
the clear proof came unto them" by which they were
not responsible to thoir disbelief since it was
impossible for them to gain access to truth owing to
the covering on their hearts. To this, az-ZamakhsharT
says it is like the ones who believe in " ,j abr" . In
reply to this, God told them that their hearts have
been impressed with disbelief because of their
persistent refusal to accept truth and not because
their hearts had been wrapped up from the beginning
in such a way as to render t;hem incapable of
listening to truth.
As far as khatm is concerned, al-Baydav/T, like other
Ash'arites, affirmatively maintains that all things come
from God. Therefore the word "khatm" in the verse means
2
the real sealing.
Al-BaydawT appears to have produced nothing about hi3
own view regarding the subject-matter, apart from describ¬
ing the difference between az-Zamakhshari's and his own
stand.
1. Al-Kashshaf, I, 21—23$ cf,, Siddiqi, M. "Some aspects
of the Mu'tazili interpretation of the Qur'an" in
Islamic Studies, vol. II, 1963, p. 109.
2. Anwar, I, 7U.
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The conclusion is reached that on most points al-
Baydawl refutes az-Zainakhshari, but that he sometimes makes
no comment on the latter's views and sometimes admits the
weak points in his own case. This is then illustrated in
detail.
Az-Zamakhsharl13 rejection of the eternal attributes
of God in order that nothing apart from God should partake
in eternity is strongly attacked by al-Baydawi, since he
maintains that to say that God has eternal attributes i3
not implying something besides God partaking in eternity
because there is a difference between the equalisation of the
eternal essence (dhat al-qadxma) and the eternal attributes-
(sifat al-qadima). For the former it lead3 to unbelief
while the latter does not.
Az-Zamakhshari1s rational argument of his denial of
the vision of God in general, besides his religious arguments,
is based on his belief that only body and accident can bo
perceived by vision. Since God, the Almighty, i3 neither
body nor accident, the vision of Him is impossible. Al-
BaydawT maintains that vision of Him is possible. For instance,
ho argued that the denial of vision in general does not imply
the denial of vision absolutely. Therefore the vision is
possible for the next world for certain believers.
Regarding the speech of God, az-Zamakhsharl maintains
that "it" is created; it consists of a word and a voice and
can therefore be heard, while al-Bayd&wl strongly opposes
the view saying that God's speech is an idea inherent in
His essence which is entirely different from His knowledge
and His will.
Concerning Reason and Revelation, az-Zamakhsharl
maintains that the knowledge of God is made obligatory upon
man by Reason without the assistance of Revelation, since
Reason is self-sufficient; a guide to the truth. The coming
of the prophets, in accordance with az-Zamakhshari, i3 only
to remind people of what they have forgotten about the
necessity of Reflection, while al-Baydawx opposes this view,
saying that the knowledge of God is made obligatory by
Revelation. The obligatory nature of the knowledge of God
has nothing to do with Reason, since the verse '17il5*
evidently denies the occurrence of divine punishment before
the coming of the prophetic calls. Therefore, the sending
of the prophets, according to al-BaydawT, is a completion
of God's revelation.
Az-Zamakhshari's view that human reason is capable of
knowing the right and the wrong, leads him to believe that
God is bound to do what is best for man. Goodness or badness
are real qualities inherent in things which are rationally
known to be good or bad. Al-BaydawT, however, rejects the
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principlo of "the best" and considers that the goodness or
badness of a thing is not a real quality inherent in them,
but a function of the divine will.
Az-ZamakhsharT's view that God would not produce
"unlawful sustenance" since God has attributed the rizq to
Himself, is criticised by al-Baydawx who maintains that
God's attribution of rizq to Himself is for glorification.
Furthermore, al-BaydawX argues that if it were not called
rizq, the consumer would not be called "one sustained" at
any time in his life.
Concerning the superiority of all the angels over the
prophets due to their humble obedience and their creation
as maintained by az-Zamakhsharx, al-Baydawl attacks this
view, although he confesses that the archangels (al-khawwas)
are superior to human beings in general. Al-Baydawx argues
that since human beings are not naturally created to be
obedient like the angels, it would be difficult for them
to fulfil the religious obligations. Therefore, their
deeds are highly appreciated and deserve great reward.
Another main reason given by al-Baydawx is that it is not
necessary to consider that the superiority of a group of
tVvs h Vv
angels over the prophets,, infers looking down upon some of
the prophets. Adam is superior to certain angels (i.e. who
fell prostrate before him), while the Prophet Muhammad and
Jesus (peace be upon them) are superior to all the angels.
Therefore, al-Baydawi firmly adopts a moderate view between
the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites.
The basis of az-Zamakhshari's denial of the miracles
of the saints refers to his interpretation of the word
rasQl in the verse '72:26,27', in which he interprets it
as meaning "messenger", therefore, the miracle is only for
the prophets. Al-Baydawi, on the other hand, interprets
it as the angel (al-malak), hence, it implies that the
karama is not impossible for anyone who has been chosen by
God, even though he is not a prophet. Therefore, the
karama based on al-Baydawi.'s argument is also possible for
the saints.
The question of who is a believer is one of the main
centres of controversy between the two scholars.
Al-Baydawi's definition of Iman As only assent (tasdiq)
excluding words and works as maintained by az-Zamakhshari,
leads to his different treatment regarding the fate of the
grave sinner and its relevance. Al-Baydawi strongly maintains
that the unrepentant grave sinner will not be eternally
punished since his character as the believer could not be
removed so long as it was ascribed to the tasdiq of which
was called Iman. Az-Zamakhshari, on the other hand,
maintains that he will be eternally punished, since he is in
the intermediate position. Al-Baydawi's concentration on
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ta3dTq, however, is to include the grave sinner as a member
of the Islamic community. Therefore, it is an attempt to
reject az-ZamakhsharT's doctrine of the intermediate
position.
Az-ZamakhsharT•s emphasis on the necessity of
punishment before repentance and forgiveness after repent¬
ance is strongly criticised by al-BaydawT, since he considers
it as reservation without having substantiated it by the
burden of proof. Therefore, it implies weakness.
Az-ZamakhsharT's concept of Ihbat and TakfTr, that
good works will be negated by the grave sins and unbelief,
and that God is bound to forgive when the grave sins are
avoided, respectively, are exposed to al-BaydawT's attack
since he maintains that the concept of Ihbat should be
applied only to a man in his state of unbelief, while in
TakfTr, al-BaydawT maintains that it is not necessary for
God to forgive when the grave sins are avoided, since it
is totally dependent upon God's will.
As far as Intercession is concerned, both az—
ZamakhsharT and al-BaydawT agreed that it should take place
in the next world. But the question i3 to whom it would be
granted and what its objective would be. Az-ZamakhsharT
maintains that Intercession will be granted only to the
believers whom God sanctions. And the purpose of Inter-
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cession is to increase the grace among the believers, not
the grave sinners. Al-Baydawx opposes the view of az~
Zamakhsharl and maintains that it is for the believers,
including the grave sinners in order to free them from
punishment.
The dispute between az-Zamakhshari and al-BaydawT
concerning the concept of God's justice, however*, refers
to their different definitions of God's justice itself.
For az-ZamakhsharT, God's justice implies "human free will".
Therefore, he explains away the Qur'anic verses which
stressed* God's omnipotence fav^God'a hand and make man a
responsible being. For az-Zamakhsharl, the guidance,
leading astray, sealing of the hearts and human acts, should
not really be attributed to God, since it implies the
invalidity of human free will. Therefore, the factor
leading to going aright or astray is the attitude chosen
by man himself, and the involvement of God's will cannot
be described as arbitrary.
Al-Baydawx, who is mostly in line with the Ash'aritos,
disagrees with the view of az-Zamakhshari, and maintains
that God's justice lies in His dealing as possessor and
Lord, and in making decision according to His will. For
a1 —Baydawx to say that man is a free agent would mean that
God is not absolute. Therefore, guidance, leading astray, and
sealing of the heart, should be really attributed to God.
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Concerning the verses which support God's justice,
al-Baydawl alludes to the theory of al-kasb in x«rhich man.
is empowered by God to do his acts, therefore, he is not a
free agent.
In general, al-Baydawi's interpretations which remove
the rationalistic views of az-Zamakhshari make the under¬
standing of the verses more orthodox, dependent merely on
God's will without giving new effort to man in order to
improve his own responsibility.
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